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ABSTRACT
Determiner phrases have the ability to act as "concealed questions" (CQs), embedded questions
in sentences like John knows the time (i.e., John knows what time it is). The fact that know and
wonder differ in their ability to embed CQs partially motivated the hypothesis (Grimshaw 1979)
that verbs select the possible syntactic categories of their complements independently of
selection for the semantic type of their complements. Theories of CQ meaning generally follow
Grimshaw in assuming them to denote questions, or else take them to denote individual concepts
(intensions of individuals; Heim 1979, Romero 2005). This dissertation argue that the former
assumption does not easily describe the semantically conditioned distribution of CQs, which can
be embedded under only those verbs which allow propositional complements as well as question
complements. The latter assumption, on the other hand, incorrectly predicts that any DP with an
individual concept meaning can be used as a CQ.
We therefore need a new theory of CQ denotations, and this dissertation proposes that CQs
denote propositions, so that the time in John knows the time actually denotes the proposition that
the time is x, where x has the value of whatever the current time might be. In this theory,
relatively little machinery is required to restrict the distribution of CQs, and it is possible to
restrict propositional denotations to only those DPs which can act as CQs, using facts about
relational nouns and the composition of relative clause modification.
Thesis Supervisor: Kai von Fintel
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FOREWORD: HOW TO READ THIS DISSERTATION
I have kept this dissertation as neutral as possible with respect to the syntax. That is to say, very
little of the proposals herein rely on one or another particular syntactic theory. I have drawn trees
in a GB/Minimalist style and have expressed certain points in terms of movement, but these
decisions result less from a theoretical need for category labels and movement and more from
familiarity and a desire to maintain continuity with earlier work.
As a result, I have used certain category labels throughout, most notably DP for
determiner phrases such as the governor of Vermont or every New England governor and NP for
noun phrases such as governor of Vermont or New England governor. This need not be taken to
reflect any particular theory of constituency or architecture; I use DP and NP primarily as labels,
to maintain an often-necessary distinction between the two levels. Additionally, for ease of
reading, I have translated the syntactic node labels of earlier authors. In particular, I will
consistently use IP and CP for nodes earlier authors labeled S, and will refer to points authors
made about the DP or NP even when their actual writing concerns, say, the NP and N'.
Semantically, I have used a type-driven framework like the one spelled out in Heim and
Kratzer (1998). (I also follow Heim and Kratzer in switching more or less casually between
speaking of semantic objects as sets or as their characteristic functions.) The two primary
semantic operations are function application and predicate modification:
(1) Function Application
If y has daughters a an d, and [tal] e D(,,,) and 1[f3I1 e Do, then [Y)1 = 1E(I[PI3])
Predicate Modification
If y has daughters a and 3, and I[aT], [3I cE D(o, ), then [I]1 = Xxo . I[cal(x) A 1[[J31(x)
The semantic interpretation brackets [I...JI are shorthand for 1[..."' ", i.e. [[textJ indicates the
denotation of text (or properly, a binary branching structure for text) with an assignment function
g at a world and time index w. As nothing here will rely on unbound variables and as variables
will be left unbound only very briefly and locally, I will always leave g implicit. On the other
hand, I will sometimes include the world and time index, particularly when it is bound:
[lsleeps] = x . x sleeps
[[sleepsl] = Lxe . x sleeps at w
Xw . [[sleeps]]w = Xwl . xxe .x sleeps at wl
Additionally, as I will be working within an extensional framework, certain derivations require
intensionalized versions of the operations in (1). Primary among these:
(2) Intensional Function Application
If y has daughters o and 0, and [fall" E D((, c),' and [II3]w e Do, then
[IYW = e -ai W(Xw . 13 1w)
As with other operations, the intensional versions are type-driven.
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Full derivations will consist of a series of lines, each line numbered (with the numbers
corresponding to the node labels in the tree provided) and indicating the source of the meaning in
that step: [1...]] indicates a lexical entry; qp(W) indicates a meaning derived by applying step (p to
step V via function application; p A V indicates a meaning derived by combining steps (p and V
via predicate modification, and A(p indicating (for historical reasons) intensionalization.
To aid understanding, each line in a derivation will include the semantic type of that
step's denotation. Semantic types are expressed in the usual way: e for individuals, t for truth
values, s for world/time indices, c and t as placeholders where type is unknown or ambiguous
(as in the (a, T) type used above). I use one conventionalized shortcut when writing semantic
types: on their own in text, (e, t), (s, t), and (s, e) will appear in full to set them apart, but when
part of a larger function or when subscripted to indicate a variable type they will often be written
et, st, and se respectively. For instance, ((e, t), ((e, t), t)) will typically appear as (et, (et, t)); P(e, t)
will most often be written Pet.
As with syntactic node labels, previous papers on this topic have used widely varying
semantic representations. Once again, in the interest of clarity and consistency, I have translated
other people's logical formulae into the notation used throughout this dissertation. Part of this
process of modernizing notation is abandoning the fairly familiar ^ and " operators of Montague
semantics. Intensions will be written as explicit X-abstraction, so that the intension of Fred
knows p, whose extension is
[[Fred knows p"W = 1 iff Vwl E DOXfred(W) [p(w 1) = p(w)]
is written as the first of the following formulae, and not the second:
Xw [[Fred knows p]"W = w2 . Vw l  DOXfred(W2) [p(wl) = p(w 2)]
A [[Fred knows p] = A[ Vwl E Doxfred(wo) [p(w) = p(wo0)l
or more commonly,
[[Fred knows Pl(s, t) = •w 2 . VWl E Doxfred(w2) [p(w) = p(w 2)]
Similarly, the extension of an object will involve the explicit inclusion of the variable wo (or
another appropriate world variable), so that the extension of a proposition p is p(wo) and not "p.
Past papers have used different variables for different semantic types-e.g., u and v for
individuals, x and y for intensions of individuals (Janssen 1984); or x and y for individuals, x and
y for intensions of individuals (Romero 2005). In this dissertation the only variable names that
indicate their types are d, a variable over degrees, and w and t, variables over indices of type s
(with t used when the world is constant and only different times are being considered). In
formulae with only one world or time variable, w or t may be used; otherwise, the variables will
have subscripts, with wo and to indicating the actual world.
Certain other variables may be used in typical ways-p and q for variables over
propositions, P as a variable over sets of individuals-but for clarity, the first occurrence of a
variable in a formula (other than d, w, or t) will have its type given as a subscript, e.g.:
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[[ every, (et, e,,,))A = XPet -XQet. VXe . [P(x) - Q(x)]
[[every((,t, t), ((st, t), t))ZD = XP(st, t) . Q(st, t) - Vpst - [P(p) -* Q(p)]
Traces also have their types indicated by subscripts, as do lexical items with more than one type
when disambiguation is needed (as with the two senses of every above).
To distinguish particular senses of a word while leaving open the exact type, a
subscripted word may be used: [the governor of California]individual means "the phrase the
governor of California, used to denote the individual who is the governor" and [the governor of
California]cQ means "the phrase the governor of California, used to denote the concealed
question 'who the governor is"'. Similarly, knowindividual and knowcQ mean, respectively, "the
sense of know that takes an individual as its complement" and "the sense of know that takes a
concealed question as its complement."
For ease of reference: this dissertation uses the following abbreviations for linguistic terms (as










abstract/concrete relational noun - §4.2.3
Concealed Question - § 1.1
Individual Concept - §3.2
Interrogative Raising - §5.1
the Proposition/Concealed Question Correlation - §2.3
Positive/Negative Epistemic Commitment - §2.3.1
the Quantificational Variability Effect - §5.1
relational/nonrelational noun - §4.1
Specificational Subject - §6.2
Additionally, Beck and Sharvit (2002) is abbreviated B&S, and Dowty, Wall, and Peters (1981)
is abbreviated DWP. Finally, many example sentences refer to USNDH, which is the (wholly
fictional) University of Southern North Dakota at Hoople.
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION
1.1. Scope of the Dissertation
The observation that determiner phrases can act as indirect questions dates back to Baker (1968).
The sentences in (1) provide a few examples and help illustrate the intuitions about their
meanings.
(1) a. Kim knows the governor of California.
b. Leslie has forgotten the capital of Vermont.
c. Sandy told me the time of the meeting.
The relevant readings for this dissertation are those in which the DPs are treated as questions:
Kim knows who the governor of California is, or Leslie has forgotten what the capital of
Vermont is. Determiner phrases used in this way are known as concealed questions (CQs).
Over the ensuing four decades, a number of different meanings have been proposed for
CQs, beginning with the theory that CQs derive transformationally from clausal questions and
have the same meaning as their clausal counterparts. Two distributional questions have emerged
over the course of this exploration, each theory of meaning coupled with an answer to one or the
other. First, which predicates can take CQs as complements? Though the italicized DPs in (1)
seem to denote questions, they cannot be arguments of all question-embedding predicates.
(2) a. John knows the capital of Vermont.
b. * John wonders the capital of Vermont.
If CQs have the same denotation as clausal questions, we would expect them to be compatible
with wonder, which takes a clausal question as its complement.
Second, which nouns can serve as CQs under which circumstances? Clearly (the)
governor/capital/time (of) all have CQ interpretations, but not every noun does. Even with an
equal pragmatic bias in the context, the department head and the semanticist differ in their ability
to have question meanings.
(3) a. The department of linguistics at the University of Southern North Dakota,
Hoople, has (like most others) a single head.
John told me the department head.
b. The USNDH linguistics department has a single semanticist.
* John told me the semanticist.
Compare the second sentence of (3b) to a variant with a full question, John told me who the
semanticist is. That sentence is grammatical and is a natural continuation of the dialogue, and yet
the semanticist cannot mean who the semanticist is in (3b). On the other hand, the noun
semanticist does not per se exclude a question meaning:
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(3) b'. The USNDH linguistics department has a single semanticist.
? John told me the semanticist who teaches there.
In this context, the DP the semanticist who teaches here does have a question meaning; the
second sentence of (3b') is equivalent to John told me which semanticist teaches there.
Over the course of this dissertation, I will show that previous theories of CQ meanings do
not provide adequate answers to these questions. Consequently, I propose that concealed
questions denote propositions, roughly as in (4).1
(4) The Meaning of Concealed Questions
[[the NP]I = tpt . [[Xe .p = wl . [INP]w"' (x)] A C(p)]
"the NP" denotes the unique (maximal) proposition such that
(a) for some individual x, the proposition is the set of worlds such that NP is true of x
in that world, and
(b) the proposition meets a contextual restriction C (most frequently, the restriction is
that the proposition is true)
For example, [[the governor of California] is the unique true proposition such that, for some
individual x, the proposition expresses that x is a governor of California. There are many
propositions of the form "x is a governor of California", but the only true one at the time of this
writing is that Arnold Schwarzenegger is a governor of California. This captures the truth
conditions of Kim knows the governor of California, which will be true if Kim knows the
proposition that Schwarzenegger is the governor of California.
The theory that CQs denote propositions, like previous theories of CQ meanings,
produces the correct truth conditions for basic sentences like those in (1). I will show in this
dissertation that it also yields the correct truth conditions for the full range of sentences with
concealed questions. It has the added advantage that, unlike previous theories of CQ meanings, it
allows a natural account of the facts in both (2) and (3), based on the following two
generalizations. First, CQs have a predictable distribution:
(5) The Distribution of Concealed Questions: The Proposition/CQ Correlation2
A concealed question can fill a predicate's argument position if and only if
(a) the Case requirements of the position are met, and
(b) a (clausal) question can fill the position, and
(c) a (clausal) proposition can fill the position.
Having CQs denote propositions provides a way to describe this generalization in a way that, as
we will see in Chapter 2, having CQs denote questions does not. And second, CQs have a
predictable form:
Or rather, CQs with definite determiners. Nearly all CQs discussed in previous literature have either a
definite article (the price of milk) or a possessive pronoun with the same effect (John'sfavorite drink). Heim (1979)
also mentions everything that John does, and discusses methods for getting John knows Bill's phone number to
follow from John knows every phone number. I will return to CQs with determiners other than the in Chapter 4. In
the interim, the meaning in (4) is the one to keep in mind as the dissertation progresses.
2 Henceforth referred to as the PCQC, pronounced Pickwick.
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(6) The Form of Concealed Questions
A DP can be a concealed question if:
(a) its head noun is relational: it expresses a relationship between two individuals
(e.g. a state and its governor, a commodity and its price), or
(b) its head noun is nonrelational, but is modified in certain ways (e.g. with a relative
clause)
Deriving propositional denotations allows these restrictions to be encoded in the compositional
semantics in a way that, as we will see in Chapter 3, using individual denotations or their
intensions does not.
These facts will come together in Chapter 4. The remainder of this chapter serves as a
launching pad for the exploration in the rest of the dissertation. §1.2 lays out some basic facts
about CQ interpretation, focusing on constructions that look like CQs but in fact are not; the
ways in which they differ will provide a starting point for understanding the meaning of CQs and
the predicates that embed them. § 1.3 provides a road map of the chapters to follow.
1.2. A Few Things That Aren't Concealed Questions
As a prelude to an investigation of CQ meanings, we should take a moment to understand what
is, and what is not, a CQ. While deriving the meanings of CQs will be the focus of later chapters,
this section focuses on what those meanings are. In particular, we will distinguish predicates that
embed CQs from similar predicates that do not, and distinguish DPs that are CQs from similar
DPs that are not; and see that the question meanings that CQs seem to have are only the
meanings of identity questions. 3
1.2.1. CQ-embedding senses of predicates vs. individual-embedding senses
How do we recognize a DP being used as a concealed question? Consider again two of the
sentences in (1).
(1) a. Kim knows the governor of California.
b. Leslie has forgotten the capital of Vermont.
I claimed above that the italicized DPs have the meanings of questions, e.g. who the governor of
California is. In fact, (la) and (lb) are ambiguous; while the DPs may have these question
meanings, they can also denote individuals, as in the following approximate paraphrases:
(7) a. Kim is friends with the governor of California.
b. Leslie no longer has memories of the capital of Vermont.
However, these meanings of the sentences in (1) are irrelevant to understanding CQs, as the two
readings of each sentence use two different senses of the each verb, a "be familiar with" sense of
3 As mentioned above, I am ultimately claiming that CQs denote identity propositions and not questions.
However, I will continue speak of question meanings and paraphrases in this chapter, in order to maintain continuity
with earlier literature and to avoid biasing the discussion against older theories from the outset.
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know or "no longer be familiar with" sense of forget used in (7), and a "hold knowledge about"
sense of know or "no longer hold knowledge about" sense of forget used with CQ meanings.
A number of facts demonstrate that the predicates have two different senses. First, the
two readings have independent truth conditions; neither is a special case of the other. Suppose
that Kim is friends with Arnold Schwarzenegger from his movie days, but she's been out of the
country for a few years and has no idea that he's been elected governor of California. Then (la)
is true with the individual-denoting meaning of the DP, but false with the CQ-meaning. On the
other hand, suppose that Kim has never met Arnold Schwarzenegger, and indeed dislikes action
movies so much that she wouldn't even be able to distinguish him in appearance from Jean-
Claude van Damme or Vin Diesel. Nevertheless, she knows that he's the governor of California.
Then (la) is false with the individual-denoting meaning of the DP, but true with the CQ-
meaning. Equivalent arguments demonstrate the independence of the two senses of other
predicates (e.g. forget in (ib)).
Second, the two senses of the predicates differ as to whether substituting a coextensional
DP preserves meaning. Replacing the DP with the rigid designator that names its extension-
which for, e.g., (la)-(lb) gives Kim knows Arnold Schwarzenegger and Leslie has forgotten
Montpelier-results in sentences with only the "(no longer) be familiar with" readings in (7), and
without the "(no longer) know a fact" CQ readings at all. Heim (1979) makes a similar
observation about substituting a coreferential definite description:
(8) John knows the capital of Italy.
The capital of Italy is the largest town in Italy.
F-John knows the largest town in Italy.
The entailment holds for the "be familiar with" know which embeds an individual-denoting DP,
but not for the "know a fact" know which embeds a CQ.
Third, Heim (1979) gives reasons to believe that these verbs are lexically ambiguous-
that is, there are two verbs know, one which means "to be familiar with" and one which means
"to hold certain knowledge", and not a single verb with two senses.4 For instance, she observes
that German uses different words for the two meanings (kennen for the former, wissen for the
latter); and in those dialects of German in which wissen can take DP as its complement, the DP
has only a CQ meaning. 5
Heim also notes that the question-embedding meaning of many verbs does not
predictably relate to the object-embedding meaning, except in a metaphorical way-such as
revealquestion = "to make known" and revealobject - "to unwrap or unveil". In truth, there is an
argument here somewhat stronger than the one Heim offers: not all question-embedding verbs,
even those that allow CQs complements, have an object-embedding sense. For instance, John
guessed/predicted the winner of the 2004 World Series has only a reading in which John guessed
or predicted that the Red Sox would win the World Series, and no reading that asserts a relation
between John and the Red Sox themselves. (John guessed/predicted the Red Sox is grammatical,
but only with an elliptical, John guessed/predicted that the Red Sox... meaning.) So for at least
4 Heim is arguing against the specific theory that individual vs. CQ interpretation results from a difference
in scope, a theory she refutes to an extent sufficient enough that I will not entertain it here, nor will I present the
arguments particular to that theory.
s Other languages make the same distinction (e.g. French connattrelsavoir, Spanish conocerlsaber,
Norwegian kjenne/vite).
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some verbs, the CQ-embedding sense cannot derive from an object-embedding sense because the
latter does not exist.
For the rest of this dissertation, I will entirely set aside the individual-embedding
meanings of these verbs with the assumption that the two meanings of these verbs are unrelated,
perhaps due to a lexical ambiguity.6
1.2.2. Concealed question denotations vs. other question denotations
As noted above, this dissertation seeks a semantic explanation of the interpretation of CQs. To
that end, it is important to distinguish two categories of nouns with question meanings, only one
of which will be discussed in this dissertation.
1.2.2.1. Question meanings lacking from CQs
CQs, as they have been discussed in the literature, have a particular and limited meaning. This
fact has been somewhat disguised by the variety of paraphrases CQs have been given. For
instance, Baker (1968) offers and Grimshaw (1979) repeats the following sentences and their
corresponding paraphrases (Grimshaw's 67-68, Baker's 6.1-6.8; emphasis added):
(9) a. James figured out the plane's arrival time.
b. John refused to tell the police the fellows who had been involved.
c. Susan found out the place where the meeting was to be held.
d. Fred tried to guess the amount of the stolen money.
(10) a. James figured out what the plane's arrival time would be.
b. John refused to tell the police which fellows had been involved.
c. Susan found out where the meeting was to be held.
d. Fred tried to guess how much money had been stolen.
These paraphrases make CQs seem to have great flexibility in meaning.
However, this flexibility is an illusion. In fact, the CQs in (9) can all be paraphrased with
questions parallel to the one in (10a), underscoring their common meaning.
(11) a. James figured out what [the plane's arrival time] would be.
b. John refused to tell the police who [the fellows who had been involvedl were.
c. Susan found out what [the place where the meeting was to be heldl was.
d. Fred tried to guess what [the amount of the stolen money] was.
In other words, insofar as a concealed question denotes a question, that question is an identity
question, i.e. one of the form who X is or what X is.7
6 Heim (1979) proposes that CQs do denote individuals and that CQ-embedding senses of predicates, like
non-CQ-embedding senses, semantically compose with objects of type e. The arguments in this section do not
themselves demonstrate that CQs cannot denote individuals; but see §3.1 for arguments against Heim.7 The tense of the identity question varies predictably for sequence-of-tense reasons. Note as well that some
predicates set particular tense requirements on their complements--e.g. the complement of predict must describe an
event after the time of prediction, regardless of syntactic form: #John is predicting { that the Red Sox won the World
Series / who won the World Series). The identity question (or proposition) paraphrase will have this same
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This limitation becomes more obvious when considering other contexts. The following
sentences demonstrate that, even though a particular non-identity question meaning might be
pragmatically sensible, CQs cannot have those meanings. Thus, questions with copulars such as
where DP is or when DP is and questions with extraction from subject or object position of
transitive verbs such as what DP saw or who saw DP are not possible meanings of CQs. (The
latter might be expected because of the extra semantic material, but even a context which
supplies that material does not make the CQ meaning available.)
(12) a. Leslie needed driving directions, so I told her where the capital of Vermont is.
b. #Leslie needed driving directions, so I told her the capital of Vermont.
c. Leslie was studying for a geography quiz, so I told her the capital of Vermont.
(13) a. Alex wants to be on time, so I told him when the class he should attend is.
b. #Alex wants to be on time, so I told him the class he should attend.
c. Alex wants to learn semantics, so I told him the class he should attend.
(14) a. Scooter has a list of famous directors, and he's trying to find out who in his class
saw each director's first movie, so I told him who saw the movie directed by
Orson Welles.
b. #Scooter has a list of famous directors, and he's trying to find out who in his class
saw each director's first movie, so I told him the movie directed by Orson Welles.
c. Scooter has a list of famous directors, and he's trying to find out what movie I
saw by each director, so I told him the movie directed by Orson Welles.
The (a) sentences in (12)-(14) show full questions embedded under told, each of which is
pragmatically relevant in the context. Nevertheless, the DPs in the (b) sentences cannot have
these question meanings. (Each DP can be used as a CQ in other contexts, as in the (c) sentences;
but crucially the CQs in these sentences mean what the capital of Vermont is, what the class he
should attend is, and what the (contextually-relevant) movie directed by Orson Welles is-that is,
identity questions.)
In fact, a CQ is even limited in what identity question it can represent-while who DP is
and what DP is are possible meanings of a CQ, which one DP is is not.
(15) I bought milk at the store (with a couple of other things). The receipt lists three unnamed
items: one cost $1.49, the second cost $1.99, and the third cost $2.49.
#1 don't know the price of milk.
(cf. I don't know which one the price of milk is.)
While I don't know the price of milk, meaning I don't know what the price of milk is, is true here,
the context creates an expectation for a question like which one of these three prices, and in that
sense the CQ is infelicitous. The meaning of a CQ must be the identity question who/what X is
and not which one X is.
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restriction, so that for instance the CQ in John is predicting the winner of the World Series is better paraphrased who
the winner will be instead of who the winner is. This fact is incidental to the core meaning of the concealed question.
Ben Russell (p.c.) suggested (16) as a possible counterexample to this claim, insofar as
one might ask it to find out when the last train to Boston is, making the DP a when-question and
not an identity question.
(16) Tell me the last train to Boston.
However, when speaking of trains (and other scheduled transportation), we habitually identify
them by time: in fact, "8:10" is a less appropriate answer than "the 8:10" (and "the Northeast
Direct," with no mention of a time, is an equally good answer). While one can ask (16) to learn
when the last train is, this is because learning one of the train's names will thereby allow one to
learn its time. So the CQ really is the identity question Tell me what the last train to Boston is.
The DPs discussed in this section are concealed questions as they have been discussed in
the literature. They each appear as the complements to a wide variety of predicates, including
know and tell but excluding wonder, and their question meanings derive entirely from the
denotations of the DPs themselves, with no added information such as where... or who saw....
These are the hallmarks by which we can recognize CQs, and they will be used as diagnostics
throughout this dissertation.
1.2.2.2. Question-denoting DPs that aren't CQs
English has other examples of nouns in certain contexts having question meanings. In this
section, we'll look at a few such cases and see how the question-DPs differ from the CQs
discussed in the previous section (and elsewhere in the literature).
Chris Barker (p.c.) noticed a context in which a DP can have the meaning of a non-
identity question. The verb teach, semantically similar to tell as a verb of communicating
information, embeds both propositions and questions.8
(17) a. I taught Leslie that the capital of Vermont is Montpelier.
b. I taught Leslie what the capital of Vermont is.
A DP complement to teach, however, denotes a question with more information than a mere
identity question.
(18) a. I taught Leslie French. = I taught Leslie how to speak French.
b. I taught Leslie the tango. = I taught Leslie how to dance the tango.
Indeed, a paraphrase with an identity question is inadequate; for (18a) to be true, it is not
sufficient for me to have taught Leslie what French is. This would seem to be an example of a
CQ with a non-identity-question meaning.
However, the DPs in (18) differ from the CQs discussed above in a number of ways
beyond the difference in possible meaning. In the following paragraphs, we will see sufficient
8 Teach sets other restrictions on its complement, which are not by and large relevant here. One restriction
worth noting: the complement must be some sufficiently complex or obscure, and possibly relatively unchanging,
fact; thus the infelicity of #I taught John what time it was. Many proper CQs may sound degraded as the
complement to teach for this reason: I taught Leslie the capital of Vermont is only as felicitous as the sentences in
(17). Thus, some indulgence may be needed for teach + identity-question-DP examples in this section.
Note, too, that teach is not an idiosyncratic case; at the least, learn behaves identically.
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differences to support not treating these DPs as concealed questions in the sense of the term
employed in the rest of this dissertation.
First, the DPs in (18) not only do not have identity question meanings, they cannot occur
productively with other CQ-taking verbs, even those compatible with a how to... question.
(19) a. * I found out French. (cf. I found out how to speak French)
b. * Tell me the tango. (cf. Tell me how to dance the tango)
Given that French and, arguably, the tango are rigid designators, the nonproductivity of these
DPs as CQs is unsurprising in light of one of the diagnostics for CQ meanings discussed in the
previous section. We saw that substituting co-extensional DPs in general does not preserve their
truth conditions, and that substituting rigid designators in particular removes the meanings
entirely. With teach, a rigid designator can have a question meaning; and substituting co-
extensional DPs for the complement of teach does preserve meaning.
(20) a. I taught Leslie the language spoken in Paris. (- 18a)
b. I taught Leslie the language spoken by Maurice Chevalier. (= 18a)
c. I taught Leslie the national dance of Argentina. (- 18b)
d. I taught Leslie the dance the Argentinean in Moulin Rouge! performs. (- 18b)
Interpreting the DPs as CQs (modulo footnote 8), (20a) and (20b) do not have equivalent truth
conditions, nor do (20c) and (20d). These facts make the DP complement of teach look
decidedly un-CQ-like.
CQs and DP complements to teach differ in other ways. A pronoun can have a CQ
meaning only when its antecedent is itself a CQ, as in (21a), and not when its antecedent denotes
an individual, as in (21b). However, pronouns with individual-denoting antecedents can be the
complement to teach:
(21) a. I know the capital of France! I can tell it to you.
b. I love the capital of France! #1 can tell it to you
c. I love the tango! Let me teach it to you.
(Thanks to Ben Russell for this observation.) And finally, Kai von Fintel (p.c.) observed that the
approximate paraphrases in (18), which suggest that nouns like the tango have the same meaning
as questions like how to dance the tango, are not entirely accurate: full questions such as how to
dance the tango apparently denote mere information, whereas infinitives such as to dance the
tango or DPs such as the tango additionally entail ability:
(22) a. Leslie taught me how to dance the tango, but I can't actually perform it.
b. #Leslie taught me to dance the tango, but I can't actually perform it.
c. # Leslie taught me the tango, but I can't actually perform it.
All in all, DPs like those in (18) are sufficiently different from the objects commonly
called "concealed questions" in the literature that we ought not expect a single explanation to
cover both. If DP complements of teach have question meanings, they receive them not through
the same sort of uniform semantic change that gives CQs their identity question meanings, but
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instead via a kind of metonymy, in which the DP stands in for a related question. Thus, I taught
Leslie French may mean that I taught her to speak French, or that I taught her to read French, or
perhaps that I taught her to understand French (but not to speak it herself). How this metonymy
works is well outside the scope of this dissertation.
A similar phenomenon can be seen with many verbs of discussion, such as discuss itself
as well as others like comment on.
(23) a. Leslie and Sam discussed Alex's wife.
b. Leslie commented on the capital of Italy.
While these sentences may describe the same situations as their identity-question paraphrases
(e.g. Leslie and Sam discussed who Alex's wife is, Leslie commented on what the capital of Italy
was), they can also be used in situations described by non-identity-question paraphrases (Leslie
and Sam discussed how tall Alex's wife is, Leslie commented on why she liked the capital of
Italy).
For the most part, the discussion of complements of teach applies here as well. For
instance, the non-identity-question senses of the sentences in (23) do not change with the
substitution of a co-referring expression, even a rigid designator; the identity-question senses,
however, do change. For instance, if (23b) is used to describe a situation in which Leslie
commented on why she liked the capital of Italy, then Leslie commented on the largest city in
Italy is also true, as is Leslie commented on Rome; but neither can be used to describe the
situation in which Leslie offers her opinion about which city is the capital of Italy. Similarly, if I
don't know what the capital of Italy is, but someone tells me that you went to the capital of Italy,
I cannot say (24a), because pronouns with individual-denoting antecedents cannot be CQs. If I
do know what the capital of Italy is, though, (24b) is fine, though of course it can only mean that
I want to discuss Rome, not that I want to discuss what the capital of Italy is.
(24) a. I hear you recently visited the capital of Italy. #I want to learn it.
b. I hear you recently visited the capital of Italy. I want to discuss it.
In this case, the DP complements to discuss and comment on are probably not metonymous for
questions; more likely, these verbs have the same ambiguity as know, in that their complements
can be questions (or CQs) but can also be individuals. So the sentences in (23) are each
ambiguous:
(25) a. Leslie and Sam discussedquestion [Alex's wife]cQ.
a'. Leslie and Sam discussedobject [Alex's wife]individual.
b. Leslie [commented on]question [the capital of Italy]cQ.
b'. Leslie [commented on]object [the capital of Italy]individual.
It happens that the two senses of these verbs are closer in meaning than the two senses of know,
and thus one sense can be used in a paraphrase of the other. The non-identity-question
paraphrases of the sentences in (23) are not paraphrases of the (a) and (b) sentences in (25), i.e.
the non-identity questions do not paraphrase CQs; they are paraphrases of the (a') and (b')
sentences. So these apparent counterexamples can also be set aside.
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1.3. An Overview of the Dissertation
Throughout this dissertation I will be discussing many past approaches to concealed questions.
As different researchers have analyzed different aspects of CQs, I will not attempt to introduce
all previous theories at once. Instead, I will describe them in detail as they arise. Nevertheless, an
overview of the status of our understanding of CQs may serve as a road map for the following
chapters, and so I offer one here. But let us first start with a few comments on the meaning of
questions.
1.3.1. The distribution and meaning of questions
The papers discussed in later chapters (Heim 1979; Lahiri 2000, 2002; Beck and Sharvit 2002;
Romero 2005) use meanings for questions based on Hamblin (1973) and Karttunen (1977). For
convenience, I will use Hamblin's question semantics. Because I will not, in the end, assign
question denotations to concealed questions, little will depend on this decision.
For both Hamblin and Karttunen, questions denote sets of propositions. The denotation of
a proposition is the set of worlds in which the truth conditions for the proposition hold, i.e. the
set of worlds in which the proposition is true; or, alternately, a function which maps to "true"
those worlds in which the proposition holds. Propositions thus have the semantic type (s, t).
(26) [[that the capital of Vermont is Montpelier] = Xwl . Montpelier is the capital of VT in wl
A question then denotes the set of propositions that are answers to the question. (Hamblin takes
the set to contain all answers, and Karttunen, only the true answers; but given the intensions of
the sets, either one can be derived from the other.) For instance, the question What is the capital
of Vermont? (or its embedded variant, what the capital of Vermont is) denotes the set of
propositions of the form that x is the capital of Vermont. The set may be given explicitly, as in
(27a), but is often described schematically as in (27b).
(27) a. [[what is the capital of Vermontl =
{ that Montpelier is the capital of Vermont,
that Boston is the capital of Vermont,
that Burlington is the capital of Vermont, ...}
b. [[what is the capital of Vermontj] =
•pst . 3xe .p = •wl . [x is the capital of Vermont in wl]
Another aspect of question meanings, one we will return to occasionally over the course
of the dissertation, is exhaustivity. While a question denotes the set of all propositions which
answer it, the truth conditions of a sentence with an embedded question do not always depend on
all the propositions. Typically, three levels of exhaustivity are discussed. For a strongly
exhaustive reading, all the answers to the question are relevant, true or false; for a weakly
exhaustive reading, only the true answers are relevant; for a mention-some reading, only one true
answer is relevant. For example:
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(28) John knows who has access to the supply closet.
Strongly exhaustive reading:
For everyone who has access to the supply closet, John knows that they
have access; and he knows that no one else does.
Weakly exhaustive reading:
For everyone who has access to the supply closet, John knows that they
have access.
Mention-some reading:
For someone who has access to the supply closet, John knows that they
have access.
Suppose that three people in an office (A, B, C) have access to the supply closet. If John is an
administrative assistant, one might say (28) with its strongly exhaustive reading; someone who
asks Does John know who has access to the supply closet? wants to be sure that John has
complete knowledge of closet access. If John has a cubicle near the supply closet, one might say
the sentence with its weakly exhaustive reading: he's seen A, B, and C access the closet, so he
knows they have access, but he can't be sure there's not someone else with access who happens
not to have come by yet. And if John just works somewhere in the office, one might say the
sentence with its mention-some reading: he might not know that all three of them have access but
only that B does, because he goes to B whenever he needs something from the closet.
Many authors (see especially Heim 1994, Beck and Rullmann 1999) have investigated
exhaustivity, offering formal operators to produce the different meanings. In this dissertation, we
will not need to explore exhaustivity meanings in this detail; the authors discussed herein for
whom exhaustivity is an issue (Beck and Sharvit 2002, Lahiri 2002) offer sufficient explanations
of their own theories' abilities to capture all the correct meanings.
A final point before moving on from questions to concealed questions: Karttunen (1977)
divides question-taking predicates into nine categories.
(29) a. verbs of retaining knowledge: know, be aware, recall, remember, forget
b. verbs of acquiring knowledge: learn, notice, find out, discover
c. verbs of communicating (knowledge): tell, show, inform, indicate, disclose, reveal
d. decision verbs: decide, determine, specify, agree on, control
e. verbs of conjecture: guess, predict, bet on, estimate
f. opinion verbs: be certain, have an idea, be convinced
g. inquisitive verbs: ask, wonder, investigate, be interested in
h. verbs of relevance: matter, be relevant, be important, care, be significant
i. verbs of dependency: depend on, be related to, have an influence on
(adapted from Karttunen 1977, 8)
Karttunen's divisions are not the only possible divisions, nor even necessarily the most useful
from a theoretic standpoint. The categories are not syntactically homogenous, as a single
category may include both adjectives and verbs (be relevant and care) or both transitive and
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ditransitive verbs (reveal and tell). Nor are they even semantically homogenous: many sections
of this dissertation will explore the ways in which ask differs from wonder.
So no theoretical point will rely on these categories. However, it is useful to have a list of
predicates to use in testing question and concealed question complementation, and I will use the
divisions to simplify discussions of empirical generalizations. And with that, we can move from
questions to concealed questions.
1.3.2. The distribution and meaning of concealed questions
This dissertation comprises four main chapters. The first two examine other theories of CQ
meanings, and the third and fourth propose and defend the new theory.
We begin in Chapter 2 by considering whether CQs can simply denote questions. §2.1
demonstrates that assigning question denotations to DPs is possible, and that they adequately
capture the meaning of CQs. However, as some predicates (like wonder) are compatible with
question-denoting clauses but not question-denoting DPs, this theory of CQ meanings must be
supplemented with an explanation of CQ distribution. Consequently, §2.2 examines what this
explanation might be.
Grimshaw (1979), discussed in §2.2.1, takes concealed questions to have meanings
identical to clausal questions but argues that CQs enter the derivation as DPs and are not derived
(as in Baker 1968). This allows her to explain why CQs have a different distribution than clausal
questions do; she proposes that predicates are lexically marked for syntactic selectional
properties and semantic selectional properties. Therefore, some predicates allow DP
complements, some allow CP complements, and some allow both; some predicates allow
propositional complements, some allow interrogative complements, and some allow both. The
property of embedding concealed questions is the conjunction of two independent properties,
namely allowing DP complements syntactically and allowing interrogative complements
semantically.
§2.2.2 continues with Grimshaw (1981) and Pesetsky (1981), both of whom expanded on
this notion. The former offered an explanation for the incompleteness of the strict independence
of syntactic and semantic complementation (why, e.g., no predicates allowed DP questions but
not CP questions). The latter related syntactic complementation to Case selection, arguably
needed in the grammar for independent reasons. Both, however, maintained the central result of
Grimshaw (1979): accepting or not accepting CQ complements is an arbitrary property, specified
lexically for each predicate.
§2.2 concludes by observing that these syntactic theories of distribution cannot, by their
very nature, explain a semantic condition on distribution. This leads the way to a search for a
semantic explanation of distribution in §2.3, beginning with Dor (1992), who postulates a
correlation between a verb's "epistemic commitment" (whether the subject necessarily knows
the answer to the embedded question) and its ability to embed CQs. His theory goes against the
conclusions of Grimshaw and Pesetsky, as he argues that, while CQ-embedding is not a property
of all question-embedding predicates, it is not arbitrary either. While his particular proposal turns
out to be empirically inadequate, it lays the groundwork a semantic approach instead of a
syntactic approach, which brings us to the Proposition/Concealed Question Correlation (PCQC)
mentioned above in § 1.1. After considering a number of apparent counterexamples in §2.3.2 and
explaining them via Case, the chapter finishes by concluding that enough evidence supporting
the PCQC exists to justify finding another meaning for concealed questions, one that will permit
a semantic characterization of their distribution.
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Chapter 3 explores another commonly proposed meaning for CQs, namely individual
concepts (ICs). It begins in §3.1 with the theory from Heim (1979) that CQs are simply DPs that
denote individuals, but it will rapidly become clear that neither Heim's particular approach, nor
any other theory that treats CQs as individual-denoting objects, can explain the data. §3.2
introduces individual concepts, which are the intensions of individual denotations, starting with
the original motivation in Montague (1973) to postulate their existence, and continuing with the
proposal in Romero (2005) that CQs denote ICs. Romero ultimately argues for a unification of
CQs and specificational subjects of copular sentences (e.g. The number of planets is nine, as
opposed to the number of planets is large), a point I will return to briefly in the conclusion.
§3.2.2 concerns only those parts of the paper about CQ meanings, including a discussion of an
ambiguity in a sentence first noted in Heim (1979) and how IC meanings can produce the correct
truth conditions for both readings.
§3.2.3 considers the relation of Romero's theory to the PCQC as developed in the
previous chapter, and comes to the conclusion that, while it doesn't provide an easy explanation
of the correlation, it at least admits the possibility. The theory does not, however, do as well with
the issue of the form of CQs, as we will see in Sections 3.3 and 3.4. The former section presents
some of the challenges for the individual concept theory, including suggestions from Janssen
(1984) that IC meanings are fairly widespread through the grammar, and are therefore available
to DPs that do not have CQ uses. In particular, ICs can be used as the subject of change, as titles
that refer to people in index-dependent ways, and as certain nouns that vary over time (such as
home). The latter section follows up on this suggestion with Lasersohn (2005), who proposes that
nouns like price, which Montague set apart from other common nouns as having intensional
meanings and which Romero uses as an IC-denoting CQ, should have the same kind of lexical
denotation as other, extensional common nouns. Instead, he concludes, IC meanings can be
derived from definite descriptions and should not be part of a lexical denotation.
With IC meanings available for any definite DP, but only some definite DPs usable as
CQs, Romero's proposal runs into trouble. The basis of Chapter 4, therefore, is the need to find a
meaning for Montague's "intensional" nouns that is not grounded in individual concept
meanings. After §4.1 sets out the distinction between relational nouns and nonrelational nouns
(alluded to in (6) as a way to separate DPs that can have CQ meanings from those that cannot),
the chapter considers ways to introduce IC meanings into the grammar other than doing so
lexically, following Montague, or doing so by intensionalizing definite descriptions, following
Lasersohn. §4.2 looks at the effect of quantifying over a set of ICs, first seeing what meanings
such quantification can have, and then seeing how to derive the correct sets from the lexical
denotations of relational nouns and of nonrelational nouns.
This examination of quantified ICs provides a clear understanding of what lexical
denotations we have available for relational and nonrelational nouns. §4.3 uses the differences in
available denotations to derive propositional meanings for DPs. It starts in §4.3.1 with relational
nouns, offering a type-shifting operation applicable only to relational-noun denotations and
demonstrating how this theory, too, can capture both readings of the ambiguous sentence
discussed by Romero. §4.3.2 then considers how certain nominal modifiers turn nonrelational
nouns into CQs, while other forms of modification do not.
By the end of Chapter 4, we will have seen how to assign propositional meanings to DPs,
which encompasses the observed restrictions on the form of a CQ. In Chapter 5, we return to the
issue of CQ distribution and the PCQC. The theory that DPs denote propositions predicts a
stronger correlation-namely, that propositions and CQ should have exactly the same
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distribution. The qualification that this is true only in Cased positions having been introduced at
the end of Chapter 2, this final chapter will cover three other problematic kinds of predicates.
§5.1 discusses those predicates that do not embed questions at all, such as believe. The proposed
solution draws inspiration from Lahiri (2000, 2002), whose theory of Interrogative Raising
interprets question complements of proposition-embedding predicates by moving the question
and leaving a propositional trace, thereby opening it to the same challenge from a predicate like
believe.
§5.2 discusses decide, which Beck and Sharvit (2002) argue does not embed propositions
on one of its question-embedding meanings, and reaches the conclusion that the verb's inability
to take propositional complements in fact lies in the presupposition it places on its complement,
in combination with other effects that can be isolated. §5.3 takes up the remaining problematic
predicates, depend and ask, the latter being perhaps the most difficult predicate for any theory of
CQ distribution-all the more so because it is often taken as a prototypical CQ-embedding verb.
While neither accepts propositions as arguments, they also accept only a limited range of DPs,
far fewer than the full range of CQs: in fact, the complement of ask must be a relational noun,
and the subject of depend must be a particular kind of relational noun. Thus, neither verb needs
to compose with DPs in the same manner that CQ-embedding verbs compose with their
arguments.
The concluding remarks in Chapter 6 will offer a sketch of how the proposal in this
dissertation may fit into a larger picture, including the reincorporation of CQs into Romero's
(2005) theory of specificational subjects of copular sentences and speculations on CQs cross-
linguistically.
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CHAPTER 2 - WHY CONCEALED QUESTIONS Do NOT DENOTE
QUESTIONS
A natural starting point for concealed questions meanings might be to assume that they denote
questions; after all, as we saw in the introduction, their meanings can be paraphrased with clausal
questions. In this chapter, we will begin by considering whether question denotations can in fact
capture the CQ meanings, and see that they do seem to be adequate. Giving CQs the same
denotations as questions, however, forces us to consider the difference in distribution between
questions and concealed questions. If they contribute identical meanings to sentences, the
difference in distribution cannot be explained semantically; consequently, we will have to
entertain a syntactic explanation.
Ultimately, I will propose the rough descriptive generalization in (1).
(1) The Proposition/Concealed Question Correlation (PCQC) (approximate version)
In argument positions where questions are acceptable, propositions and concealed
questions have the same distribution.
An explanation that relies on syntactic facts without reference to the semantics cannot explain
such a correlation, if it is true. On the other hand, this correlation seems unlikely, or even false,
at first glance: some question-embedding verbs follow the correlation, but others contradict it. In
fact, the verbs know, ask, care, and wonder seem to suggest the lack of any such correlation. All
four allow clausal questions as complements with equal ease.
(2) Kim {knew/asked/cared/wondered} how late it was.
Nevertheless, as the paradigm in (3) shows, the verbs behave differently with respect to
propositions and CQs, exemplifying all four possible behaviors instead of the two predicted by
the correlation. Know, embedding both propositions and CQs, and wonder, embedding neither,
follow the correlation. But ask allows CQs but not propositions as its complement; care allows
propositions but not CQs.
(3) a. Kim knew... ...the time. ...that it was after 5 pm.
b. Kim asked... ...the time. *...that it was after 5 pm.
c. Kim cared... *...the time. ...that it was after 5 pm.
d. Kim wondered... *...the time. *...that it was after 5 pm.
In this chapter, we will see that, contrary to this superficial examination, the correlation is an
accurate generalization for most of the data. Consequently, an explanation of CQ distribution
must be sensitive to semantic facts, and as a theory in which CQs have question meanings
apparently cannot, we will need to explore other possible meanings.
§2.1 discusses question denotations: how they can be assigned to CQs, whether they
adequately capture the meanings of CQs, and what predictions they make about CQ distribution.
We will see that there is no immediate semantic reason to rule out question denotations, but that
taking CQs to denote questions requires a framework of selection for syntactic categories. §2.2
examines Grimshaw (1979) and Pesetsky (1981), who offer the necessary framework to
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distinguish the roles of syntactic and semantic selection. They argue for a lack of correlation
between, on the one hand, syntactic selection for CPs or DPs, and on the other hand, semantic
selection for proposition meanings or question meanings. It will become apparent that using
selectional properties of predicates provides no basis to explain a semantically conditioned
distribution of a particular syntactic category.
In §2.3, we will look for ways in which the (syntactic) distribution of question-denoting
DPs correlates with the semantic property of embedding propositions. §2.3.1 looks at the account
of Dor (1992), an earlier explanation of CQ distribution based on semantic facts; §2.3.2 presents
data suggesting that the correlation presented in (1) is correct. Consequently, a predicate's
compatibility with CQs is not accidental but predictable; and insofar as it requires the predicate-
by-predicate specification described in §2.2, the theory that CQs denote questions cannot be
correct.
2.1. How Concealed Questions Could Denote Questions
To begin, we need a method to derive question meanings for concealed questions, and as a
starting point we can follow Baker (1968) and treat a CQ as an interrogative clause that has
undergone a deletion process.
(4) Kim knows [CP whe the governor of California is].
In this case, it's clear how the object of know gets the meaning of the clausal interrogative: the
object really is a clausal interrogative, the identity-question meaning coming from material
deleted before pronunciation.
Once we look at this possibility in further detail we can see that, unless we stipulate
additional restrictions, this theory allows any question-embedding verb to embed CQs and allows
any DP to have a CQ meaning.
(5) a. * Kim wonders [cp whk the governor of California is].
b. * Kim knows [cP whe Arnold Schwarzenegger is].
The theory presented in Grimshaw (1979), which appears in the next section, rejects this
approach on the basis of (5a): wonder accepts an interrogative CP such as who the governor of
California is as its complement, and would therefore also accept an object with the same
semantic type and syntactic category even though it happens to have had some words deleted.
Instead of restricting wonder to keep it from taking "[CP whe the governor of California is]" as its
complement, the grammar could restrict the deletion process from applying to the CP object of
wonder; but this requires allowing a local syntactic operation to be sensitive to the semantics of
the rest of the sentence, which seems unlikely at best, and is more likely simply outside the
power of the grammar. The same objection applies to (5b), which can only be ruled out if the
syntactic transformation is sensitive to the semantic difference between the two expressions the
governor of California and Arnold Schwarzenegger.'
Of course, there is also a syntactic difference between the two expressions, but we saw in the introduction
that the semanticist and the semanticist who teaches at USNDH differ in their abilities to be CQs, and the syntactic
difference between these two expressions is, if not more subtle, at least at a deeper point in the derivational process,
a depth which should be invisible to the syntactic deletion transformation at the clausal level.
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A more promising approach would be to treat the CQ as a DP, rather than a CP, and shift
the denotation to the denotation of a question. This shift must apply to the intension of the type-e
denotation, as otherwise the governor of California and the star of Total Recall, which have the
same type-e denotation in wo, would denote the same question; nevertheless, John knows the
governor of California and John knows the star of Total Recall are not synonymous on their CQ
readings. (In the introduction, we saw the same point about the capital of/largest town in Italy,
from Heim 1979.) An operator that turns the intension of a definite description into an identity
question is easy enough to write; it should add exactly the meaning of who...is in the
compositional meaning of the identity question. Something like (6) should suffice:
(6) (s, e) - (st, t)
kxe . X•,, . [3ye . p = Xwl • [x(wl) = y]]
...where "= y" corresponds to the meaning of the copula and the trace left by who, the rest
corresponding to the meaning of the question morpheme. (Heim 1979 suggests a similar shifting
operation in formula 7 on page 52.)
In a moment, we will consider the empirical predictions of this approach, but let us first
take a few paragraphs to consider whether question meanings capture the range of CQ meanings.
Heim in particular addresses the issue of whether question meanings are adequate. She focuses
on the following distinction (her (8) and (9), attributed to Greenberg 1977):
(7) a. John found out who the murderer of Smith was.
b. John found out the murderer of Smith.
Although in the last chapter we spoke of sentences like (7a) as paraphrases for those like (7b),
Greenberg observes that the former has an additional meaning absent in the latter. For the sake of
concreteness, let the facts be that Jones is the murderer of Smith, and that additionally Jones is
the chair of the USNDH linguistics department. While the sentence with a concealed question
must mean that John now knows that Jones murdered Smith, the sentence with a clausal question
can also mean that John now knows some other fact about Jones's identity-for instance, John
found out that Jones (i.e. the murderer of Smith) is the chair of the USNDH linguistics
department, even if he knows nothing about the murder. (In fact, though Heim does not say so,
(7a) has a third reading: without knowing anything about Jones, John may have gathered
evidence that whoever it was that murdered Smith also serves as chair of the USNDH linguistics
department. As it happens, (7b) lacks this meaning as well.)
Ultimately, Heim does not really reject question meanings for CQs; she sets aside the
possibility for "practical" reasons, namely that with the tools available (in particular, giving the
DP wider scope), this latter meaning cannot be predicted for (7a), and therefore it is hard to see
whether (7b) can be kept from having it as well. As practical reasons go, this one is fairly
sensible, but in the interest of being thorough I would like to suggest a way to predict the extra
reading of (7a) without also generating it for (7b), so that we can give the CQs-as-questions
theory as much consideration as possible.
Based on the shifting operation given before, we know we want the murderer of Smith, as
well as who the murderer of Smith is on its synonymous reading, to denote the following set of
propositions.
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(8) [[who the murderer of Smith is]]w = Xpst . 3ye .p = Xwl . [y = murderer-of-Smith(wl)]
For John to "find out the murderer of Smith", or to "find out who the murderer of Smith is" in
this sense, there must be some individual y-in this case, Jones-such that John knows that, in
the actual world, "the murderer of Smith" refers to y. Heim shows that our current question
semantics predicts this meaning without a problem, so let us move on to the other two readings.
In (9b) we have a plausible denotation for the question who the murderer of Smith is on the
reading where John knows of Jones, the actual murderer of Smith, that he has some other
identifying property; in (9a), we have a denotation for the reading where John knows of the
murderer of Smith, whichever individual he happens to be, that he has some other identifying
property.
(9) a. [[who t.m.o.S. is]'w = •pst . 3xse . p = Xwl . [murderer-of-Smith(w) = x(wl)]
b. [[who t.m.o.S. isl]j = Xpst . 3XV . p = Xwl . [murderer-of-Smith(w 1) = x(w1)]
These two meanings, like the meaning in (8), are sets of identity propositions, propositions
which assert of individual A and individual B that they are the same individual-y, x(wi),
murderer-of-Smith(wl), and murderer-of-Smith(w) are all expressions with type e. What the two
meanings in (9) have in common, and what distinguishes them from the meaning in (8), is that in
these latter two the propositions in the set differ over an (s, e)-type property, where the
propositions in the former differ over an e-type individual.
This difference makes it easy to generate the meanings in (9) for a clausal question
without generating them for a concealed question. Concealed question denotations come only
from the semantic composition of DP denotation and the shifting operation in (6), so that they
can never have the denotations in (9). Clausal question denotations, on the other hand, contain
additional sememes, notably the denotation of the interrogative pronoun and its corresponding
trace. By interpreting the trace as a variable of type (s, e) instead of type e, the semantics of
questions has the flexibility to produce both denotations in (9).
At this point, we should follow Heim's admonition "to remember that this paper is not
supposed to be about puzzles in the semantics of wh-, i.e. overt, questions, and that we are
primarily trying to determine whether an adequate interpretation of concealed questions is likely
to result from" the type-shifting approach (p. 54). Unlike Heim, though, we can conclude that
treating CQs as having the same denotation as clausal questions is at least possible, and perhaps
even plausible, in terms of the semantics.
Having accepted question meanings for CQs, we can now return to the empirical,
distributional questions. To solve the question of why not all DPs have CQ uses, the shifting
operation that produces question denotations might be restricted to apply only to certain DPs but
not others. It is not obvious to me how this might be done, especially in a non-stipulative
manner, as the operation above shifts the DP denotations and cannot distinguish, in type or
meaning, DPs composed from different NPs. That is, given any DP with an (s, e) denotation, the
shifting operation will turn it into a DP with an (st, t) denotation, and does not have reference to
the syntactic or semantic qualities of the NP that might distinguish a possible CQ like the capital
of Vermont or the semanticist who teaches at USNDH from a non-possible CQ like the large city
in Vermont or the semanticist. Let us set this problem aside, assuming for the sake of argument
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that a type-shifting operation applying to the NP and thus sensitive to its characteristics could
replace the operation in (6) that applies to the DP. 2
The other distributional question-which verbs allow CQ complements-seemed
impossible to answer on the approach that treated CQs as CPs, as it predicted CQs to appear as
the object of any predicate that can embed an interrogative CP. If instead CQs are DPs with
clausal question denotations, we cannot characterize their distribution with only semantic facts,
but we may be able to do so with a syntactic explanation. In the next section, we will see how.
2.2. A Lexical/Syntactic Explanation of Concealed Question Distribution
Both Grimshaw (1979) and Pesetsky (1981) explain the distribution of concealed questions
based on the assumption that they denote questions. In the next section we will consider the
former, which relies entirely on lexical specification; following that we turn our attention to the
latter, which derives some of that specification from independent syntactic principles.
2.2.1. Grimshaw (1979): the Autonomy Hypothesis
In Grimshaw (1979), we find a two-part proposal to explain the distribution of complements with
various syntactic and semantic forms. The first part of the proposal is the presence of two
subcategorization systems in the lexicon, which she terms c-selection (the selection a predicate
makes for the syntactic category of its complement) and s-selection (the selection a predicate
makes for the semantic type of its complement). Predicates are lexically specified for both: each
verb allows certain kinds of syntactic phrase as its complement, and certain kinds of semantic
meaning.
To demonstrate the effects of c-selection, Grimshaw considers CP and DP complements,
as well as the possibility of null complements. For s-selection, Grimshaw discusses propositions
and interrogatives and, additionally, exclamatives, illustrated in their matrix form in (10). 3
2 Rigid designators, as we have seen, also have no CQ reading; this may seem problematic for a theory
which turns DPs into question, as on the surface the identity question about a rigid designator--e.g., Who is Arnold
Schwarzenegger? or John knows who Arnold Schwarzenegger is-seems meaningful. But the question is
meaningful only with the readings expressed in (9); a concealed question meaning for the rigid designator Arnold
Schwarzenegger, following (8), would be:
(i) XPst . 3ye . p = Xwl [y = Arnold Schwarzenegger]
As there is only one y such that y is Arnold Schwarzenegger, this is the singleton set containing the proposition "that
Arnold Schwarzenegger is Arnold Schwarzenegger"-a trivial proposition, enough to allow us to rule out question
denotations for rigid designators on wholly pragmatic grounds.
3 These types were sufficient to demonstrate Grimshaw's conclusions, but they are not the only types (nor
did Grimshaw claim they were). For instance, imperatives form a different semantic category. Imperatives have a
syntactic form distinct from declaratives, interrogatives, and exclamatives; in addition to a matrix form they have an
embedded form which can be the complement of some verbs but not others (and which can be distinguished from
embedded declaratives by the use of the subjunctive mood); and they also have a "concealed" form with a
,distribution different than the embedded clausal form:
(i) a. The king ordered that the traitor { be/*was } executed. (command, *proposition)
b. The king asked that the traitor {be/*was} executed. (command, *proposition)
c. The king knew that the traitor {*be/was } executed. (proposition, *command)
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(10) a. How tall Susan is! (- How tall is Susan?)
b. What a fool Susan is! (# What fool is Susan?, How foolish is Susan?)
Matrix exclamatives show wh-movement but, unlike interrogatives, no subject-Aux inversion.
As neither interrogatives nor exclamatives exhibit subject-Aux inversion when embedded, some
clauses are ambiguous between exclamations and questions. Adding an intensifier such as very
or extremely disambiguates in favor of the exclamation.
(11) a. Martin knows how tall Susan is.
(= Martin knows what her height is or Martin knows that she is notably tall)
b. Martin knows how very tall Susan is.
(= Martin knows that she is notably tall, : Martin knows what her height is)
(Not all clauses are ambiguous: for instance, embedded whether-questions have no exclamative
reading, and exclamatives with the form what a N, such as the one in (10b), cannot be interpreted
as questions even when embedded.) Embedded exclamatives, like questions, can also be
expressed by determiner phrases: Susan's remarkable height, the incredible fool Susan is.
With this in mind, let us look at the predicates think, appreciate, wonder, find out, and
care, all of which c-select for CPs. These predicates vary as to whether they s-select for (a) a
proposition, (b) a question, or (c) an exclamative, and whether they c-select for (d) a determiner
phrase expressing a question or exclamative; or (e) a null complement.
(12) a. John thinks that the time is 3 pm.
b. * John thinks what time it is.
c. * John thinks how incredibly late it is.
d. * John thinks the time.
e. * I think that the time is 3 pm, and John thinks too.
(13) a. John appreciates that this task was difficult.
b. * John appreciates who completed this task.
c. John appreciates how incredibly difficult this task was.
d. John appreciates the incredible difficulty of the task.
e. * I appreciate that this task is difficult, and John appreciates too.
(ii) a. The king ordered the traitor's execution. ("concealed command" OK)
b. *The king asked the traitor's execution. ("concealed command" ungrammatical)
Much remains to be said about the syntactic and semantic distribution of imperatives, and about the possible relation
between imperatives and the categories discussed by Grimshaw, and the relation between embedded and matrix
imperatives. The latter, for instance, cannot have the passive form seen in (i)--*The prisoner be executed!-without
an auxiliary-May the prisoner be executed! I will have nothing further to say about them in this dissertation. (I am
grateful to Justin Fitzpatrick (p.c.) for the original observation.)
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(14) a. * John wonders that the time is 3 pm.
b. John wonders what time it is.
c. * John wonders how incredibly late it is.
d. * John wonders the time/the incredible lateness of the hour.
e. * I wonder what time it is, and John wonders too.
(15) a. John found out that the time is 3 pm.
b. John found out what time it is.
c. John found out how incredibly late it is.
d. John found out the time/the incredible lateness of the hour.
e. I found out what time it is, and John found out too.
(16) a. John cares that the time is 3 pm.
b. John cares what time it is.
c. * John cares what an idiot James is.
d. * John cares the time.
e. I care what time it is, and John cares too.
The predicates in (12)-(16) have the following lexical specifications, where P, Q, and E
represent propositional, interrogative, and exclamative meanings, and parentheses indicate that
the argument is optional.
(17) c-selection s-selection
think [ _ CP] < P>
appreciate [ _ CP, DP] < _ P, E>
wonder [ _ CP] < _ Q>
find out [ (CP, DP)] < _ P, Q, E>
care [ _ (CP)] < P, Q>
Note that some predicates take DP complements and some do not; some take their complements
obligatorily and some optionally; some take propositions, some questions, some exclamations, in
varying combinations. Looking in particular at wonder and find out, we see that both accept
complements which denote questions, but while the latter allows both CPs (e.g. clausal
questions) and DPs (e.g. concealed questions), the former allows only CPs (and thus does not
allow concealed questions); in this manner, syntactic selection can distinguish between those
predicates which allow CQs and those which do not.
The second part of Grimshaw's proposal is the Autonomy Hypothesis: c-selection and
s-selection are specified independently. We saw before that the mapping between syntactic and
semantic forms is not one-to-one, nor even many-to-one or one-to-many: items in the same
syntactic category can have meanings belonging to different semantic categories, and meanings
of the same semantic category can be represented by expressions of different syntactic types.
That is, both CPs and DPs can express propositions, questions, or exclamations, and conversely,
each of the semantic types can be expressed by a CP or DP.
We see in (17) that there are predicates such as think that accept proposition CPs as
complements but not question CPs, and that there are predicates such as wonder that accept
question CPs but not proposition CPs. Therefore, s-selection is not predictable from
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c-selection-in particular, the syntactic ability to take a CP complement does not entail having
the ability to take a proposition-denoting complement, or the ability to take a question-denoting
complement, or both. Thus, predicates cannot be lexically specified for syntactic complements
without mention of semantic restrictions. By the same token, there are predicates such as wonder
that accept CP questions but not DP questions, and thus c-selection is not predictable from s-
selection: predicates also cannot be lexically specified for semantic complements with no
syntactic restriction. Hence, the Autonomy Hypothesis: the lexicon needs both c-selection and
s-selection, and the two must be specified independently.
How does the Autonomy Hypothesis relate to the PCQC given at the beginning of this
chapter (among question-embedding predicates, propositions and CQs have the same
distribution)? For Grimshaw, a predicate allows a CQ complement only if it c-selects for DPs
and s-selects for Qs, as find out does in (17). In terms of Grimshaw's selections, the PCQC states
that, among predicates that s-select for Q, predicates s-select for P if and only if they c-select for
DP. If the PCQC holds, the Autonomy Hypothesis becomes much less likely. The former
predicts that no predicate has the selectional specifications in (18),
(18) c-selection s-selection
a. ? [ _ CP, DP] < _ Q> (CQs but not propositions)
b. ? [ _ CP] < _ Q, P> (propositions but not CQs)
whereas if c-selection and s-selection are independent, the lack of such specifications in the
lexicon is a mere accidental fact.
In fact, the specifications in (18) are not unattested, a problematic fact for the PCQC.
Recall the data given in the introduction for know, ask, care, and wonder. The sentence in (2)
showed that all four allow clausal questions; in Grimshaw's terminology, they all c-select CP
and s-select Q.
(2) Kim { knew/asked/cared/wondered } how late it was.
The different behaviors in (3) result from differences in c-selection for DP and s-selection for
propositions. The table in (19) shows the full c-selection and s-selection facts.4
(3) a. Kim knew... ...the time. ...that it was after 5 pm.
b. Kim asked... ...the time. * ...that it was after 5 pm.
c. Kim cared... *...the time. ...that it was after 5 pm.
d. Kim wondered... * ...the time. *...that it was after 5 pm.
4 That is, full with respect to P and Q. Know also happens to s-select for exclamatives; as I have little to say
about the distribution of exclamatives and concealed exclamatives, I will omit them for the sake of clarity. Similarly,
I omit c-selection for optionally null complements as an unnecessary complication.
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(19) c-selection s-selection
know [ CP, DP] < _ Q, P>
ask [ CP, DP] < Q> (18a)
care [ CP] < _ Q, P> = (18b)
wonder [ CP] < Q>
Know and ask can take CQ complements because they are marked [ DP] and < Q>. These
properties are independent of each other and of any other property, so being marked for both-
i.e. taking CQs as complements-is an accidental, non-predictable fact about any given
predicate.
Given the binary nature of selection (that is, a predicate either does or does not c-select
for a certain syntactic form, and either does or does not s-select for a certain semantic form), the
table in (19) shows all four possibilities for selecting or not selecting DP or P, among predicates
that c-select for CP and s-select for Q. In theory, four independent binary options should
correspond to sixteen possibilities. In practice there are only nine, because we are concerned only
with predicates that embed some sort of sentential complement (i.e. predicates that s-select for at
least one of P and Q) with some overt syntactic form (i.e. predicates that c-select for at least one
of CP and DP).'
In addition to the four possible selection frameworks seen above, there are two with
selection for CP but not Q, two with selection for Q but not CP, and one with selection for
neither:
(20) c-selection s-selection
[ CP, DP] < _ P>
[ CP] < P>
[ DP] < Q, P>
[ DP] < _ Q>
[ DP] < P>
The first two and the last of these need not concern us here, as predicates exhibiting these
frameworks are not question-embedding predicates. (We will return briefly to such predicates in
Chapter 5.)
The third and fourth possibilities (as well as the fifth) show frameworks in which the
predicate would allow complements with question meanings, or proposition meanings, or both,
but would not allow clausal questions/propositions. The Autonomy Hypothesis predicts the
existence of such predicates, but they are in fact unattested. Grimshaw discusses this point
herself (Grimshaw 1981), but let us move directly to Pesetsky's (1981) criticism of her solution
and to his own counterproposal.
s In theory a predicate could exist that s-selects for neither P nor Q because it s-selects for other sentential
meanings, such as E; as I am explicitly excluding exclamatives from consideration here, one of P or Q must be
s-selected for. Similarly, a predicate might c-select for neither CP nor DP if the proposition or question takes the
form of some other syntactic category, but such predicates are also outside the scope of the discussion here.
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2.2.2. Pesetsky (1981): Case Theory
Case Theory (Pesetsky 1981) simplifies Grimshaw's system by eliminating c-selection, folding
its work into the independent fact that predicates must be specified for Case. Consider the
abridged paradigm in (21):
(21) a. John knew what the time was.
b. John knew the time.
c. John wondered what time it was.
d. * John wondered the time.
Both know and wonder s-select question complements and both c-select CPs; but only the former
c-selects DP complements.
Selection for DP therefore seems to be a particular fact about a proposition/question
embedding predicate, but what about selection for CP? In fact, other than a few rare
counterexamples, 6 every predicate that s-selects for propositions c-selects for CPs. Grimshaw
(1981) suggests that each semantic form has a "canonical structural realization", which is CP for
propositions, interrogatives, and exclamatives. The grammar then has an additional principle that
any predicate which s-selects for a semantic category must c-select for its canonical structural
realization. This, Pesetsky observes, means that the grammar no longer needs c-selection to
predict the distribution of CPs-but of course, as DP selection is still not predictable, eliminating
c-selection requires another explanation of the distinction in (21), i.e. of the distribution of
concealed questions (and concealed exclamatives and propositions).
Pesetsky proposes that Case Theory explains the distribution as an example of quirky
case. In languages that show overt morphology for case, some predicates require objects with
unusual case marking. Icelandic is an often-invoked example. As a default, predicates take
objects with accusative case, and most predicates have this default. But not all: for instance,
bjarga 'rescue' requires dative case on its object.
Extending this to the complementation above, we can say that predicates that don't take
CQs exhibit quirky case: know sets no case requirement and thus appears with both CPs and
DPs, but wonder sets a particular requirement on its object's case, namely Caselessness.
(Pesetsky hypothesizes a [+O-case] feature, analogous with the presumable [+Dative case] that
bjarga requires of its object). Since DPs must have case and CPs need not, a predicate whose
object must be [+0-case] can take the latter as its object but not the former. This recasts
Grimshaw's lexical specifications as follows.
(22) Case s-selection
know < Q, P>
ask < Q>
care [+0-case] < _ Q, P>
wonder [+0-case] < _ Q>
From Case Theory, it also immediately follows that adjectives (which do not assign Case) never
allow DP complements regardless of their s-selection, and that prepositional phrases (which do
6 Pesetsky mentions approve of and pay attention to, which he reduces to the fact that prepositions never
accept propositional CP complements, though they can embed interrogative CPs.
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not require Case) can be complements of any predicates, including adjectives. I will revisit this
consequence in §2.3.2.1.
This theory eliminates one of Grimshaw's selectional requirements by reducing it to an
element independently required by the grammar. However, specification for Case is, like
c-selection, independent of s-selection. The fact that know allows DPs and wonder does not is
still specified lexically for the predicates, and while it is now specified with Case instead of
c-selection, Case Theory (at least as presented by Pesetsky) preserves the Autonomy Hypothesis:
marking or not marking one's object for 0-case is independent of selection for interrogative (or
propositional) complements, neither one affecting the other.
2.2.3. Discussion
We have seen reasons to believe that a predicate's ability to embed CQs (or lack thereof) is, from
the point of view of s-selection, accidental; it does not follow from semantic facts alone. The
Autonomy Hypothesis explicitly states that allowing or disallowing question-denoting DPs as
objects cannot be predicted from allowing question-denoting objects in general, whether it is
c-selection or Case Theory that determines the possibility of DPs. Marking predicates like
wonder and care with the quirky [+0-case] feature is, by the very nature of quirky case, an
arbitrary fact underivable from other features of the lexical entry.
Data in the next section will suggest the opposite: CQ-embedding, which Grimshaw and
Pesetsky reduce to a syntactic fact, does indeed correlate with semantic facts beyond question-
embedding, and therefore predicates never need to be specified as allowing or disallowing CQs.
Before we look at that data, we should note some evidence that the ability to embed "concealed"
forms-DPs with propositional or interrogative meanings-does not correlate with the ability to
embed DPs simpliciter. There are two distinct ways in which a predicate may allow DPs and also
allow semantic objects with meaning M, and yet not allow DPs with meaning M (i.e. "concealed
M" DPs).
First, marking a predicate as requiring [+0-case] for its object predicts that it cannot take
any DP at all as its complement. However, it turns out that wonder (and other predicates, such as
inquire) can embed DPs, though of course its s-selection requires these DPs to denote questions.7
7 Oddly, while wonder can embed question-denoting DPs, it cannot embed any with the noun question
itself:
(i) Kim asked who left, and Sandy asked that question as well.
(ii) *Kim wondered who left, and Sandy wondered that question as well.
On the other hand, proposition-embedding predicates cannot embed them either.
(iii) *Kim { knew/guessed/told us/... } who left, and Sandy {knew/guessed/told us/... } that question as well.
The fact that ask a (certain) question is fine whereas wonder/know/guess/tell a (certain) question is not remains
deeply mysterious to me.
(At least, this judgment holds for most speakers. Heidi Harley (p.c.) reports that, while on jury duty, she
saw a lawyer "asking a prospective juror if he thought his upcoming dissertation deadline would distract him unduly
during the trial if he was selected as a juror....during the course of asking about this, the lawyer said: I'm wondering
this question from two directions." Harley, other informants, and I all find the italicized sentence quite strange; I
have no idea whether an Arizona lawyer would also accept sentences like (iii).)
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For instance, demonstratives and the same thing can denote questions when they take their
meaning from an antecedent question.
(23) a. Kim wondered who left, and Sandy wondered that as well.
b. Kim wondered who left, and Sandy wondered the same thing.
Relative clause markers and interrogative pronouns, which are generally taken to have Case, also
readily appear as the complement to wonder.
(24) a. John told Mary who left, which she had wondered for some time.
b. What Mary wondered was who had left.
c. What is Mary wondering now?
Of course, these are actual DPs complete with Case and not some sort of exceptionally Caseless
objects: they cannot appear in genuinely Caseless positions. For instance, like other DPs and
unlike CPs, they cannot be extraposed subjects. 8
(25) a. It matters to Kim who left.
b. * It matters to Sandy the same thing. (cf. The same thing matters to Sandy)
c. * What does it matter to Kim? (cf. What matters to Kim ?)
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that wonder really does c-select for, or assign Case to,
DPs; and of course it allows question objects. Nevertheless, it does not allow concealed question
objects: CQs are not among the question-denoting DPs it can embed.
Second, a predicate that allows concealed DPs ought to allow them for any meaning it
s-selects for. Pesetsky argues for the existence of concealed propositions:
(26) a. I'll assume that he is intelligent.
b. I'll assume his intelligence. (= Pesetsky 1991, 6)
(27) a. I'll pretend that he is intelligent.
b. * I'll pretend his intelligence. (= Pesetsky 1991, 7)
Predicates that embed concealed propositions must select for propositional meanings and must
not assign [+O-case] to their complement: thus, assume assigns Case normally, whereas pretend
assigns [+O-case] to its complement. Both verbs s-select only for propositions, making them
exactly analogous to ask and wonder, which s-select only for interrogatives.
We saw in the last section that know accepts concealed DP complements and therefore
does not assign [+O-case]. It s-selects for interrogatives and therefore it allows concealed
questions. Because it also s-selects for propositions, it should also allow concealed propositions.
However, it does not:
8 (25c) has a reading idiomatic to relevance predicates, for which what means "why" or "what...for": what
do you care? means why do you care? or what do you care for?, but what did you leave? does not mean why did you
leave? or what did you leave for?. Similarly, we find what does it matter to Kim who left?. On this reading what is
an adverb, not a DP, and therefore does not require Case. As a DP, it does require Case assignment, so that (25c)
cannot elicit (25a) as a response.
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(28) a. I know that he is intelligent.
b. * I know his intelligence.
Insofar as the DP in (28b) can be interpreted at all, it can be interpreted only as a concealed
question: I know how intelligent he is or I know what the level of his intelligence is. So once
again we have a predicate whose concealed-DP-embedding abilities are not a simple function of
its abilities to embed DPs.9
Neither of these undesirable predictions is an argument against Case Theory itself, for
which arguments exist independent of facts about CQs. Indeed, in the remainder of this chapter,
we will come back to Case Theory to explain certain distributional facts. What the discussion in
this section does indicate is the following. First, autonomous syntactic and semantic selection
properties, however they may be described, cannot have the independence claimed in Grimshaw
(1979). The distribution of CQs depends on either some semantic fact or some semantically-
influenced syntactic selection. Second, marking predicates as assigning [+O-case] does not by
itself explain the distribution.
This brings us back to the Proposition/CQ Correlation. Recall that the correlation
expresses a generalization on predicates which, in a theory that separates the ability to embed
CQs from the ability to s-select for propositions, must be an accidental fact about the lexicon. If
we re-examine the data surrounding the know/ask/care/wonder distinction that introduced this
chapter and find the PCQC to be correct, we will have further evidence that the Autonomy
Hypothesis and Case Theory are insufficient to explain the distribution of CQs.
2.3. A Second Approach: a Semantic Answer
Before going directly to the evidence for the PCQC, we should consider a previous attempt to
correlate the distribution of CQs with other semantic attributes of question-embedding
predicates. Dor (1992), taking Karttunen's classification of question-embedding predicates as a
starting point (see the list in §1.3.1), observed that---certain exceptions aside-predicates in five
of Karttunen's categories (knowledge retention, knowledge acquisition, communication,
decision, and conjecture) accept CQs and predicates in three (opinion, inquisition, relevance) do
not.' 0
9 Because I will not discuss concealed propositions beyond this section, I am not certain that the theory
proposed in the following chapters does not make the same prediction. If it does, my suspicion is that, just as I will
argue that so-called "concealed questions" actually have the denotation of propositions, a "concealed proposition"
denotes something other than an actual proposition, and that assume, but not pretend or know, has a meaning
compatible with whatever it does denote. Turning this suspicion into a theory would require an examination of the
distribution of concealed propositions, which would hopefully correlate with some other aspect of these verbs (as the
distribution of CQs correlates to the distribution of propositions). This kind of move might be compatible with Case
Theory, but exploring the adaptations necessary is well outside the scope of this dissertation.
'0 Dor, like Grimshaw, sets aside verbs with question subjects as outside the realm of lexical specification.
Primarily this encompasses dependence verbs, though many of Karttunen's question-taking predicates (be relevant,
be important, be significant) take questions as subjects or extraposed subjects with an expletive it (Who left is
relevant; It is relevant who left).
The tradition in the literature of ignoring predicates which select question subjects will come back to haunt
us later. Beck and Sharvit (2002) use verbs of dependency as crucial evidence for their theory, and anyone writing
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The following table represents Dor's judgments on the eight categories:
(29) Dor's (approximate) judgments for predicates with CQ complements
a. retaining knowledge John { knew / recalled / remembered / forgot } the price of milk.
b. acquiring knowledge John {I learned / noticed / found out / discovered} the price of milk.
c. communicating John { told / showed } me the price of milk.
John {indicated / disclosed / revealed } the price of milk.
d. decision John { decided / determined / specified} the price of milk.
e. conjecture John {guessed / predicted / estimated } the price of milk.
f. opinion *John { was certain / was convinced } the price of milk.
g. inquisition John asked (me) the price of milk.
*John { wondered / inquired } the price of milk.
h. relevance *John cared the price of milk.
The pattern in (29) suggests the existence of exactly the sort of semantically-based restriction on
CQ distribution that the syntactic theories of the previous section cannot capture. Because we are
treating Karttunen's categories as a descriptive tool of the metalanguage rather than lexical facts
about words of English-that is, because predicates are not lexically marked as [+decision] or
[+conjecture]-these judgments do not themselves represent a grammatical correlation between
the ability to take a CQ complement and some other fact about a predicate. Both theories
considered in this section offer some semantic fact which is present in, or predictable from, a
predicate's lexical entry, and which correlates with Karttunen's categories in (roughly) the same
way that CQ distribution does.
In §2.3.1, we will look at Dor's explanation for the correlation in (28), which links these
judgments with the "epistemic commitment" of a predicate, and see that the generalization is not
as clear-cut as he predicts. §2.3.2 will present the case for a new semantic explanation, namely
that a correlation exists between embedding propositions and embedding concealed questions.
2.3.1. Dor (1992): Epistemic Commitment
Dor proposes that predicates can be distinguished by a variation on factivity more suited for
questions: it is not the truth of the complement that matters, but its epistemic commitment:
whether the subject knows the answer to the question complement. This is exemplified by the
syllogism in (30).11
about question complementation can no longer ignore these predicates, which will turn out to cause a certain amount
of trouble.
All the same, I'll join my predecessors in setting aside question subjects for the time being, though I do so
for expository reasons and with the promise to return to them later.
11 The first premise of the syllogism structure involves the embedded question what X was. Though identity
questions are common paraphrases of CQs, Dor does not seem to intend the syllogism to require identity
questions-his syllogisms use the question where the meeting was to be held-but instead apparently uses what X
was and X was Y to stand in for any question and its true answer. The premises that appear below will also not
strictly have the form what X was.
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(30) John [PRED-ed] what X was.
X was Y.
-John knew that X was Y. (= Dor's (18))
If a predicate satisfies the syllogism in (30), it has Positive Epistemic Commitment (PEC),
formally defined in the paper as "impl[ying]...that its cognitive subject has assigned the true
value to the variable represented by a wh-phrase." The opposite property, Negative Epistemic
Commitment (NEC), is defined analogously, with the syllogism in (31).
(31) John [PRED-ed] what X was.
X was Y.
[-John did not know that X was Y. (= Dor's (26))
An NEC predicate is one that satisfies this syllogism and thus "implies...that its cognitive
subject has not assigned the true value to the variable represented by a wh-phrase".
Dor claims that, broadly speaking, the predicates in the first five categories in
Karttunen's classification are PEC predicates, while those in the others are NEC. Predicates in
the first five categories embed both concealed questions and exclamations, while those in the last
three embed neither. Dor therefore concludes that only PEC predicates take exclamatory
complements, and only non-NEC predicates take concealed questions. The difference between
the two sets is ask, which is non-NEC (because one can ask a question while knowing the
answer-game show hosts do so often), but is also not PEC (because one can ask a question
without knowing the answer). Not being PEC, it cannot embed exclamations, but not being NEC,
it can embed concealed questions.
This theory is appealing in light of the conclusions of the previous section, as it describes
the distribution of CQs with no reference to syntactic complementation (c-selection, Case) at all.
Nevertheless, it has certain empirical gaps. For example, within the class of inquisitive predicates
Dor groups inquire with wonder (and separately from ask) in the class of NEC predicates on the
basis of the following syllogism.
(32) John inquired where the meeting was to be held.
The meeting was to be held in the office.
[John did not know that the meeting was to be held in the office.
But for many speakers this syllogism is not valid; inquire does not differ from ask at all in this
respect. That is to say, if John already knows the answer and is stating a question (for
confirmation, say, or to make the answer public), the first sentence in (32) is as acceptable as
John asked where the meeting was to be held. Nevertheless, even for those speakers who find
(32) invalid (i.e. for those speakers for whom inquire is a non-NEC predicate), inquire does not
take concealed questions.'12
12 My own intuition that (32) is invalid is not strong, and some readers have questioned the judgment.
Nevertheless, every informant I asked accepted inquire in a context in which the inquirer already knew the answer to
the question and wanted to make the answer public. Searching with Google and with Amazon.com's contents-
searching feature turns up numerous examples from published books and articles, such as:
(i) During dinner Anna Mihalovna talked of the rumours from the war, of dear Nikolay, inquired twice when
his last letter had been received, though she knew perfectly well, and observed that they might well be
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Conjecture verbs do not neatly categorize as non-NEC predicates. Dor considers guess a
PEC-predicate, which would mean that John guessed where the meeting was to be held entails
that he knew the location. Though one meaning of guess is guess correctly, it seems more likely
as a scenario that, if John guessed where the meeting was to be held, he did not actually know.' 3
This is even clearer with estimate and predict.
(33) John estimated how tall the building was.
The building was 45 stories tall.
fJohn knew that the building was 45 stories tall.
tJohn did not know that the building was 45 stories tall.
(34) John predicted who the winner of the 2004 World Series would be.
The Red Sox were the winners of the 2004 World Series.
-John knew that the Red Sox would be the winners of the 2004 World Series.
tJohn did not know that the Red Sox would be the winners of the 2004 World Series.
getting a letter from him to-day. (Leo Tolstoy, War and Peace, translation at Bibliomania
(http://www.bibliomania.com/); also used in Rosemary Edmond's translation)
(ii) "Did you hear that?" [Threepio] inquired rhetorically of his patient companion, referring to the throbbing
sound. (George Lucas, Star Wars: A New Hope)
(iii) When it came time to pay the bill, I inquired if they took credit cards, but I was sure I knew the answer
already. ("Lebanese specialties, with character", May 21, 2003, The [New Hampshire] Union Leader:
http://www.theunionleader.com/Gourmet show.html?article=21479&archive=1)
Of course, some speakers do accept the syllogism in (32). Danny Fox (p.c.) observed the following, which
may explain the fuzziness of the judgments: asking and inquiring, unlike the actions described by many other
predicates (know, remember, care, wonder), are public acts, and thus rely not only on whether the subject knows the
answer but on whether the subject seems to know it. A person may ask something whether or not it's known that
they know the answer (again, think of game show hosts or professors giving tests), but inquiring something suggests
that they don't know the answer. Consequently, a person may inquire something she already knows the answer to,
even something that it's known that she knows the answer to (as with Anna Mihalovna, who inquired twice), but her
inquiry is pragmatically disingenuous-it requires a pretense of not knowing the answer and thereby violates a
social convention. Nevertheless, one can "inquire" as long as one is willing to flout the pragmatic felicity; and on
the purely semantic grounds on which Dor's theory makes predictions, inquire is non-NEC.
Complicating matters further, inquire historically did take concealed questions as objects. The OED
separates the question-taking meaning of inquire into the usages "with interrogative clause as object" and "with
simple object". The latter, it notes, is "now less usual", but the citations indicate that inquire used to appear with
concealed questions: You must enquire your way (Shakespeare, Coriolanus); The wily mother...Wi' heart-struck,
anxious care, inquires his name (Bums, "Cotter's Saturday Night"); and many others. This may seem to cause
trouble for the PCQC-assuming that Shakespeare and Burns would have rejected inquire with a proposition, at any
rate. My suspicion is that inquire used to behave the way ask currently does; see §5.3.3 for discussion.
In the end, inquire is at the very least problematic for Dor. The details of pragmatics, synchronic variation,
and diachronic change, I must leave to future researchers.
13 Dor's actual formulation of Positive/Negative Epistemic Commitment requires that the predicate only
commit the subject to (not) knowing the answer to the complement in some sense of the predicate. This is an unusual
sort of requirement, insofar as it would allow an NEC use of a verb like guess to embed concealed questions on the
strength of the existence of other uses. Even so, it's not clear that any sense of a conjecture verb implies that the
subject knows the answer to the embedded question.
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In both cases, John may have been right (i.e., he may have estimated that the building was 45
stories tall, or he may have predicted that the Red Sox would win the World Series) and even
have been confident that he was right, but in neither case did he know. Thus estimate and predict
do not seem to be PEC predicates at all, and in fact appear to be NEC predicates. Nevertheless,
both take CQs (John estimated the height of the building; John predicted the winner of the 2004
World Series).1"
With these predicates, we already have enough counterexamples to Dor's proposed
correlation for us to start exploring other approaches. Before we continue, however, let us take a
moment to note a handful of other predicates, undiscussed by Dor, for which the theory of
epistemic commitment makes the wrong predictions. In fact, we will see in the next section that
they also run counter to the correlation to be proposed between CQ-embedding and proposition-
embedding, but that gives us even more reason to want them on the table in advance.' 5
First among these predicates is care, which Dor uses to exemplify the non-CQ-
embedding nature of relevance predicates but leaves out of the PEC/NEC discussion. The NEC
syllogism does not hold with care (i.e. (35) is invalid), so care does not have a negative
epistemic commitment.
14 Verbs of conjecture have a complicated sort of factivity. With propositional clauses, none of them are
factive:
(i) John guessed that I was 20 years old, but he was wrong.
John estimated that the building was 50 stories tall, but he was wrong.
John predicted that the Yankees would win the 2004 World Series, but he was wrong.
With question clauses, the verbs seem more factive...
(ii) ??John guessed how old I was, but he was wrong.
?John estimated how tall the building was, but he was wrong.
??John predicted who would win the 2004 World Series, but he was wrong.
...and with concealed questions, guess and predict seem outright factive.
(iii) #John guessed my age, but he was wrong.
?John estimated the height of the building, but he was wrong.
#John predicted the winner of the 2004 World Series, but he was wrong.
Of course, tell behaves similarly-non-factive with propositions, factive with questions and concealed questions.
Note that, in any case, the difference in the factivity of these verbs with questions and concealed questions
cannot salvage Dor's theory. Though John guessed my age and I am 30 years old may together entail John guessed
that I am 30 years old, i.e. that his guess was correct, the verb-as explained in the main text-still carries no
positive epistemic commitment: correct or not, John didn't know that I am 30 years old. (And, of course, to use
factivity by itself to describe the ability to embed concealed questions is to beg the question for predicates like
wonder, as it is only for proposition-embedding predicates that factivity is a sensible notion.)
15 As it happens, the upcoming Case-based explanation for why they are counterexamples to the PCQC can
also be used to explain why they are counterexamples to Dor's PEC/NEC approach. But while it is true that one
could supplement epistemic commitment with Case Theory and thereby explain inform and investigate, be certain
would become a new problem: while still NEC, it will be able to embed CQs.
-47 -
(35) John cared where the meeting was to be held.
The meeting was to be held in the office.
IVJohn did not know that the meeting was to be held in the office.
Nevertheless, as we saw earlier and as Dor observes, care does not take CQs (*John cared the
location of the meeting).
Moreover, a few predicates differ from those used to exemplify their categories. Inform,
like tell and other verbs of communication, has a positive epistemic commitment: like tell,
question-embedding inform is factive, and thus to inform someone what X is one must know the
answer to the embedded question. However, inform contrasts with tell in that it does not allow
CQs.
(36) a. John told us the price of milk.
b. * John informed us the price of milk.
Conversely, while predicates of inquisition generally do not allow CQs, there are a few
predicates in the category which, while also NEC predicates, seem better with CQs than wonder
does. For example, investigate is at least arguably NEC, as one cannot investigate something one
already knows the answer to, but investigate + CQ seems better than does wonder.'6
(37) a. * John wondered the price of milk.
b. ? John investigated the price of milk.
With all of these cases-care, inform, investigate-Dor's classification seems at best
incomplete. 17
Dor's observation that CQ distribution is sensitive to some semantic property of
predicates is sound, but his proposal that this property is epistemic commitment contains too
many empirical gaps to be correct. Let us now move on to evidence for a new proposal.
16 Though compare footnote 12: it might be semantically possible, and merely pragmatically disingenuous,
to "investigate" something one already knows the answer to. Hence "arguably" NEC.
17 Danny Fox (p.c.) observes that, because of the tenses in the syllogisms, forget also gets misclassified as
NEC. Forget, as a verb of retaining knowledge, should be analogous to know and remember, both of which are PEC
predicates. However, John forgot where the meeting was to be held entails that, at the time of his forgetting, he
didn't know that the meeting was to be held in the office, and not that he did know.
John's forgetting, on the other hand, does entail that he knew where the meeting was to be held at some
previous point (i.e. John had known that the meeting was to be held in the office). We could change the conclusion
in the PEC schema in (30) to read John knew or had known that X was Y. But making the analogous change to the
NEC schema, so that its conclusion reads It is not the case that John knew or had known that X was Y, i.e. John did
not know and had not known that X was Y, results in no predicates being NEC: John might wonder where the
meeting was to be held even if he had known at some earlier point, but forgotten in the meantime, that it was to be
held in the office.
It might still be the case that a relatively minor alteration to Dor's theory will repair this problem, e.g.
allowing a certain flexibility in the tense of the syllogism, just as a certain flexibility in tense is necessary for the
identity question paraphrases of CQs (see footnote 7 in chapter 1). For that reason, I have consigned this discussion
to a footnote; I am not certain that forget is a strong argument against Dor's theory, but it does bear mentioning as a
concern if not an actual challenge.
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2.3.2. The Proposition/Concealed Question Correlation
The initial observation that propositions and CQs seem to have unrelated distributions was based
on the four predicates know, ask, care, and wonder, each of which exemplified a different
possibility for CQ-embedding and proposition-embedding. Let us now give these possibilities a
more careful examining by turning, like Dor, to Karttunen's predicates. Dor provided judgments
for the ability to embed CQs; now let us see whether they can embed propositions.









John { knew / recalled / remembered / forgot I that the price
of milk was $1.99/gallon.
John {learned / noticed / found out / discovered} that....
John {told / showed } me that....
John {indicated / disclosed / revealed } that....
John { decided / determined / specified } that...
John {guessed / predicted / estimated that...
John {was certain / was convinced} that...
*John {asked / wondered / inquired } that....
John cared that....
Combining this with Dor's judgments in (29), we see the following correlation:
(39) Comparison of CQ embedding and proposition embedding
a. know b. learn c. tell
/ V /
d. decide e. predict f. be certain
/ /, *
[inform]
For the most part it seems to be the case that proposition-embedding predicates are CQ-
embedding predicates and vice versa. The classes of opinion and relevance predicates are
exceptions; and ask is an exception within its category, as are inform and investigate, as we saw
at the end of the previous section. If these various exceptions can be explained-and we will see
immediately how three of the five can-then we postulate with some confidence the Proposition/
Concealed Question Correlation first given at the beginning of this chapter:
(40) The Proposition/Concealed Question Correlation (PCQC) (approximate version)
In argument positions that allow questions, propositions and concealed questions have the
same distribution.
The PCQC is not an explanation; it is only an observation about the data. It therefore suggests a
next step, in two parts: the correlation should follow from other facts, and the way in which it
follows should explain the counterexamples.
An explanation of ask and care must wait until Chapter 5, after we have seen how to











justify postulating the observed correlation by explaining other counterexamples. We will use
machinery already available-Case Theory, and the observation that CQs must have identity
meanings-to explain the apparent fact that opinion predicates allow propositional complements
but not CQs. We will also examine two of the predicates introduced at the end of the previous
section, inform and investigate. (Note that inquire, raised as a challenge to Dor's theory, is
unproblematic here: it allows neither propositions nor CQs. Similarly, the conjecture verbs that
caused trouble for Dor follow the PCQC.)
2.3.2.1. An explanation of be certain
Dor judged be certain and other predicates of opinion as non-CQ-embedding on the basis of
sentences like (29f), repeated here.
(29f) * John { was certain / was convinced} the price of milk.
Certainly this sentence is ungrammatical. However, we need neither epistemic commitment nor
the PCQC to see why: its ungrammaticality is a direct consequence of the inability of an
adjective to assign the necessary Case to a DP complement. CPs, both propositional and
interrogative, are unproblematic because they do not require Case.
We could at this point dismiss adjectives of opinion as a counterexample to the PCQC by
simply excluding them from consideration on Case-based grounds, but there is good reason not
to do so. A deeper exploration of be certain and other adjectives can actually support the
generalization if it shows that, in the right circumstances, they do allow CQs as well as
propositions.
Recall from §2.2.2 that Pesetsky (1991) not only uses Case to rule out CQs as
complements for question-embedding adjectives, but also observes the consequence that, as
prepositional phrases can appear in Caseless positions, non-Case-assigning words like adjectives
and the verb care can take PPs as complements.
(41) a. John was certain *(about) the time. (cf. Pesetsky 1991, 34b/35)
b. John was convinced *(about) the time.
c. John cares *(about) the time. (= Pesetsky 1991, 33a)
We might want to claim that the acceptability of about + CQ in these argument positions,
positions that allows propositions, provides support for the PCQC. Unfortunately, inquire and
wonder also allow PP complements.
(42) a. Mary inquired *(about) the murderer of Caesar.
b. Bill wondered *(about) John's whereabouts. (= Pesetsky 1991, 33b-c)
Using the data in (41) to resolve opinion predicates and care as counterexamples to the PCQC
would force us to consider wonder, previously a core motivating case to posit the correlation at
all, to be a new counterexample. Additionally, this is beginning to seem like a step backwards for
a semantic explanation: not only did we reject [+O-case] as an explanation, but the Case-based
explanation for care and wonder requires the kind of predicate-by-predicate stipulation that a
semantic explanation seeks to minimize.
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Using about to make these predicates compatible with CQs does not help the correlation.
But this is not the result of using a preposition, but of using this particular preposition. Pesetsky
himself makes the crucial observation, contra his 1981 claim,
...that about is [not] a "dummy" preposition like of which makes no semantic
contribution. As correctly pointed out by Abney (1985), about does make a
contribution. Thus John asked about the time need not be a request to name a
specific time of day (e.g. ten o'clock), but may be a general request for
information concerning some particular time of day (e.g. why ten o'clock and not
noon was chosen for some event). (Pesetsky 1991, footnote 6)
That is to say, the DP complement of about in John asked about the time no longer has the strict
identity-question or identity-proposition meaning characteristic of CQs, like the DP complement
in John asked the time has. The same observation holds for inquire about, wonder about, be
certain about, and be convinced about. The DPs do not necessarily denote identity questions-
indeed, they seem to denote actual individuals, and the PP headed by about can take on the
meaning of almost any question about the individual. As further evidence that about is not
merely connecting the predicate to a concealed question complement, note that DPs that cannot
be CQs can nevertheless serve as the object of about in these constructions:
(43) a. Bill wondered about Rome.
b. John was certain about the semanticist at USDNH.
Since Rome and the semanticist at USNDH cannot be CQs, about is doing more than licensing
CQs in a position that ordinarily does not allow them.
But while it is true that about is not a dummy preposition, we do have a preposition
which is used as a Case marker and "makes no semantic contribution": of. Just as of is used to
mark Case in nominalization and certain gerunds (Caesar's destruction of the city, John's eating
of the cake), we can use it with be certain:
(44) a. Sam is certain about the time of the meeting.
b. Sam is certain of the time of the meeting.
c. * Sam is certain {by/at/to/with/from... } the time of the meeting.
Other than about DP, which can denote a question due to the semantic contribution of about, no
other preposition can head a PP complement to be certain. Of makes no more semantic
contribution in (44b) than it does when introducing the object of a nominalized or gerundive
verb. So in contrast to the relatively unconstrained meaning of (44a), (44b) cannot mean that
Sam is certain of any fact about the time of the meeting except for its identity. In other words,
when it is the complement of certain, of DP has exactly the meaning of a CQ, which suggests
that the DP is a CQ and the preposition is exactly what about cannot be: a semantically empty
preposition inserted for Case requirements.
The same facts hold for other adjectives that take questions as complements and for other
phrases such as have an idea that do not assign Case directly; while verbs do not generally allow
Case-marking of, they may select particular prepositions.
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(45) a. Sam is aware (*of) the price of milk.
b. Sam has an idea (*of) the price of milk.
c. Sam and Jesse agreed (*on) the price of milk.
As with certain, all of these would also be grammatical with about (in which case the DP would
not be not a CQ), and would not be grammatical with any other preposition, and have only an
identity-question denotation for of + the DP. No such empty preposition exists for, say, wonder
or inquire.
(46) a. * Sam wonders { of/on/to... } the price of milk.
b. * Sam inquired { of/on/to... } the price of milk.
(In contrast, see the next section for another verb which does use of as a Case marker.)
In short, we need not simply dismiss adjectives like be certain as irrelevant for Case
reasons. Instead, once standard Case requirements are met-"standard" in the sense that an
adjective's inability to assign Case is a general and predictable fact and not the same kind of
quirky case needed to rule out wonder and care-predicates of opinion accept both propositional
and CQ complements. In this way they actually support the generalization in the PCQC.
2.3.2.2. An explanation of inform
We can find a similar, albeit more complex, Case-based explanation for inform. Inform (and its
near-synonym notify, though not other communication predicates such as tell) embeds
propositions but not concealed questions:
(47) a. Kim informed Sandy when the meeting would take place.
b. Kim informed Sandy that the meeting was at 3 pm.
c. * Kim informed Sandy the time of the meeting.
But on closer inspection, inform does not embed questions quite as freely as other predicates.
There is nothing exceptional about the embedded questions who left or what you find out, and tell
embeds either without anomaly; yet inform cannot.
(48) a. John told me who left.
b. * John informed me who left.
c. Keep telling Sandy what you find out.
d. * Keep informing Sandy what you find out.
In particular, there seems to be a specific restriction on who- and what-questions as complements
to inform, in contrast to when-, where-, or why-questions. One might suspect that some
difference in the semantics is responsible, but note that the grammatical (47a) is essentially
synonymous with the ungrammatical *Kim informed Sandy what the time of the meeting was.
Let us hypothesize that inform has an odd syntactic selectional restriction against
embedding who- or what-questions. This might extend to explain its resistance to concealed
questions: even if we take CQs to have propositional meanings, they are closer to who- or what-
questions than where- or why-questions Recall from §1.2.2 that, for instance, the capital of
Vermont specifically cannot have the meaning where the capital of Vermont is.
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What makes this especially seem like a syntactic selectional restriction is that these
disallowed question complements improve with the addition of the Case-marking preposition of.
And like be certain-but unlike other verbs like wonder and care-the verb inform allows CQs
with of.
(49) a. John informed me of who left.
b. Keep informing Sandy of what you find out.
c. Kim informed Sandy of the time of the meeting.
Of course, inform is a verb and not an adjective, so this fact about Case assignment cannot be
reduced to a more general restriction as it could with be certain. That would make inform with a
CQ a genuine instance of quirky case assignment, with independent motivation from the way it
embeds clausal questions. This dissertation cannot resolve the mysterious details of inform's
Case requirements, but these details provide an explanation of its apparent nature as a
counterexample to the PCQC.'8
2.3.2.3. An explanation of investigate
Earlier, I marked investigate as questionable with a CQ rather than ungrammatical. Certainly the
sentence in (50) is not as bad as similar sentences with wonder or care.
(50) ? John investigated the price of milk. (= 37b)
Other predicates of inquisition, e.g. be interested in, also seem to allow CQs.
But recall once again the observation that CQs necessarily have identity meanings-that
is, that they can be paraphrased by identity questions (or, as we will see later, identity
propositions). With know, learn, tell, and so forth, DP complements denote exactly that: John
knows the price of milk means John knows what the price of milk is (or, if the price of milk is
$1.99/gallon, John knows that the price of milk is $1.99/gallon). The same is not true for
investigate and be interested in: while (50) can mean John investigated what the price of milk
was, the sentence can also describe a situation in which John investigated why the price of milk
was so high, or whose job it was to determine the price of milk, and so forth. The DP
complement of investigate, like that of wonder/care/know about above, and discuss and comment
on in § 1.2.2, is not really a concealed question.
2.4. Summary
Now that many of the apparent counterexamples to the generalization have been explained, we
can put forth with more confidence a slightly revised version of the PCQC. In light of the
discussion in the previous section, the generalization must make allowances for Case assignment,
both predictable (as with adjectives) and quirky (as with inform).
18 1 first discussed inform as a problematic predicate for Dor because it does not seem to embed CQs. One
could counter this problem using the argument in this subsection: inform actually does embed CQs, once you
include the preposition of. But the immediate consequence of this argument is that the NEC be certain, once you
include of, also embeds CQs; using Case explains inform only at the cost of no longer explaining opinion predicates.
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(51) Comparison of CQ embedding and proposition embedding (revised)
a. know b. learn c. tell d. decide e. predict f. be certain g. wonder g'. ask h. care
CQ / / / / / / * / *
Prop. / / / / / / * * /
(52) The Proposition/Concealed Question Correlation (PCQC) (revised version)
In Case-assigning argument positions that allow questions, propositions and concealed
questions have the same distribution.
When the verbs under consideration were know, wonder, ask, and care, the latter two seemed to
indicate the absence of a correlation. Now they seem like exceptions to what is otherwise a solid
correlation in the distribution of CQs and (clausal) propositions.
What does this tell us about the meaning of CQs themselves? We began the chapter with
the possibility that CQs denote questions, coupled with the observation that, with clausal and
concealed questions having the same semantic type but different syntactic categories, a theory of
syntactic argument selection would be necessary to explain their distribution. However, an
approach that reduces CQ-embedding to c-selection or quirky case, or any other syntactic fact
independent of s-selection for propositions, cannot capture the PCQC; the correlation between
embedding propositions and embedding CQs becomes an accidental fact about the lexicon.
These theories would need an additional stipulation in the grammar about the relation between
the syntax and the semantics, which runs counter to the Autonomy Hypothesis.
Therefore, we must consider other possibilities for CQ meanings, meanings sensitive to
the semantic properties of question-embedding predicates. The next chapter presents the primary
current theory of CQ meaning, in which CQs denote individual concepts, and shows that-
whether or not it captures the PCQC-it makes incorrect predictions about which DPs can be
CQs. In Chapter 4, I propose a new theory in which CQs denote propositions, which has the
PCQC as an immediate consequence.
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CHAPTER 3 - WHY CONCEALED QUESTIONS Do NOT DENOTE
INDIVIDUAL CONCEPTS
In the last chapter, we saw that treating concealed questions as denoting questions led to an
inability to explain their distribution. Though this treatment allowed a simplification in the
s-selection of CQ-embedding predicates, which universally accept CP questions as complements
and thus need no additional semantic marking to accept DP questions, it simultaneously forced a
complication in the c-selection or Case assignment, as well as blocking any easy connection
between the ability to embed CQs with other semantic facts.
In this chapter, we will consider (and ultimately reject) another possible denotation for
CQs, namely that of individual concepts (ICs), functions from indices to individuals. We begin
in §3.1 with a discussion of why assigning individual denotations to CQs is insufficient. §3.2
then introduces the individual concept, followed by the theory of Romero (2005), in which CQs
have IC denotations. §3.3 suggests, as a challenge to the theory, that a wide variety of DPs have
IC denotations, and not all of them can be CQs; and §3.4 introduces Lasersohn (2005), who
offers a new view of individual concepts, which makes them seem even less well-suited to be
CQ denotations.
3.1. Why Concealed Questions Do Not Denote Individuals
Before we venture into individual concepts, let us consider a simpler possibility, namely that
CQs denote individuals. After all, DPs (or at least definite descriptions) need to have individual
denotations available for independent reasons, and giving CQs denotations of type e instead of
type (s, e) potentially allows simpler meanings, with one less variable to bind or otherwise
saturate. It will turn out that neither of these is an advantage: empirical evidence suggests that
first, while DPs can denote individuals, they do not when used as CQs, and second, having an
intensional object-i.e., having a world variable-is advantageous, and indeed necessary.
But as neither of these conclusions is immediately obvious, we will begin by seeing what
a theory treating CQs as individual-denoting expressions would look like. As mentioned above,
any definite description, whether it can act as a CQ or not and whatever other denotations it
might have, can denote an individual of type e.1
(1) a. Sam painted her bedroom the color of her hair.
b. Leslie visited the capital of Vermont.
c. Kim met the semanticist who teaches at USNDH.
In none of these sentences is the DP interpreted as a CQ. So unlike the theory that CQs denote
questions, this theory requires no additional mechanism to derive CQ denotations. The extra
work in this case lies in postulating an extra meaning for verbs like know, but not for those like
wonder, in which the first argument is an individual, rather than a proposition or question.
Heim (1979) somewhat cautiously advances a theory of this kind. She suggests that a
CQ-embedding predicate is context-dependent and has a built-in variable P(s,, (,e, )) whose value is
Or the equivalent, if for instance one generalizes to the worst case and has all DPs denote (et, t) objects.
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determined pragmatically. For example, the CQ-embedding sense of know, KNOW(P),
corresponds roughly to "knows as P"; in a context where P is the property of being the capital of
Italy, know x has the sense "know x as the capital of Italy". The invalidity of the syllogism in (2)
with CQ-embedding know, which we saw in § 1.2.1, relies on using two different Ps in the first
premise and the conclusion.
(2) John knowscQ the capital of Italy.
The capital of Italy is the largest town in Italy.
W- John knowscQ the largest town in Italy.
In both the premise and the conclusion, the object DPs denote Rome, which is both the capital of
Italy and its largest town. In the first premise, the contextual variable P is the property of being
the capital of Italy, so that the sentence means "John knows Rome [- 'the capital of Italy'] as the
capital of Italy". The conclusion, using a different P, means "John knows Rome [- 'the largest
town in Italy'] as the largest city in Italy."
Romero (2005) provides a simple argument against Heim's theory: because KNOW(P) is
a relation between two individuals, any individual-denoting argument should provide all the
information the predicate needs. For example, Heim's pragmatic theory would allow John knows
Rome to have the CQ-like meaning "John knows Rome as the capital of Italy" in the proper
context, but the sentence has only the "be familiar with" sense of know.2 (For another argument
from Romero, one that centers on an ambiguity to be discussed in §3.2.2, see footnote 13.) This
argument, mutatis mutandis, will hold against any theory in which the CQ denotes an individual.
In this way, it turns out that having the world variable in an (s, e) denotation will prove useful in
distinguishing expressions which, though accidentally coextensional, have different intensions.
So using individual denotations for CQs involves an unavoidable lack of information. In
addition, empirical evidence demonstrates that DPs used as CQs behave differently than DPs
used to denote individuals. For example, while both CQs and individual-denoting DPs can be the
objects in right-node-raising sentences, a single DP object cannot denote a CQ for one verb and
an individual for the other (similar facts hold with VP conjunction when both verbs are
passivized).
2 A possible context, suggested by Kai von Fintel, p.c.:
[I asked John the capital of Italy and Peter the capital of Germany.]
(i) John knew Rome but Peter didn't know Berlin.
The sentence in (i) may not sound terrible in this context, though on an informal survey of English speakers it's not
particularly good. Of course, (ii) sounds fairly robustly bad, even if the conversants are trivia buffs who know
offhand the birthplaces of various famous people:
(ii) #John knew the birthplace of Sophia Loren but Peter didn't know the birthplace of Elke Sommer.
Taking "the birthplace of Sophia Loren" to simply denote Rome and "the birthplace of Elke Sommer" to denote
Berlin, this ought to be just as good as (i) in the same context. I suspect that, to whatever extent (i) sounds good, it's
a fact about metonymy with proper names and not about the pragmatic abilities of CQ-embedding know.
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(3) a. Sam told me, and Kim learned independently, the capital of Vermont.
b. Sam has seen pictures of, and Kim has actually visited, the capital of Vermont.
c. # Sam told me, and Kim has actually visited, the capital of Vermont.
d. # Kim visited, and Sam told me, the capital of Vermont.
Compare the latter two sentences to Sam told me the capital of Vermont, and Kim has visited the
capital of Vermont (or vice versa). If both tell and visit denote (e, et) predicates that compose
with the individual "Montpelier", with the work of getting a CQ meaning done by the CQ-
embedding verb, we would expect the latter two sentences to be as felicitous as the first two.
Additionally, while a gendered pronoun is used as an anaphor for a DP when it denotes
an individual, a genderless pronoun is used when its antecedent DP is a CQ.
(4) a. Kim introduced Sam to [the governor of California]individual, so now Sam knows
{him/#it } too.
b. Kim told Sam [the governor of California]cQ, so now Sam knows {it/#him) too.
If the governor of CaliforniacQ had the (gendered) individual "Arnold Schwarzenegger" as its
referent, we would expect a pronoun with the CQ as its antecedent to agree with it in gender.
Nevertheless, it is used as a pronoun for a CQ instead of him.3 Similarly, while it can stand in for
a CQ, it cannot do so when its antecedent is an individual, even a genderless individual:
(5) # Kim visited [the capital of Vermont]individual, and Sam told itcQ to me.
Again, compare this to, say, ...and Sam showed me pictures of it, where the pronoun does denote
an individual and is acceptable. It can denote an individual, but that individual denotation cannot
be a CQ.4
In short, a CQ must denote something other than an individual. We will now consider the
possibility that it denotes an individual concept.
3 Romero (2005) also observes this in §4.1, though in a different context.
4 An apparent counterexample to the distinction in reference between individuals and CQs appears in (i), in
which it seems that it, denoting an individual, has a CQ as its antecedent:
(i) Sam told me the capital of Vermont, and Kim has actually visited it.
However, pronouns are notoriously good at picking out any salient individual from discourse, not just those named
overtly. A similar effect can be seen with a full question.
(ii) Susan told me who governs California, and added that she met him once.
No constituent in the clause Susan told me who governs California actually denotes the referent of him, namely
"Arnold Schwarzenegger", but he is salient enough to serve as an antecedent. Since the individual "Montpelier" is
salient in Sam told me the capital of Vermont, the acceptability of (i) does not force us to assume that any constituent
such as the capital of Vermont actually denotes "Montpelier", and thus is not especially worrisome.
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3.2. Concealed Questions as Individual Concepts
In the previous section, we saw that a type e denotation, though available for some DP uses, does
not suffice for a DP used as a concealed question. This section considers another denotation
available to at least some DPs: individual concepts (ICs), functions which map a world/time
index to an individual at that index and which have the semantic type (s, e).
We can use DP the president of the United States as an example. In addition to denoting
the individual "George Walker Bush" at the time of this writing, it can also denote the function
from world/time indices to the individual who, at that time and in that world, is the president. If
we focus on times and hold the world constant, that function will be:
1789 George Washington
1796 -- George Washington
1797 John Adams
1861 -- Abraham Lincoln
2005 - George W. Bush
i.e. the function that, for any time, returns the president at that time. (The function is undefined
for times before 1789, when the president of the United States did not denote any individual; for
times after the present, the function is defined, though we do not of course know in 2005 what
the value of the function will be in 2009.) More accurately, because the argument of the function
is a world/time index, we have:
2005; wo - George W. Bush
2005; wl - Dick Cheney
2005; w2  + John Kerry
2005; w3  Al Gore
2005; w4 John McCain
where wo is the actual world, wi is a world in which George W. Bush left office mid-term and
Dick Cheney assumed the presidency, w2 is a world in which Kerry defeated Bush in 2004; and
so on.
The ICs we consider will always hold either the world or the time constant-that is, each
IC will either be evaluated in wo as a mapping from times to individuals (as in the first function
above), or evaluated at to as a mapping from possible worlds to individuals (as in the fragment
shown in the second). An IC with the world or time held constant is simply a special case, and
even when the descriptions refer to the IC as a function from "times to individuals" or "worlds to
individuals", the domain of the IC is still a set of indices representing a world and a time. (Some
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consequences of having ICs range over world/time indices, rather than just over worlds or just
over times, will be considered at the end of the chapter, in §3.5.1.)5
In the first part of this section, we will see why DPs need to have IC meanings available,
independently of CQs. Following this, we will consider various proposals that CQs denote ICs,
with CQ-embedding predicates taking appropriate meanings. This theory of CQs meanings
avoids the shortcomings of the two possibilities examined in the last section and describes much
of the data, but like the ones in the previous section, it will ultimately prove inadequate.
3.2.1. The origins of the individual concept
The observation of the ambiguity between type e and type (s, e) denotations originated with the
invalid "ninety and rising" syllogism in (6), due to Barbara Partee 6 and first appearing in
Montague (1973):
(6) a. The temperature is ninety.
b. The temperature is rising.
c. 1- *Ninety is rising.
No theory of meaning should license (6c) as a conclusion from (6a)-(6b). Montague's
explanation of the invalidity is the following. In (6a), where ninety denotes an object of type e (in
fact, a rigid designator), the sentences equates the individual denoted by ninety to the individual
denoted by the temperature. However, rise in (6b) does not denote a predicate of individuals but
a predicate of individual concepts, which attributes the property of rising to the individual
concept denoted by temperature, i.e. the function from an index to the individual that is the
temperature at that index.
Intuitively, this sense of rise must select an intensional subject, as its meaning is roughly
something like the following.7
(7) rise is true of x at time t iff
for times t, earlier than t, the value of x at t, is less than the value of x at t, and
for times t2 later than t, the value of x at t2 is greater than the value of x at t
[Irise]]'== hase. [ [Vt < t . x(tl) < x(t)] A [Vt 2 > t . x(t2) > X(t)] ]
x needs to denote a different number at different times, and is thus an individual concept, a
function from times to individuals (i.e. individuals which are numbers).
To formalize the difference between the e-denoting and (s, e)-denoting senses of
temperature, Montague took nouns to denote objects of type (se, t): for instance, temperature
5 Functions will typically be written horizontally instead of vertically, e.g. [1789 -- George Washington, ...,
1796 -* George Washington, 1797 -+ John Adams, ...] or [wo --* George W. Bush, wl --+ Dick Cheney, ...], to save
space.
6In "Reflections of a Formal Semanticist" (Feb. 2005), Partee explains that the example originated as a
question she asked David Lewis, who in turn relayed the puzzle to Montague.
7 The actual meaning of rise is more subtle than this, of course. t
, 
and t2 do not range over all times, just
sufficiently pragmatically local times. Nor does the change need to be as monotonic as the definition here suggests:
fluctuations are acceptable as long as the overall trend is a rising trend. (Compare the temperature has been rising
all day vs. the temperature has been rising all week vs. the temperature has been rising ever since the Industrial
Revolution.) For illustrative purposes, however, this rough sense will suffice.
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does not denote a set of individuals which are temperatures, but a set of individual concepts that
each map indices to temperatures (with the definite article felicitous only when that set has
exactly one member). 8 The sentences of the "ninety and rising" syllogism have the following
meanings.
(8) a. 3xse, [Vyse . [temperature(y) -+ x = y] A x(wo) = 90]
b. 3xse . [Vyse . [temperature(y) ' x = y] A f[rise]J(x)]
c. rise'(,wl . 90)
In (8a), the individual concept x-which, the Vy-clause asserts, is the unique IC for which
temperature is true-is asserted to, in the world of evaluation, have an extension equal to the
(rigid designator) 90. In (8b), it is not the value of the individual concept in the world of
evaluation of which rise is true, but the individual concept itself. Substituting ninety for the
temperature in (6b) is thus not warranted by (6a): the equivalence of, on the one hand, the
extension of the unique temperature x and, on the other hand, ninety, does not guarantee the
equivalence of the unique temperature x and the intension of the rigid designator ninety. (In fact,
to predicate is rising of ninety is to say that the intensional predicate Dirise]l is true of the
intension of ninety. And since the latter is a rigid designator, its intension yields the same value
at all indices, and therefore rise is not true of it, i.e. (8c) is not true.)
Because Montague's type system required generalizing to the worst case, he required all
nouns, and not just temperature and price, to have (se, t) denotations. To distinguish
"extensional" common nouns (dog, town, semanticist, ...) from "intensional" ones (temperature,
price, ...), he suggested that the meaning postulate in (9) holds for any extensional noun 8:
(9) l[86(xse) --+ 3u. [x = Xw . u]] (Montague 1974, (20))
This postulate ensures that any ordinary common noun is such that any IC in its denotation (at
any given index) is actually a constant function mapping each index to the same individual.
Temperature and price, being exempt from this postulate, have denotations containing individual
concepts that map different indices to different individuals. In post-Montagovian terms that do
not require all nouns to have the same semantic type, nouns like temperature and price denote
(se, t) predicates while common nouns such as semanticist and city denote (e, t) predicates. (We
will revisit this assumption of Montague's in §3.4.2.)
3.2.2. Romero (2005): concealed questions as individual concepts
Romero (2005) treats CQs as individual concepts, a move she considers "a parsimonious
extension" (§2.1) of the way know composes with an interrogative complement. She begins with
8 Later authors offered various criticisms of this approach. For instance, Bennett (1975) claimed that a
number ought not be an individual and that temperature should incorporate some sense of measurement. Jackendoff
(1979) treats the temperature is (at) ninety as naming a point on a scale rather than equating two individuals,
analogous to the sentence the airplane is at 6000 feet, and therefore the syllogism does not actually have the form
A is B A B is C-+A is C.
See Libner (1981), Lasersohn (2005) for discussion and refutation of these criticisms. Lasersohn offers a
very different criticism, to be discussed in §3.4.1.
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the interrogative-embedding meaning of know in (10). (Doxz(w) is the set of worlds compatible
with what z believes in world w.)
(10) Ilknowques]w = Xq(s,(st, t) . z,e . Vwl E Doxz(w) [q(wi) = q(w)]
Knowing a question is to have the set of its true answers in all of one's belief worlds be the same
as its true answers in the world of evaluation.9
Analogously, knowing an individual concept entails having the value of the IC be the
same in all one's belief worlds as its value in the world of evaluation.
(11) [[knowcQ] w = kxe . ze . Vwl e Doxz(w) [x(wl) = x(w)]
A CQ such as the capital of Italy denotes the individual concept in (12), a function from an index
to the individual which is the capital of Italy at that index.10
(1.2) Xw . lXe. [capital-of-Italy(x,w)] (Romero 2005, 19)
And combining these two meanings, we have:
(13) [[ John knows the capital of ItalyI]Wo=
Vwi e Doxj(wo) [[Xw. txe. cap.-of-Italy(x,w)](w1) = [Xw . te . cap.-of-Italy(x,w)](wo)]]
Vw l e Doxj(wo) [te . capital-of-Italy(x,w1 ) = txe . capital-of-Italy(x,wo)]
9 Romero uses a Karttunen (1977) semantics for questions, in which a question denotes the set of true
answers and not the set of all answers. As noted in Chapter 1, switching between a Karttunen meaning and a
Hamblin meaning is not difficult: the set of true propositions in a question meaning q is Xp,, . [q(p) A p(wj)]. One
way to recast (10) with Hamblin meanings would be:
(i) Xq(,, t) . Xz. e Vw e Dox,(w) [Xp, . [q(p) A P(wl)] = Ps,,. [q(p) A p(w)ll
Once we move away from the know that takes interrogative arguments and consider one that takes individual
concept arguments, the choice between Karttunen and Hamblin semantics will become even less relevant.
to This meaning is noteworthy in that it represents a break from the conception of ICs used in Montague
(and Heim (1979), discussed below), in two ways. First, Romero uses a presuppositional meaning for the definite
determiner rather than the earlier quantificational meaning. Second and perhaps more strikingly, the expression
capital of Italy denotes a set of individuals (albeit a world-dependent one), rather than a set of individual concepts.
We might have expected that capital of Italy, like temperature, would need to denote a set of ICs, so that in
Montague's system the capital of Italy would have the denotation in (i), and in Romero's, the presuppositional
variant in (ii).
(i) XP,s. 3x,-. [Vye . [capital-of-Italy(y) +-+ x = y] A P(x)]
(ii) x,e,. [capital-of-Italy(x)]
The use of a presuppositional definite determiner, and the distinction between (12) and (ii), will both become crucial
in the discussion of Lasersohn (2005) in §3.4. For the time being, we will put on hold any further scrutiny of the
meaning in (12), and return to it following the discussion of Lasersohn. Romero's meaning for price, as we will see
in a moment, looks somewhat closer to Montague's meaning for temperature.
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which asserts that, in each world compatible with John's beliefs in wo, the individual that is the
capital of Italy in that world is the individual that is the capital of Italy in wo (i.e. in each world
compatible with John's beliefs in wo, the capital of Italy is Rome).
A notational aside: because the capital of Italy has both the type-e denotation "Rome"
and the type-(s, e) denotation in (12), I will occasionally use capital letters to distinguish the
name of an individual concept. For instance, THE-CAPITAL-OF-ITALY names the IC described in
(12) and could replace it in (13), thus:
(13') Vwl e Doxj(wo) [THE-CAPITAL-OF-ITALY(WI) = THE-CAPITAL-OF-ITALY(wo)]
That is, the (s, e) function named by THE-CAPITAL-OF-ITALY has the same value in all of John's
belief worlds as it does in the actual world.
Heim (1979) observes the following advantage of giving IC denotations to CQs. Consider
once again the following syllogism, repeated from (2).
(2) John knowscQ the capital of Italy.
The capital of Italy is the largest town in Italy.
V- John knowscQ the largest town in Italy.
Heim observes that by making knowcQ a relation between an individual (the subject) and an
individual concept (the object)," instead of a relation between two individuals, this syllogism is
invalid for much the same reason that the "ninety and rising" syllogism is invalid. The sentences
in the syllogism have the following representations (from Heim's (31)), where know can be seen
as an abbreviation of Romero's meaning above:
(14) 3xse. [Vyse . [capital-of-Italy(y) -+ x = y] A know(x)(john)]
3xse. [ Vyse. [capital-of-Italy(y) +- x = y] A
3zse [VVs,,. [largest-town-in-Italy(v) +- z = v] A x(wo) = z(wo)]]
3zse. [Vvse . [largest-town-in-Italy(v) -+ z = v] A know(z)(john)]
Just as equating [[the temperature]] with the number 90 does not warrant substituting the
intension of (the rigid designator) 90 for [[the temperature]], equating the values in wo of the
individual concepts [[the capital of Italy]l and [[the largest town in Italy]] does not guarantee the
identity of the two intensional objects and thus does not warrant substituting the one IC for the
other.
3.2.2.1. Challenges for a CQs-as-ICs theory
Heim, however, ultimately rejects the proposal that CQs are ICs for a few reasons. First, she
worries that this solution will leave no "ordinary" common nouns. Remember that IC-denoting
common nouns are exempt from the meaning postulate in (9), while ordinary common noun
denotations must satisfy it; or that nouns with IC meanings denote (se, t) objects while other
" "Roughly characterized, this relation of knowing holds between [an individual] X and [an individual
concept] Y at i iff X is at i able to identify the value Y(i) that Y yields when applied to i" (p. 56); this rough
characterization is what Romero formalizes in her meaning for knowcQ in (11).
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nouns denote (e, t) objects. Heim's concern is that an increasing number of NPs (in addition to
capital,12 favorite drink, and thing that John did) will need to be exempt from the postulate-or
will need to denote (se, t) and not (e, t) predicates-and no extensional common nouns will be
left in the grammar. She mentions this twice in passing, noting that "maybe we could live with
that" (p. 57) before moving on to her primary objection, but we will revisit this objection and
consider a solution to it (from Lasersohn 2005) in §3.4.1.
Her primary objection, and the one more relevant to Romero's theory about CQs,
concerns the ambiguity she observes in the sentence in (15).
(15) John knows the price that Fred knows. (Heim 1979, (34))
For either reading of the sentence, there's something such that Fred knows how much it costs
(e.g., milk). On one reading (I will follow Romero (2005) in designating it Reading A), John
knows how much this thing costs as well, though he may know nothing about Fred or Fred's
knowledge. On the other reading, Reading B, John need not know what the thing costs, but he
knows that Fred knows what it costs. The two meanings can be paraphrased as in (16).
(16) a. John knows the same price Fred knows. (Reading A only)
b. John knows what price Fred knows. (Reading B only) (Romero 2005, (23)-(24))
Giving CQs question paraphrases, this can be thought of as Fred knowing the answer to a
question (e.g. "what is the price of milk?"), and John knowing either the answer to that question,
or the answer to the meta-question "which question does Fred know the answer to?". 13
The problem Heim finds in the IC approach to CQs is that it can assign only one logical
representation to (15),
(17) 3xe, . [VYse . [[price(y) A know(y)(fred)] +-+ x = y] A know(x)(john)]
which corresponds to Reading A (note that [[know]]<se, et> relates John and the actual individual
concept that Fred knows). Capturing Reading B requires a higher type for price, so that the
"price" John knows is an "individual concept concept"--consequently, the variable x must have
type (s, se) and not just (s, e). (Though Heim does not explicitly say so, know must also have a
higher-typed homonym which can take the higher-typed x as its first argument: that is, in
addition to the (se, et)-typed know needed for Reading A, there must be one with type ((s, se), et)
to relate John to the "individual concept concept" that he knows.)
Moreover, the type can go arbitrarily high:
12 Or perhaps capital of Italy; and additionally town, or largest town. Because it is largest town in Italy and
capital of Italy that apparently have the (se, t) denotations, the denotations of town and capital may be somewhat
different. But the internal compositional details of the NPs will be put off until the next chapter.
13 In regard to Heim's pragmatics-based proposal, discussed above in §3.1, Romero (2005) observes a
singularly striking fact: it cannot capture the ambiguity Heim found in (15)! Because KNOW(P) relates both the
matrix subject and the embedded subject to an actual individual denoted by the price, both John and Fred must
actually know the price in question. Even having the matrix know use the property of being the price Fred knows,
the sentence will mean something like "Fred knows $1.99/gallon as the price of milk; and John knows $1.99/gallon
as the price Fred knows"; but for Reading B of (15), John need not have any knowledge about "$1.99/gallon".
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(18) John knows the price known to Fred that Bill knows.
This sentence is in fact four-ways ambiguous; let's label the readings W-Z.
(19) Reading Fred knows: Bill knows: John knows:
W some price the same price as Fred the same price as Bill
X some price which price Fred knows the same price as Bill
Y some price the same price as Fred which price Bill knows
Z some price which price Fred knows which price Bill knows
Reading W is like Reading A, above: all three prices are (s, e) objects. Reading Z is like Reading
B, in that each price has a successively higher type: Fred knows the answer to a question such as
what is the price of milk?, Bill knows the answer to the meta-question which price does Fred
know?, and John knows the answer to which price does Bill know?, which is a meta-meta-
question, as its answer is not "the price of milk" but rather "which price Fred knows". Readings
X and Y are somewhere between the two, requiring only (s, e) and (s, se) denotations.14
Regardless of the first three readings, Reading Z will require a higher type for price than
Readings A and B above did, namely an (s, (s, se)) type. And, setting aside performance issues,
this ambiguity can continue indefinitely, necessitating an infinite number of homonyms for price
(and, inferably, for know as well-one for each type price has).
Romero (2005) observes that the need for arbitrarily high types for know (if not also for
price) does not in itself necessitate rejecting this theory, as two meanings of know may "perform
exactly the same operations and vary only in the type...of their first argument" and may therefore
be "simply crosscategorial variants of each other, comparable to crosscategorial conjunction
(Partee and Rooth 1983)" (§2.4.2). (We will see two such variants in a moment.) But simply
using a higher type for the trace of price does have a more basic problem: while John knows the
value of the y(,, e which is a price, what Fred knows is the value of the value of y, not the value
of y itself. In other words, while the logical representation analogous to (17) would be the
following, the know that relates Fred to X(s, se) is not the same know that relates John to y(s, se);
instead, it must instead extensionalize x and relate Fred to the resulting (s, e) meaning.
(20) 3y(s, se). [Vx(s, se). [[price(x) A know(x)(fred)] +-k y = x] A know(y)(john)]
Spelling this out with meanings for know of the sort given above, we get the following (adapted
from (42) in Romero):
14 Romero (2005) uses a simpler example:
(i) John knows the price Fred knows: the price announced yesterday morning.
In this case, rather than Fred knowing the answer to a question and John knowing the answer to the meta-question
about Fred's knowledge, Fred knows the answer to a metaquestion and John knows the answer to the meta-meta-
question. The principle is the same; the rising type of price may be easier to conceptualize.
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(Heim 1979, (36))
(21) Vwl Doxjon(wo) . [
lX(s, se) [price(x) A Vw 2 e DOXfred(WO) [X(WO)( 2) = X(WO)(wO)] (w 1)
x(,,,,se) [price(x) A Vw2 e DOXfred(WO) [X(Wo)(w 2) = X(Wo)(Wo)] (wo)
The bolded "x(wo)" indicates the extensionalization of the metaquestion about prices into a
simple question about prices; it is the value of this extensionalization that must be the same in
Fred's knowledge worlds as it is in wo, whereas it is the value of x itself that must be the same in
John's knowledge worlds as it is in wo.
This higher-typed price theory still has the (se, et) meaning of know, used for ordinary
CQ objects like the capital of Italy and for Reading A; additionally, it needs two different
((s, se), et) meanings. First, there is the one in (22b), used in the matrix clause to make John's
knowledge comprise the answer to the metaquestion. Second, there is the one in (22c), used in
the relative clause that Fred knows to make Fred's knowledge comprise the answer to the actual
question about the price of something, and not the answer to the metaquestion.
(22) a. [[knowcQl]]w = xse. XZe. Vw1 e DoxZ(w) [x(wl) = x(w)] (= (11))
b. [[knowcQ2llw = X, se). Ze. Vwl e Doxz(w) [x(wl) = x(w)]
c. [[knowcQ3]1w = xCs, se, . Xe . Vwl e Doxz(w) [x(w)(wl) = x(w)(w)]
The first two of these, which differ in the types of their arguments but which "perform exactly
the same operations" on those arguments, are unproblematic crosscategorial variants. The third,
however, is not, as it differs in more than the mere type of its arguments.
Heim's objection to using ICs as CQs-that the lexicon will need infinitely many
homonyms which are not crosscategorial variants-now seems quite valid. Romero notes,
however, that having (22c) in the lexicon creates more fundamental problems. While these
meanings for know can generate Reading A and Reading B, as shown in (23a) and (23b)
respectively, they also generate a third reading when the two senses of know used for Reading B
are switched, as shown in (23c).
(23) a. John knowscQ, the price(se, > that Fred knowscq, (Reading A)
b. John knowscQ2 the price((s, se), t> that Fred knowscQ3 (Reading B)
c. #John knowscQ3 the price((s, se>, t> that Fred knowscQ2 (Reading B')
The sentence in (23c) is true if there is a price question that John knows the answer to and a price
metaquestion that Fred knows the answer to (rather than the other way around, as in Reading B).
However, the sentence John knows the price Fred knows lacks this reading.
At this point, it seems that IC meanings cannot be used for CQs. What, then, is Romero's
solution to the problems just presented?
3.2.2.2. An answer to the challenges
Romero uses knowcQl and knowcQ2 in the same manner as the theory just described: the former
for knowledge, the latter for metaknowledge. But rather than have price be ambiguous between a
predicate of ICs and IC concepts (i.e. between types (se, t) and ((s, se), t)), Romero derives an
(s, se) meaning for the price that Fred knows by intensionalizing the (s, e) meaning used in
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Reading A. 15 Consequently, the problematic knowcQ3 in (22c) is unnecessary, and the two
readings need only the available meanings of know:
(24) a. John knowscQa [the price(se, ,) that Fred knowscQi,,e (Reading A)
b. John knowscQ2 [the price(se, t> that Fred knowscQa](s, se) (Reading B)
These are the rough schemata; the compositional details follow.
As (24) suggests, Romero gives price the denotation of a set of ICs; the relative clause
that Fred knows, which has a trace of type (s, e), has the same type; and the two compose via
predicate modification. Hence both Reading A and Reading B use the same (s, e) denotation for
the DP, which is illustrated in (25), from Romero's (30).16
(25) DPII
Detlo NP 9
the NPS CP 7
price C6  IP5
that DP4  VP 3
Fred V2  DPI
knows tse
15 More accurately: in Romero's system, the world variable in the price that Fred knows is already bound-
the compositional principles generate its denotation with the type (s, se). Extensionalizing the denotation produces
Reading A; leaving it intensional produces Reading B. I will continue to derive meanings in the opposite manner,
and speak as if Romero does the same: generating (s, e) meanings, leaving them extensional to produce Reading A,
intensionalizing to produce Reading B. In any case, the meanings are the same; the difference is notational.
16 As noted in the introduction, I1...] here abbreviates [...],' w: in particular, which variable the trace denotes
depends on the assignment function g, but as the variable will become bound a few compositional steps later, we can
safely ignore g. Similarly, all formulae are given as evaluated at world w; Romero, rather than including w as part of
the evaluation function, puts an explicit bound world variable into each expression, but as the previous footnote
observed, this is by and large only a difference in notation for our purposes (footnote 17 will point out an exception).
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VI /[ ,\ [t R l\, U1 Use
2 x.se Xz,. . Vwl E Doxz(w) [x(w 1) = x(w)] (se, et) [[knowcQjl
3 Xz, . Vw1 e Dox,(w) [yl(wl) = yl(w)] (e, t) 2(1)
4 fred e [[Fred]
5 Vwi E Doxfred(W) [yI(Wl) = YI(w)] t 3(4)
6 lambda-abstraction introduction
7 Xyse ;. VwI E DoXfred(W) [y(W1 ) = y(w)] (se, t) Xy . 5
8 Xxse. price(x) (se, t) [[price11
9 Xy.,e. [price(y) A Vwl e DOXfred(W) [y(w) = y(w)]] (se, t) 7 A 8
10 P,:se,, t. Uxse. P(x) = 1 ((se, t), se) [[thel
11 tys,. [price(y) A Vwl e DOXfred(W) [y(w) = y(w)]] (s, e) 10(9)
That is, the price that Fred knows is the unique individual concept y such that (a) y is a price and
(b) y has the same value in the world of evaluation as it does in all of Fred's knowledge-worlds.
For instance, if Fred knows the price of milk and no other price, then the only individual concept
whose value is the same in the actual world and in all of Fred's knowledge-worlds is the
individual concept denoted by the price of milk, i.e. the individual concept THE-PRICE-OF-MILK.
Reading A uses the same knowcQl in the matrix clause as the one in the relative clause.
(26) IP 15
DP14  VP 13
John V12  DP11
knows the price that Fred knows
11 tys,, . [price(y) A Vwl Doxfred(W) [y(w 1) = y(w)]] (s, e) (above)
12 x,e . ze . W V 2 E Doxz(w) [X(W 2) = X(w)] (se, et) [[knowcoQhl
13 XZe . Vw 2 E Doxz(w) . [ (e, t) 12(11)
[tyse. [price(y) A Vwl c DOXfred(W) [y(w) = y(w)]]](W2)=
[tyse. [price(y) A Vwl c DOXfred(W) [y(w 1) = y(w)]]](W)
14 john e [[Johnj]
15 Vw 2  Doxjohn(w). [ t 13(14)
[tyse. [price(y) A Vw1 E Doxfred(W) [y(w) = y(w)]]](w 2) =
[tyse . [price(y) A Vwl E DOXfred(W) [y(w 1) = y(w)]]](w)
Note that [tyse. [price(y) A Vwl e DOXfred(W) [y(w 1) = y(w)]]](w) cannot be simplified by
lambda-conversion, because the expression in larger brackets, which takes a world as its
argument, is equivalent to a particular function from worlds to individuals. We could, however,
substitute another name of the IC [tyse . [price(y) A Vw l c DOXfred(W) [y(w 1) = y(w)]]] (as the
world variable w is not bound, but has its value supplied by the evaluation function, this will not
affect the truth conditions). Suppose, as above, that the only individual concept which is a price
and which is known to Fred in w is the price of milk. Then the bracketed expression picks out in
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w the individual concept denoted by the price of milk, and the sentence John knows the price that
Fred knows denotes
(27) Vw 2 e Doxjo0r(w). [THE-PRICE-OF-MILK(w 2) = THE-PRICE-OF-MILK(w)]
which is equivalent to [[John knows the price of milk]w". This is the right meaning for Reading A:
there's a price that Fred knows (in this case, the price of milk), and John knows it too.
Reading B uses, instead of knowcQ1 in the matrix clause, knowcQ2. Because the price that
Fred knows denotes an IC and the first argument of knowcQ2 is the intension of an IC, the two
combine via intensionalized function application.' 7
(26') IP15
DPl 4  VP 13
John V 12  DPi I
knows the price that Fred knows
11 tye . [price(y) A Vwl E Doxfred(W) [y(WO) = y(w)]] (s, e) (above)
12 Xy(s, se) . Xze. Vw 2 E Doxz(w) [y(w2) = y(w)] ((s, se), et) [[knowcQ2l
13 XZe . Vw 2 E Doxz(w). [ (e, t) 12(^11)
[Rw 3 . tye. [price(y) A Vwl E DOXfred(W 3) [y(wi = y(w 3)11](W 2) =
[Rw 4 y,,se [price(y) A Vwl e DOXfred(W4) [y(w4 ) = y(w 4)]]](W) ]
XZe . Vw 2 e Doxz(w). [
tyse. [price(y) A Vwl e DOXfred(W2) [y(wi = y(w2)]] =
tyse. [price(y) A Vw l e DOXfred(W) [y(w) = y(w)]] ]
14 john e [[John]]
15 Vw 2 E Doxjohn(w). [ t 13(14)
tyse . [price(y) A Vwl e DOXfred(W2) [y(w) = y(w 2)]] =
tyse. [price(y) A Vwl e DOXfred(W) [y(w0 = y(w)]] I
In step 13 here, unlike in step 13 of the previous derivation, lambda-conversion can simplify the
formula, thereby returning the extension of the intensionalized individual concept at the different
worlds. Again supposing that it's the price of milk that Fred knows in w, the denotation of the
overall IP can simplify somewhat, to
17 When abstracting over the world of evaluation, Xw . [the price that Fred knows]l", there is in fact a world
variable being neglected in the formulae in the text: the one implicit in price(y). lpricell" in truth denotes not
Xy . price(y), but something like Ay . pricew(y), "the set of ICs y such that y is a price in world w". Romero, I have
noted in previous footnotes, does include this explicit world variable, and binds it properly via when lambda-
abstracting over worlds. Nevertheless, omitting it here has no effect on the truth values and serves to make the
formulae clearer by removing an irrelevant complication. (Briefly: there is no effect because individual concepts that
are prices at one index are necessarily prices at all indices. This will be discussed in more detail in §3.4.1, with
respect to an observation of Anil Gupta's.)
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(28) Vw2 e DOXjohn(w) -
[tyse. [price(y) A Vwi e DOXfred(W2) [y(wi) = y(w2)]] = THE-PRICE-OF-MILK]
Here, the actual value of the IC the price of milk at the world of evaluation (or any other world)
doesn't appear as part of John's knowledge. This corresponds with the paraphrase of Reading B
given above, in which John need not know what milk actually costs. Instead, the assertion is that
the IC which is a price, and which is the same in each of John's knowledge-worlds as it is in the
worlds compatible with what Fred knows in those worlds, is the IC whose value Fred actually
does know (i.e. the one denoted by the price of milk).
Romero's theory of individual concepts and their intensions properly derives Reading A
and Reading B, while avoiding the unavailable Reading B' derivable when only extensions of
ICs are used. Using these two readings as a starting point, readings with arbitrary high meta-
knowledge can be derived with a fully crosscategorial know, suggested by knowcQ1 and knowcQ2
and given explicitly in (29),
(29) [[knowcQjw = Ax(,, e. ,zee. Vwl e Doxz(w) [x(wi) = x(w)]
along with the possibility of an arbitrarily high trace in the relative clause. Thus, no matter how
high the meta-question about prices to which Fred knows the answer, the sentence John knows
the price that Fred knows can have the meaning in (30), using the same composition principles
seen above.
(30) [Tknowsc,+,ll(Xw [lx(s, o. [price]((s, a), t)(x) A [Xy . [[knowscQnJw(y(s, a))(fred)](x)])(john)
In this case, [rknowcQ,l]] takes an argument with type (s, (s, o)), and therefore composes with the
price that Fred knows via intensionalized function application.
3.2.3. Romero and the PCQC
As we explore individual concepts in the next sections, we will find semantic reasons to reject
them as denotations of CQs. Before we do so, however, a few words are in order about the
syntactic predictions of Romero (2005). In particular, having rejected the Autonomy Hypothesis
because of its inability to capture the PCQC, we should consider how Romero's theory fares. In
fact, it will turn out that her theory neither fails in any obvious way, nor succeeds in any obvious
way.
The meanings in (31) are the familiar variations of know, taken from Romero and used
throughout this section, with the addition of Romero's declarative-embedding know.
(31) [Iknowdecl]w = XP(s, t). XZe. Vw 1 E Doxz(w) [p(wl) = 1]
[[knowques]lw = ,q(s,(st, t)) . Xze . Vwl E Dox,(w) [q(wt)= q(w)]
[[knowcQJIw = X(s, e). Xze. Vwl e Doxz(w) [x(wi) = x(w)]
[[knowcQ 2 'w = XY(s,)se . XZe . Vwl Doxz(w) [y(wl) = y(w)]
As Romero does not discuss knowdeclarative at any length, she deliberately sets aside the full details
of the meaning of know (in particular, its factivity).
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What predictions does Romero's cluster of meanings make for the distribution of CQs-
in particular, how does it distinguish know from wonder? In a theory where CQs have IC
meanings, only verbs which semantically compose with IC arguments can embed CQs. If only
knowcQ1 and knowcQ2 are crosscategorial variants of one another, then the lexicon only needs to
specify a templatic version as a meaning of know, such as (32).
(32) [[knowcQll = x(s, ,) . Xz, . Vwl e Dox,(w) [x(w 1) = x(w)], where a is e or se 18
Predicates like know have an ((s, a), et) denotation; those like wonder do not. In this case, the
ability to embed CQs is essentially an arbitrary fact about predicates. Any predicate might
happen to have a denotation whose first argument is an (arbitrarily highly) intensionalized
individual, independent of other denotations, making it accidental that, e.g., know has one but
wonder does not. While the ability to embed CQs now follows from a semantic fact rather than,
as in Grimshaw/Pesetsky, a syntactic fact, the distribution is as impossible to predict.
On the other hand, we could extend the crosscategorial variation to knowquestion, which
also equates the value of an intensional object in all the subject's belief worlds to its value in the
world of evaluation. This would give the more general template in (33)
(33) [[knowl]] = x(s, a,). z, . Vw l e Doxz(w) [x(wl) = x(w)], for any semantic type a(19
Suppose now that [[wonder]l takes the intension of a set of propositions as its argument and
expresses something about the subject's relation to that intension-for example, that the subject
wants to know what the extension is (which is to say, wants to know what the true answers to the
question are). Then either wonder is specified as having only a wonderquestion meaning and not a
templatic one, which brings us back to the difference being accidental; or else the same sort of
crosscategorial meaning seen in know should be available for wonder. That is, there should be an
(se, et) variation of the ((s, (st, t)), et) meaning, which would take a CQ as its argument and
express a relation between the subject and the individual that corresponds to the value of the CQ.
18 Or (s, se), (s, (s, se)), etc., to capture Reading Z of Heim's ambiguity, and so on arbitrarily high.
19 If a can have any type at all, it can have type t, in which case the meaning in (i) would be possible:
(i) I[knowdelNw = XP(s, t) - XZe - Vw l e Doxz(w) [p(w 1) = p(w)]
This is not equivalent to the knowdecl in (31). However, they do have identical truth conditions once we take into
account that declarative know is factive, because if know is factive, it must be the case that in the world of evaluation
w, p(w) = 1. (That is to say, this latter formula replaces one object, the truth value "1", with something
coextensional.)
We might hesitate to adopt (i) as the actual meaning of knowdecl, but it does underscore that, with the
factivity restriction, Romero's knowdecl also equates the value of an intensional object (i.e. a proposition) in all the
subject's belief worlds to its value in the world of evaluation (which is, necessary, "1" or 'TRUE"). In this case, all
four meanings might be considered variants of one another, at which point we might expect any proposition-
embedding predicate to have a question-embedding meaning as well, or vice versa, so that propositions and
questions have the same distribution. I will not examine this prediction further here; I mention it only as a further
qualm about Romero's system of meanings. (Though out of fairness, a similar challenge will arise in Chapter 5
when we try to derive the PCQC from the theory that CQs denote propositions.)
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(34) a. [[wonderquesw = q(s, (st, t)). Xze. [z wants to know what q's value in w is]
b. * [[wondercQ]w = cX(s, e - XZe. [z wants to know what x's value in w is]
I do not intend to suggest that the meaning in (34a) is necessarily the correct meaning for
wonder, only that it is an example of what such a meaning might be and how it, like know, would
have a CQ-embedding crosscategorial variant.
All told, a thorough understanding of how crosscategorial know captures the predictable
distribution of CQs requires deeper examination of lexical meanings for the various categories of
verbs. This kind of examination is not only beyond the scope of this dissertation, it is outside the
scope of Romero (2005) as well: Romero's paper explores the meanings of CQs (and their
relation to DPs used as specificational subjects of copulars), and its intent is not to explain either
the distribution of CQs nor the details of the verb meanings.
Based on this section's examination of which predicates allow or disallow CQ objects,
we cannot immediately reject the theory that CQs denote ICs; but neither can we wholeheartedly
adopt it. In the remainder of this chapter, we will examine the theory's predictions about which
DPs can or cannot be CQs, which will provide a clearer reason to consider other denotations.
3.3. Some Problems with Concealed Questions as Individual Concepts
Treating CQs as denoting (intensionalizable) ICs seems to derive the correct truth conditions.
But there are a number of reasons to think that concealed questions are not simply individual
concepts. An initial argument that CQs aren't ICs parallels the ones we saw against treating CQs
as individuals: a predicate that takes an intensional subject, such as rise, cannot conjoin with a
CQ-taking predicate. Two predicates that select IC subjects can conjoin, as we would expect, and
two passivized CQ-embedding predicates can also conjoin with a CQ subject. However, a single
DP cannot serve as both the IC subject of rise and the CQ subject of passivized know.
(35) a. [The price of milk]ic fell last week and is rising this week.
b. [The price of milk]cQ is known to John and has been forgotten by Fred.
c. * [The price of milk]?? fell last week and is known to John.
Just as similar data demonstrated that CQs are not individuals, the fact here suggests that the CQ
object of know denotes something different than the subject of rise does. As the latter is an
individual concept, the CQ cannot be one. 20
A second, more fundamental problem is that, while "individual concept" is a useful label
for functions from worlds to individuals, Romero does not explore the details of which noun
phrases can be ICs and how. In her analysis, price denotes a set of individual concepts, as does
that Fred knows, and via function modification the two together also denote a set of individual
concept. But price of milk presumably also denotes a set of individual concepts; does of milk
denote the set of individual concepts that are somehow "of milk"? And what of Heim' s concerns
about the spread of (se, t) meanings to NPs such as thing that John did and John's favorite drink?
The theory proposed in the next chapter will face many of the same questions, though
with respect to propositional denotations instead of individual concept denotations. All the same,
20 This might be resolved in Romero's system by separating world and time variables. As the chapter
progresses, such an approach will seem less appealing; see §3.5.1 for discussion.
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the more we look at individual concepts and the internal composition of CQs, the less well-suited
ICs will seem as CQ meanings. In this section, we will examine Janssen (1984) and Lasersohn
(2005), from whom we will conclude that many DPs that have IC denotations nevertheless
cannot be CQs.
3.3.1. Janssen (1984): the useful (but widespread) individual concept
In §3.2.1, we saw Montague's argument that certain DPs denote individual concepts, and
moreover that certain common nouns such as temperature denote sets of ICs. Janssen (1984)
observes that ICs are more ubiquitous than the "ninety and rising" argument might suggest, and
they are, to borrow his word, "useful" throughout the grammar.
Janssen discusses a variety of contexts in which ICs seem to be necessary. He claims that
concealed questions are ICs, citing Heim and offering a solution to her concern about rising
homophones.21 He also discusses discourse anaphora as a construction that seems to require ICs,
which I will not explore further here.
Of more interest to the current exploration of the distribution of ICs are certain other
predicates which he argues either must be ICs or must take IC arguments. The former type
includes name-like titles, which are unlike rigid designators in that they denote different
individuals at different times. For instance, Geach (1979; discussion taken from Janssen)
discusses titles of the members of Herald's College such as Portcullis and Rouge-Dragon, which
refer to different people at different times. Thus if Alex talks to Portcullis at one time and Chris
talks to Portcullis at another after the title has passed to a new person, one might say that they
talked to "the same herald" (i.e. they both talked to Portcullis) but not "the same person".
Janssen models this by taking titles like Portcullis to name individual concepts, and nouns like
herald to denote sets of individual concepts.
Janssen does not extend the discussion of this kind of title to more compositional
expressions. Nevertheless, considering a context in which USNDH has (by policy) a single
semanticist, a single syntactician, and a single phonologist, I think it is coherent to say
(36) Alex talked to the USNDH semantics professor, and later Chris talked to the same
professor.
if Alex and Chris talked to two different people, both of whom held the same position at different
times. That is, same does not equate two individuals, the one Alex talked to and the one Chris
talked to; it equates two individual concepts, the one whose value at tl Alex talked to at t1, and
the one whose value at t2 Alex talked to at t2. (To make the sentence sound natural, contrastive
focus on semantics may be necessary, creating the focus set { [[the USNDH semantics professorE,
[[the USNDH syntax professor]l, [[the USNDH phonology professor])}, which is then a set of
individual concepts. Alternately, it might require USNDH to have one of each professor as a
matter of departmental policy.) The use of compositionally formed titles and not just preassigned
titles as ICs broadens the set of predicates that can be ICs even further.
The set of predicates that must be ICs also includes home, as in (37), from Partee (1970):
21 In particular, he suggests that a variable of any intensional height ((s, se), (s, (s, se)), etc.) can be turned
into an appropriate complement for the single, Groenendijk-and-Stokhof-based meaning for know. This higher
variable can be extensionalized down to (s, e) when made the argument of the IC, eliminating the need for
homonyms of the noun with denotations higher than (se, t).
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(37) My home was once in Maryland, but now it's in Los Angeles.
In contrast to the same sentence with house in place of home, which would be true only if the
physical object moved, (37) asserts a fact about the value of the denotation of my home at a time
in the past and at the present time. This means that one's home denotes a function that maps a
time to one's home at that time, which is to say an individual concept.22
The disparate nature of the uses Janssen describes, from concealed questions to titles to
other commonplace predicates, suggests that ICs are more widespread than believed by, e.g.,
Bennett (1974), who considered rise and temperature to be "extraordinary" and rationalizes
away their status as predicates of individual concepts. However, it is Janssen's discussion of
change, which (like rise) needs an intensional subject, that opens the floodgates for ICs to
become truly pervasive.
Following Link (1979) and Lobner (1979, 1981), Janssen discusses the following
examples.
(38) Der Trainer wechselt/The trainer changes. 23  (Janssen, (4)-(5), from Link 1979)
(39) a. The mayor changes.
b. The mayor is the husband of Helga.
c. The husband of Helga changes. (Janssen, (7)-(9), from Lobner 1981)
The latter follows the same pattern as the "ninety and rising" paradox, suggesting in the same
way that change must denote a property of ICs and that the subject must be an IC. Of the former,
Janssen observes that in situations that make it true, there is no unique "trainer" individual of
whom we can say that a change occurred. (38) is true if, for instance, a certain club employs
Alex as their trainer, and then Alex leaves the position and Bobby assumes the role. So it's true
that Alex has changed (in the extensional sense) and that Bobby has changed, but there's no one
individual denoted by the trainer who has changed. For this reason, Janssen makes the same
move for change/wechseln as Montague did for rise, taking it to denote a predicate of type (se, t),
and giving (38) the meaning:
(40) 3xse. [Vyse . [trainer(y) +-+ x = y] A wechseln(x)] (Janssen, (6))
22 It also suggests that house, at least, is immune to Heim's concern that the lexicon will be left with no
(e, t)-denoting nouns. If it is unique in this regard, its resistance to having an (se, t) denotation provides little
comfort. And if I know John's favorite house is acceptable with a CQ meaning (and I think it is), it may not be as
immune as we might hope.
23 English change has an extensional meaning, so that this sentence may mean that the individual who is the
trainer undergoes some sort of change-new clothes, a new haircut, new political views, or the like. This meaning
can be paraphrased "undergo a change", which has no intensional meaning. Thus, the trainer underwent a change
can only mean that something happened to the individual, and not that someone new is now the trainer.
As with the object of extensional know, the subject of extensional change can be replaced with a
coreferential expression without changing the truth value, and it can be a rigid designator (Paul changes). And as
with know (and wissen), German has an unambiguously intensional predicate, wechseln. So as with know, we can
safely ignore the extensional meaning.
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So just as temperature necessarily denoted a set of individual concepts with type (se, t), so does
trainer. Janssen says of the nouns trainer and mayor (and others such as president, pope, and
dean) that they "describe a public position, and they are, in the sentences under consideration,
not used to indicate a particular individual" (p. 176). For this reason, they denote not individuals
but individual concepts.
3.3.2. Implications for Romero (2005)
What makes change so interesting for the current discussion is this. Analogous to the lexical
meaning for rise we postulated in (7) at the beginning of the chapter, we can write a meaning for
change:
(41) [[change]]' = Xse . 3tl > t . x(tl) x(t)
This captures the essential truth conditions, namely that change is true of a time if there's an
earlier time where the IC subject's value was different than it is at the given time. But unlike
rise, for which the different values of its individual concept must be numbers because they are
taken to be higher or lower at different indices, change puts no restriction on the range of values
its subject can take. So for instance, even though (37) showed that my home is an individual
concept, my home rises is semantically anomalous because the different values my home takes at
different times cannot be compared quantitatively. My home changes, however, has no such
anomaly.
Therefore, we can take the conclusion of Romero that CQs have IC meanings and see
whether change can be predicated of DPs that can be CQs.
(42) a. The temperature changed.
b. The color of Sam's hair changed.
c. The capital of Vermont changed.
d. The semanticist who teaches at USNDH changed.
Each of the sentences in (42) is felicitous, each one asserting that the value of its subject IC took
on different values at different times.24 So equating CQs with ICs might look even more
promising.
But while DPs that can have concealed question meanings can be the subject of change,
many other DPs can be the subject of change as well; in fact, nearly any noun can head the DP
subject of change. L6bner (1981) claims that intensional verbs such as change distinguish
functional nouns (Funktionalbegriffe) from generic nouns (Gattungsbegriffe). He provides
linguist, rose, noun, and old man with a long beard as examples of the latter, nouns which cannot
24 (42a) and (42b) warrant particular comment; while one might attempt to claim that the trainer changed
shows a particular use of extensional change applying to two different individuals, such a claim is much harder to
maintain for these two sentences. For instance, if Sam's hair was brown and is now red, (42b) is true, but neither
"brown" nor '"red" has especially changed. True, each has a different set of properties before and after the change
(brown no longer has the property "is the color of Sam's hair"; red now has that property), but this sort of change in
properties--called a Cambridge change in the philosophical literature-is quite different, and certainly would not
warrant the rather odd assertions Brown changed or Red changed.
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be used with intensional predicates. 25 Nevertheless, generic nouns can be the subject of change.
Thus, the (a) sentences in the following examples are felicitous, having exactly the same senses
as the other sentences with change discussed here (i.e. that the individual picked out by the DP is
different now than previously). The (b) sentences show that the same DPs cannot be used as
CQs, even when the analogous sentences with clausal questions would be natural ways to
continue the conversation.
(43) A: John says he visits his niece Jordan with some frequency, but when I asked him
what picture she has on her wall, he had no idea.
a. B: The picture on Jordan's wall changes each month.
b. #That's why John didn't know the picture on Jordan's wall.
(cf. That's why John didn't know what the picture on Jordan's wall is.)
(44) A: What's new in the linguistics department at USNDH?
a. B: The semanticist changed.
b. #A: Really? Tell me the semanticist (now).
(cf. Tell me who the semanticist is (now).)
Similarly, a painter might complain "The rose changed" if someone replaced the red rose in the
still life he was painting with a white rose; a linguist, explaining why Sam told me the time is
felicitous while Sam told me the semanticist is not, might begin by saying, "The noun changes
(from one sentence to the other)"; and so on.26
This difference in judgments has two consequences for the discussion up to this point.
First, while Romero interprets CQs as ICs, it's clear that the ability of a noun to have an IC
meaning does not license its use as a CQ. Consider the meaning Romero predicts for a simplified
25 Lobner's terminology may cause some confusion. "Functional noun" usually refers to a noun with,
roughly, type (e, e): mother, for instance, is a function from an individual to the mother of that individual; and as we
will see in the next chapter, some authors have postulated a connection between functional nouns in this sense and
nouns which can be CQs. As a result, when Lobner writes that "a great variety of count nouns can be used as both
functional and generic nouns", explaining of the noun table that it
...can be understood as a piece of furniture with certain characteristics distinguishing it from desks
or stools, or as something with a certain function (for instance, the thing at which one is sitting
during one's meals, even though it be a table (in the generic sense), a carton, or a rock). (p.476)
he may seem to anticipate the claim in this paragraph: namely, that many generic nouns can be ICs.
However, his distinction here is somewhat mysterious. It is true that, as I sit here in the Diesel Caf6, the
object on which my laptop currently rests-an object about two and a half feet high, with a flat rectangular top
supported by single pole with four feet extending from the bottom-is a table in the generic sense, was a table
yesterday, will (barring fire or other destructive force) be a table tomorrow. And it is true that the cardboard box on
which I rested my laptop after first moving into my apartment was a table in a time-and-world-dependent way. But
when table is used as the subject of change, it is not necessarily in this latter sense. Should I come to the Diesel Caf6
tomorrow and find this object and the others like it along this wall replaced by ones three feet high with circular tops
supported by four legs each, I could still say "Hey, the tables changed!" The functionality, in Lobner's sense, is
irrelevant; what matters is that one (generic) table has replaced another (generic) table.
26 Many sound somewhat better as the object of transitive change rather than the subject of intransitive
change: The semanticist changed the noun, someone changed the rose, etc. Transitive change, like the intransitive
form, has both intensional and extensional senses, as the subject can either cause an object to undergo a change
(extensional) or replace one object with another (intensional).
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(but still infelicitous) variation on (43b), John knows the picture on Jordan's wall. The
composition is identical to that of the felicitous sentence John knows the capital of Italy, with
(s, e)-embedding know (i.e. knowcQ,) and the capital of Italy denoting an individual concept.27
(45) [[the capital of Italy]] = P(se,t) . 3yse . [Vxve. [capital-of-Italy(x) +- x = y] A P(y)]
[[knowcQ,] = Xse . Xz, . Vwl e Doxz(w) [x(wi) = x(w)]
[[John knows the capital of Italy]] =
3yse. [Vxse. [capital-of-Italy(x) +- x = y] A Vwl e Doxjohn(w) [y(wl) = y(w)]]
(46) [[the pic on Jordan's wall]] = P(se, t) . 3yse . [V.xse . [pic-on-J's-wall(x) +- x = y] A P(y)]
[[John knows the picture on Jordan's wallj] =
3yse. [VXse . [pic-on-J's-wall(x) *- x = y] A Vwl e Doxjo•n(w) [y(wl) = y(w)]]
The latter formula in (46) does capture the expected meaning: in all worlds compatible with
John's beliefs, the individual which is the picture on Jordan's wall in that world is the same
individual as the picture on Jordan's wall in the actual world. Nevertheless, this meaning is not
available to the sentence.
Second, Heim's concern discussed in §3.2.2-that we will run out of ordinary common
nouns that denote sets of individuals-has become more pressing now that it is no longer only
the occasional "intensional" noun (in Montague's sense) that can have an IC meaning. Moreover,
the farther we get from intensional nouns such as temperature and price, the harder it is to accept
the intuition that a common noun is really a property of an individual concept instead of being a
property of an individual. For instance, the individual concepts in (47) might reasonably be said
to be "a temperature" or "a price", respectively (i.e., a member of the set of index-to-individual
mappings that are temperatures or prices).
(47) a. [May 1 -* 50'F, May 2 -+ 51'F, May 3 --+ 55 0F,....]
b. [January -- $1.99/gallon, February --+ $2.09/gallon, March -- $2.04/gallon, ...]
It's somewhat less intuitive that, even for a so-called "public position", the IC in (48a) is
somehow "a trainer".
(48) a. [..., 2003 -+ Alex, 2004 - Alex, 2005 -+ Bobby, ... ]
b. [January -- Guernica, February - American Gothic, March --+ Mona Lisa, ...]
The IC in (48b) is even less intuitively "a picture on Jordan's wall". Nevertheless, Janssen's
analysis of change as a predicate of individual concepts-which does seem correct-apparently
necessitates that trainer denote a set that includes the former function, and picture on Jordan's
wall, the latter.
At first glance, individual concepts seemed like a good starting point as a basis for
interpreting concealed questions. By this point, however, it seems that they have not only
27 The meaning in (45) actually uses the Russell-style quantifier over ICs, though Romero uses only a
presuppositional definite determiner, in order to maintain parallelism with the Russellian meaning of the definite
determiner used by Janssen and discussed above. Using a presuppositional meaning would not change the essence of
the argument.
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expanded beyond the boundaries of relational nouns and concealed questions, but they are now
poised to entirely take over common nouns.
3.4. Further Problems with Concealed Questions as Individual Concepts
In this section, we will bring individual concepts back into line by first drastically reducing their
hold on the lexicon and then reintroducing them slowly and in carefully controlled ways. The
first step in this process is provided by Lasersohn (2005). Though aimed at a smaller part of the
problem, the theory presented in Lasersohn (2005) offers a solution to IC-property proliferation.
However, in doing so, it creates an even more fundamental problem for an approach to CQs that
gives them IC denotations.
3.4.1. Lasersohn (2005): eliminating the IC-property-denoting common noun
The discussion of individual concepts to this point has varied in its treatment of the definite
determiners, sometimes using a quantificational, Russellian meaning and sometimes using a
presuppositional meaning. Lasersohn (2005), by using only the presuppositional meaning, offers
a simplified way of viewing ICs.
Lasersohn revisits the intuition that the temperature rises requires the use of sets of
individual concepts. He agrees that knowing the truth conditions of rise inherently requires
examining different times, and thus Partee was correct to suggest that its subject must be an
individual concept. But the same is not true of temperature, price, or other so-called
"intensional" nouns. They have no inherent time- or world-dependence in their meanings;
temperatures or prices at other times are irrelevant for evaluating the truth conditions of a
sentence about the current temperature or price. Rise, therefore, does denote an (se, t) object, but
temperature and price, like other common nouns, should denote objects with type (e, t) and not
(se, t).
Additionally, while he dismisses many criticisms of the "ninety and rising" syllogism
(see footnote 8), he does find a serious challenge to its conclusions in a problem discussed in
Dowty, Wall, and Peters (1981), who credit it to Anil Gupta. This challenge lies in the following
variation on the "ninety-and-rising" syllogism:
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(49) a. Necessarily, tne temperature is tne pnce.-
b. The temperature is rising.
c. - The price is rising.
Unlike the "ninety is rising" syllogism, Gupta's syllogism does hold, but the individual concept
meanings for price and temperature spelled out above do not guarantee that it does. Montague's
system assigns the following meanings to the three sentences.
(50) a. Vw . 3xse [ Vyse [temperature'(y) +-+ x = y] A
3Zse [Vvse[price'(v) - z = v] A x(w) = z(w)]]
b. 3xse [Vyse[temperature'(y) +-- x = y] A rise'(x)]
c. 3x,~ [Vyse[price'(y) +-+ x = y] A rise'(x)]
Now consider the following scenario described in DWP (as spelled out in Lasersohn
2005). Suppose there are three time indices, il, i2, i3, such that il precedes i2, which precedes i3.
In this scenario, the temperature and price are index-dependent functions from indices to
individuals (i.e. numbers which are temperatures or prices) as follows.
il 99 il -- 89 il 79
(51) [[the temperature] = i2 100 , i2 i2 90 , i3 i2 - 80
i3 ) 101 i3 -- 91 i3 ) 81
F i- ] [gi - 911 i -- 8311
[Ithe price]] = il -- i2 -+ 98 , i2 - i2 90 , i3 -+ i2 -- 82
i3 97 i3 ) 89 i3 -- 81 -
In such circumstances, (50a) is true: at each index, there's a unique IC temperature and a unique
IC price, and the value of the two ICs at that index are equal. For instance, at i1 , the unique x
such that x is a temperature is the function [il -- 99, i2 --+ 100, i3 --- 101], and the value of this
function at i1 is 99; the unique price is [i1 -- 99, i2 --* 98, i3 -+ 97], and its value at i1 is also 99.
Taking the definition of rise in (7), repeated here,
28 This sentence-indeed, the entire discussion in Montague of individual concepts, in Lasersohn of
Montague's theory, and in Romero of concealed questions-assumes that temperature and price are simple sets of
ICs. In fact, they have another semantic argument, though it's easy in, say, the temperature is rising, to have an "of
here/now/our environs/etc." argument remain implicit. Properly, temperature and price in Montague's system
should denote (e, (se, t)) predicates. The sentence here has the additional problem that it is insufficient to merely
equate the values of the temperature and the price, even on the model given here where the latter is an IC; it's
certainly not the case that, if the temperature is 900F, the price of some understood object is 900F. Pragmatically,
(49a) is perhaps best understood as being elliptical for something like Necessarily, the temperature in degrees
Fahrenheit is the price in cents of a can of Coke.
In the discussion throughout this chapter, glossing over this extra argument has been relatively harmless;
nearly all of the points made about, e.g., [price] as a predicate of ICs could instead be made about, e.g., f[price of
milk], without losing the validity of the arguments. This argument will become critical in the next chapter, and I
bring it up here in part to foreshadow that discussion, and in part because leaving the arguments of the nouns to be
determined pragmatically in the sentence in (49a) is especially striking.
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(7) [[rise]]' = xse .[ [[Vtl < t .x(t) < x(t)] A [Vt 2 > t .x(t2) > x(t)] ]
(50b) is also true: at each index, the temperature function from indices to values yields higher
values at later indices. For instance, the extension of temperature at i2, which is [il -- 89, i2 --
90, i3 -+ 91], is an IC such that at all times before i2, its value is less than its value at i2 (89 vs.
90), and at all times after, its value is greater (91 vs. 90). However, while the premises of the
syllogism are both true, the conclusion in (50c) is false, because at each index the price function
yields lower values at later indices.
DWP observe that a simple meaning postulate will solve this problem. Lasersohn
suggests the one in (52), where a is temperature or price.
(52) Vxe . El [a(x) - Oa(x)] (Lasersohn 2005, 21)
This requires any mapping from indices to individuals that is an a at one index to be an a at all
indices. This rules out the scenario in (51), where the IC which is a temperature (or a price) at
any one index is not a temperature (or a price) at other indices, and the syllogism will be valid.
It may solve the problem, but Lasersohn objects to the meaning postulate in (52) for a
number of reasons. First, this postulate must hold not only for temperature and price, but for any
lexical item which can be substituted for them in the syllogism; thus, the postulate would have to
hold more generally in the lexicon. On the other hand, it cannot hold of common nouns in
general, as most nouns do have different extensions at different indices. Second, as the validity of
the syllogism lies not in particular facts about the lexical items but in its logical structure, a
solution should rely on the logical structure of the formulae and not on alteration of the lexical
items in the structure.
For these reasons, Lasersohn looks for an alternate way to interpret temperature and
price. The original motivation for giving relational nouns (se, t) denotations, he notes, had
nothing to do with their meanings, but only with the assumption that the definite determiner was
quantificational. Rise and temperature had to be predicated of the same variable in Montague's
formula in (8b), repeated here.
(8b) 3x.,e. [Vyse . [temperature(y) *- x = y] A i[rise]](x)]
But with a presuppositional definite determiner that takes the type-(e, t) meaning of the common
noun temperature as its argument and returns an object with type e, rise can take the intension of
the DP as its argument:
(53) lithe temperature rises]] = [[rise]](Xw . txe . l temperaturel]](x))
Spelled out in full, with the meaning for rise used above:
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(54) [[risel t = Yse. [[Vtl < t. y(tl) < y(t)] A [Vt 2 > t y(t2) > y(t)] ]
[[the temperaturef]t = xe . x is a temperature at t
Xt . [[the temperaturei' = Xt . xe . x is a temperature at t
[[the temperature rises]] =
Vtl < t. [[xe .x is a temperature at ti] < [txe. x is a temperature at t]] A
Vt 2 > t. [[xe . x is a temperature at t2] > [txe. x is a temperature at t]]
By taking the intension of the type-e DP, Lasersohn eliminates the need for common nouns to
lexically denote sets of ICs instead of sets of individuals. And having eliminated (se, t) meanings
from the grammar, the objectionable postulate in (52) is superfluous. Lasersohn automatically
achieves the effect of the postulate, as the intensionalized definite descriptions are necessarily
constant across worlds.
As noted, Lasersohn's goal was to simplify the interpretation of sentences like the
temperature rises. A welcome additional consequence of his theory is the resolution of Heim's
worry about the proliferation of IC-property denotations for common nouns. Recall that Janssen,
drawing an analogy between the temperature rises and the trainer changes, was forced to give
trainer, like temperature, the denotation of a property of individual concepts so that it would fit
into the meaning in (40), repeated here.
(55) 3xse . [Vyse . [trainer(y) -+ x = y] A change(x)]
Janssen argued that trainer was a "public position", justifying the denotation; but we saw that
change could take as its subject a wide range of definite DPs, and imagining even trainer as
denoting a property of individual concepts seemed strange, to say nothing of picture on Jordan's
wall.
Lasersohn's reanalysis of individual concepts provides a straightforward solution to this
problem. The predicate change no longer necessitates having any common nouns that denote
properties of ICs. Trainer and picture on Jordan's wall can once again denote simple properties
of individuals; the trainer and the picture on Jordan's wall denote individuals, which
intensionalize to serve as the argument of change.
(56) [[change]]'= xrse . 3tl < t . x(tl) x(t)
[[the trainer changes]]t = 3ti < t . [txe . x is a trainer at tl] # [Xe . x is a trainer at t]
So for Heim and Janssen, Lasersohn's theory is good news. All nouns have (e, t) denotations
lexically, and we do not need to worry about all the nouns in the lexicon--or indeed, any of
them-ending up with (se, t) denotations. Any DP (or at least, any definite description) with a
free world variable can become an individual concept.
3.4.2. Implications for theories of concealed questions
Recall the meaning Romero (2005) gives the capital of Italy, repeated from (12):
(12) Aw . tx,. [capital-of-Italy(x,w)] (Romero 2005, 19)
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Romero takes capital of Italy to denote a predicate of individuals and not a predicate of
individual concepts; she derives the individual concept denotation of the capital of Italy by
intensionalizing its type-e denotation. In doing so, she independently suggests the same method
of avoiding (se, t) meanings for nouns as Lasersohn does.
In light of the previous section, however, this method provides an argument against
treating concealed questions as individual concepts. Any definite description can have an IC
denotation, but not every definite description can be the object of CQ-embedding know, which
means that an IC-embedding know cannot be the right interpretation mechanism for CQs.
(Additionally, if Lasersohn is right that price does not denote a set of ICs, only a set of
individuals, it cannot be modified by the set of ICs denoted by that Fred knows. In the next
chapter, we will see a way of deriving an (se, t) meaning for price from its actual lexical
meaning, but at the very least, something more must be said on the point.)29
On the other hand, the elimination of (se, t)-denoting nouns threatens more theories than
just Romero's. Even if CQs are not individual concepts, the intuitions underlying this chapter
stand-that CQs must be intensional objects of some sort, that the failed entailment between
"know the capital of' and "know the largest town in" resembles the failed "ninety is rising"
entailment. Once we adopt Lasersohn's suggestion that no common noun denotes a set of
individual concepts, we lose the lexical intensionality of price and temperature, and thereby also
lose the ability to distinguish, based on the types of their denotations, price and temperature
from picture and semanticist. At that point, any attempt at all to explain why the former but not
the latter form CQs without further modification becomes much harder. For instance, the type-
shifting operation in the last chapter that turned DPs into question-denoting objects, repeated
here,
(57) (s, e) -+ (st, t)
•Xse . XPst [3ye . p = Xwl . [x(wi) = y11
29 One could try to salvage Romero's approach by separating worlds and times instead of grouping them
into a single index. (I am grateful to Irene Heim (p.c.) for bringing this to my attention.)
That is, individual concepts could be considered functions from times to individuals, suitable for being the
subject of rise or change; whereas concealed questions would be functions from worlds to individuals.
Distinguishing the two kinds of index as s, for worlds and s, for times, rise and change would have the semantic
type ((s,, e), t), and knowcQ and tellcQ would have the semantic type ((sw, e), et). Lasersohn's method of creating ICs
would thereby involve lambda-abstraction over a time index, creating a semantic object unsuitable to be the object
of know, tell, etc. This would additionally explain the data in (35), in which a single DP cannot be both an IC and a
CQ.
However, this approach faces a number of difficulties. First, some nouns would need to have ((s,, e), t)
denotations for CQ uses in addition to their (e, t) denotations for common-noun uses (this latter denotation also
being needed for intensionalization over times to create an IC). Like Heim (1979), we might still be concerned that
this ambiguity extends to practically every noun in the lexicon. The shifting operations discussed in the next chapter
could solve this problem, though in any case something more would need to be said.
Second, once worlds and times are separated, it becomes surprising that we have lexical items which select
for (s,, e) subjects but not (sw, e) subjects. And third, given Lasersohn's method of deriving (st, e) objects from any
definite description by abstracting over the time-index variable, the grammar should allow abstraction over a world-
index variable to derive a (s,, e) object from any definite description. If it does, we find ourselves right back where
we started, without a way to distinguish possible CQs from impossible ones. These two problems seem less easy to
overcome, suggesting that, while splitting worlds and times might resolve some of the challenges to a theory of ICs
as CQs, the move is unlikely to be correct.
-81-
also can no longer distinguish the temperature from the picture and generates question
denotations from either with equal ease.
Circumventing this lack of distinction will be a central concern of the next chapter. We
will, at least, have an advantage over the theory that concealed questions are individual concepts:
by finding another type for the object argument of a CQ-embedding predicate, we can find a
type-driven explanation for some DPs, but not others, being able to fill that argument position. A
theory in which that argument has the type (s, e) must find some other mechanism to distinguish
the two kinds of DPs; and no other mechanism is readily apparent.
3.5. Summary
At this point, we have a number of different uses for DPs requiring at least three different
denotations-individuals, individual concepts, and a concealed question denotation which is
neither of these. We now have the background necessary to propose a new theory of CQ
denotations, one that relates all three of these DP meanings. In the next chapter, we will see this
theory and consider how to achieve the right meanings compositionally, as well as deriving the
Proposition/Concealed Question Correlation as a consequence.
3.5.1. A final word about worlds, times, and world/times
Throughout this chapter, I have spoken of individual concepts (and, by extension, Romero's
meaning for concealed questions) as functions from world/time indices to individuals. At a few
points, I have alluded to a possible response from a defender of Romero's approach: separating
worlds and times. That is, individual concepts could be considered functions from times to
individuals, suitable for being the subject of rise or change; whereas concealed questions would
be functions from worlds to individuals. 30
Distinguishing the two kinds of index as s, for worlds and s, for times, rise and change
would have the semantic type ((st, e), t), and knowcQ and tellcQ would have the semantic type
((sw, e), et). Lasersohn's method of creating ICs would thereby involve lambda-abstraction over a
time index, creating a semantic object unsuitable to be the object of know, tell, etc.; and
Romero's CQ meanings, as in (12), would involve lambda-abstraction over a time index. This
would additionally explain the data in (35), in which a single DP cannot be both an IC and a CQ,
and provides a starting point for distinguishing those DPs that can be ICs (i.e., nearly all of them)
from those that can be CQs (i.e., only a fraction of them).
However, this approach faces a number of difficulties. First, some nouns would need to
have ((s,, e), t) denotations for CQ uses in addition to their (e, t) denotations for common-noun
uses (this latter denotation also being needed for intensionalization over times to create an IC).
Like Heim (1979), we might still be concerned that this ambiguity extends to practically every
noun in the lexicon. The shifting operations discussed in the next chapter could solve this
problem, though in any case something more would need to be said.
Second, once worlds and times are separated, it becomes surprising that we have lexical
items which select for (s,, e) subjects but not (sw, e) subjects. And third, given Lasersohn's
method of deriving (st, e) objects from any definite description by abstracting over the time-
index variable, the grammar should allow abstraction over a world-index variable to derive a
30 1 am grateful to Irene Heim (p.c.) for bringing this to my attention.
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(sw, e) object from any definite description. If it does, we find ourselves right back where we
started, without a way to distinguish possible CQs from impossible ones. These two problems
seem less easy to overcome, suggesting that, while splitting worlds and times might resolve some
of the challenges to a theory of ICs as CQs, the move is unlikely to be correct.
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CHAPTER 4: WHY CONCEALED QUESTIONS DENOTE PROPOSITIONS
Having seen a number of denotations that make the wrong predictions about concealed
questions, with regard to either what they mean, which predicates allow them as complements, or
which DPs can serve as them, we are ready to find a theory to encompass all three.
In the two primary theories of concealed question meaning we have examined, CQs
denoted questions and individual concepts. This chapter argues that CQs denote propositions,
roughly like the one in (ib).
(1) a. "Aps,. 3x, .p = [Xwl . x = THE-PRICE-OF-MILK(w 1)]
b. tpst . 3Xe. p = [Xwl . x = THE-PRICE-OF-MILK(wl)]
Recall that the question denotation in (la) seemed to be adequate semantically, and only ran into
trouble with the distribution of CQs. The proposition denotation in (lb) bears an obvious
similarity to the question denotation, which suggests that the latter also stands a good chance of
capturing the semantic facts. And because the proposition denotation (like the question
denotation) incorporates the (s, e) meaning of the price of milk, we should be able to derive the
CQ meaning of a DP (i.e. the propositional meaning) from the IC meaning, which we know must
exist for the independent reasons discussed in the previous chapter.
Before we blithely and wholeheartedly adopt (ib) as the CQ denotation of the price of
milk, a few observations are in order. First, if we derive the propositional meaning from the IC
meaning-either directly via a type-shifting operation like the one proposed in Chapter 2 to
derive the question meaning from the (s, e) denotation, or indirectly via the question meaning-
then our theory will be open to the same challenge seen in previous chapters: every DP,
apparently, can receive an IC denotation, but not all of them can become CQs. And second, the
meaning in (lb) is not quite right: there is no unique proposition p such that, for some x, p
expresses that x is the price of milk in wi. In fact, even if we limit possible prices to integers,
there are an infinite number of such propositions, one for each integer x.
Therefore, rather than plunge immediately into the ramifications of the theory that CQs
denote propositions, let us go through some necessary prior steps which will derive the correct
propositional meanings, in a compositional manner and only for the correct subset of DPs. In
§4.1, we will consider how exactly to characterize this subset of DPs by distinguishing different
categories of noun. §4.2 revisits the individual concept, beginning with the conclusions of
Lasersohn (2005) and demonstrating in §4.2.1 that, while (se, t) denotations may not be
necessary as lexical meanings of nouns, they cannot be eliminated entirely. The subsections
following consider each category of noun proposed in the opening section, showing what lexical
types they have and how to derive a meaning of type (se, t) for each.
Once we have the necessary semantic types for the various categories of noun, we move
on to deriving the propositional meanings proposed for CQs. In §4.3, we will once again
consider the categories of noun and see how propositional meanings can be derived for those,
and only those, DPs that can be CQs. We will also see, once we have derived meanings more
subtle than the one in (ib), that propositions capture the correct range of meanings for CQs.
Chapter 5 will once again take up the issue of CQ distribution and the PCQC.
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4.1. Relational Nouns and Nonrelational Nouns
Much of the previous CQ literature discusses determiner phrases containing only a head noun
with a complement, but which have no adjunct or modifying adjective.' A partial list, based on
Caponigro and Heller (2003):
(2) Tell me...
the governor of California the winner of last year's Pulitzer Prize
the outcome of the trial the capital of Vermont
the location of the meeting the color of my eyes
your shoe size your height
the price of milk the time of the meeting
the temperature of the water Bill's telephone number
the square root of 49 the sum of 8 and 9
Caponigro and Heller categorize these as functional nouns, nouns that denote functions from
individuals to individuals-that is, objects with type (e, e). On this view, capital (or perhaps the
capital of) is a function from a country (state, province, etc.) to a particular city, sum from a
plurality of numbers to a number, governor from a state to a person, and so forth.
I will depart from them in terminology and use the term relational nouns (RNs), as the
relation expressed may not always be strictly a function, i.e. a one-to-one mapping. For instance,
color relates an object to that object's colors, but a single object may have more than one color.
Similarly, some countries have more than one capital, such as Bolivia, which the capital relation
maps to both La Paz and Sucre. A relational noun denotes an object with type (e, et): for
instance, l[capital]] maps Italy to the set of things that are a capital of Italy, namely {Rome}, and
similarly maps Bolivia to the set {LaPaz, Sucre}. A definite determiner is pragmatically
appropriate only when the sets are singleton sets-that is, when the relation is one-to-one, which
is to say a function. (It is occasionally convenient to speak of these nouns as if they do denote
(e, e) objects that map individuals to individuals, though when working with the compositional
meanings we must be careful not to use this informal sense.) When the relation is not one-to-one,
an indefinite determiner is more appropriate: Blue is a color of the rainbow.2
One goal of this chapter will therefore be to find a mechanism to derive propositional
denotations from the lexical meanings of relational nouns. But before we move on, let us expand
on the qualification that begins this section: though much of the previous CQ literature focuses
on those with relational nouns, not all of it does. Recall that Heim (1979) discusses some CQs
with other nouns (NRNs, or nonrelational nouns) as their heads: everything John did and John's
favorite drink in particular sparked her concern that, in a CQs-as-ICs theory, every noun in the
1The argument of the head noun is required semantically; syntactically, the argument may be realized as an
actual complement (the governor of California) or as a genitive (your height = the height of you), or may, in certain
particular circumstances, be implicit (the temperature = the temperature of the current setting).
2 Another reason to use "relational noun" instead of "functional noun" is that, as we saw in the last chapter,
LUbner (1981) uses the latter term very differently, as a translation of the term Funktionalbegriffe from Libner
(1979). Funktionalbegriffe seems to refer to nouns denoting functions from world/time indices to individuals-that
is, expressions usually called "individual concepts". See §3.3.2 for further discussion.
Not all relational nouns form CQs: those expressing relationships between people, in particular, seem
degraded to me. I find Tell me her mother very odd; even when the mother is someone famous or relevant, e.g. I
know Liza Minnelli's mother-it's Judy Garland, it seems strange at best to me. This is an issue I will set aside.
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lexicon might need to be exempt from Montague's meaning postulate on extensional nouns.
(Heim also discusses the largest town in Italy, and mentions everyone's favorite movie in a point
about CQ meanings not arising from the DP taking narrow scope.) Implicit in this concern is the
assumption that nonrelational nouns (thing, drink, town, movie) obtain CQ denotations in the
same manner as relational nouns, either by having the same exemption from the extensional
meaning postulate, or by having the same lexical semantic type (if nouns can have either (e, t)
and (se, t) denotations lexically).
A second goal of this chapter will be to challenge this assumption. An RN needs nothing
more than its complement and a definite determiner to form a CQ-or at least nothing else overt.
An NRN, on the other hand, must have some additional structure, present in the possible CQs the
semanticist who teaches at USNDH and the largest city in Vermont but not in DPs that cannot be
CQs like the USNDH semanticist or the large city in Vermont. We will return to this fact in
§4.3.2, which considers what additional structure can or cannot produce CQs from NRNs and
suggests how this structure might produce propositional meanings.
To help differentiate RNs from NRNs in their respective capacities as the heads of CQs,
the next section revisits the question of IC meanings. Last chapter we saw how Lasersohn
separated relational nouns like temperature and price from individual concept denotations,
giving all nouns, RN and NRN alike, lexical denotations of type (e, t). The next section
reconsiders the completeness of that separation in order to re-establish a lexical distinction
between RNs and NRNs.
4.2. Individual Concept Meanings Rederived
Lasersohn (2005) eliminated type (se, t) denotations from the lexicon, demonstrating that even
for nouns that can head a DP subject of rise, an (e, t) denotation is sufficient. In this section, we
will see that (se, t) denotations cannot be eliminated entirely from the interpretation process, but
that they can be derived as necessary and, as Lasersohn hoped, need not be stored lexically. By
seeing how relational and nonrelational nouns differ in their ability to have (se, t) denotations,
we will be able to once again differentiate them by lexical semantic type, a crucial step in
deriving CQ denotations for the former and not the latter.
4.2.1. Quantified individual concepts
In §3.4.1, we saw that Lasersohn removed the need for (se, t) denotations by making the definite
determiner presuppositional and not quantificational. Lasersohn correctly observed that the
original motivation for having temperature and price denote sets of individual concepts was the
need for the to be able to quantify over the elements in such a set, and he removed that need.
But what happens when ICs are put into contexts where that sort of quantification really
is needed-for instance, with an actual quantifier? Consider the truth conditions for the
following sentences, one with a relational noun and one with a nonrelational noun.3 (The first
3 Picture is not, I believe, a relational noun in spite of its ability to take an internal argument, e.g. the
picture of Richard Nixon; my intuition is that the argument of picture does not bear the same relation to the picture
that, for instance, the argument of governor bears to the governor. I find it implausible to think of picture as
mapping an individual to the set of pictures of him, as opposed to governor mapping a state to the set of its
governors.
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sentence happens to be false, but we can easily imagine the circumstances under which it would
be true.)
(3) a. (In the 2004 election in the U.S.,) every governor changed.
b. (Each month,) every picture on Jordan's wall changes.
As every governor and every picture on Jordan's wall do not denote sets of individuals, the sets
of governors before and after 2004 cannot merely be different sets, e.g. by replacing one member
of the set with a new member (and similarly for the sets of pictures). At a first approximation, the
sentences in (3) are true only if each one of the individual governors or pictures changed--that
is, if the entire set of governors was replaced in 2004 by a new set of governors, and if the set of
pictures on Jordan's wall is replaced each month by an entirely new set. Additionally, the two
sets must be the same size. For (3a) this may seem like a merely pragmatic necessity, but (3b) is
not true if this month Jordan took down three pictures by Escher and put up six by Picasso,
though nothing in the situation is implausible. There is an intuition that the change must occur to
each picture.4
We might try to extend Lasersohn's analysis of definite descriptions to quantificational
DPs in a naive and straightforward way. Like definite descriptions, both quantificational DPs in
(3) have purely extensional uses, for which they denote (et, t) objects. For instance, the subject of
(4a) has the familiar composition in (5).
(4) a. Every governor voted for himself or herself.
b. Every picture on Jordan's wall depicts a horse.
(5) [[everyjl = XPer - XQet . VXe . P(x) -- Q(x) (et, (et, t))
[[governor]] = Xxe . governor(x) (e, t)
I[every governor]] = [[everylJ([[governor]1) =
XQet Vxe . governor(x) -+ Q(x) (et, t)
If Lasersohn is correct that nouns translate only to objects of type (e, t) (whether nonrelational
nouns or, presumably, relational nouns in this usage), then every governor in (3a) denotes the
same object of type (et, t) as it does in (4a). This meaning, however, cannot compose with the
(se, t) predicate change. Therefore, just as the governor has a type-e denotation which can
Consider as well that the complement of a relational noun can also appear as a possessive: California's
governor, the water's temperature, the trial's outcome, in addition to those in (2) already expressed as possessives.
On the other hand, Richard Nixon's picture can, for me, only very marginally refer to a picture depicting Nixon as
opposed to one he owns; Rouen Cathedral's picture cannot refer to a Monet painting even marginally.
For those who do not share my intuition and rather sensibly decide not to take my word for it, "picture on
Jordan's wall" can be replaced with "chair in Jordan's office" without changing the judgments. I hope even the most
skeptical reader, first, will agree that chair takes no internal argument, and, second, will indulge my continuing to
use picture, as pictures are pragmatically more likely than chairs to be things that change on a monthly basis.
4 Note that these intuitions do not hold for a definite plural DP, such as the governors changed or the
pictures on Jordan's wall change. Replacing only some governors with new ones makes the former true; Jordan
taking down three pictures and putting up six new ones is compatible with the latter.
The DPs in these sentences denote a single unique plurality of individuals (i.e. the maximal plurality),
intensionalized A la Lasersohn, of which change is asserted to be true. Changing some of the individuals in the set
changes the maximal plurality, and nothing requires the pluralities to have the same cardinality. In general, we
would expect different judgments with the NPs or other determiners with plural nouns than with every NP.
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intensionalize to a type-(s, e) denotation, we can intensionalize every governor to have an
(s, (et, t)) denotation.
This denotation also cannot compose with an (se, t) predicate. However, change could
have different types for differently-typed subjects, because it typeshifts or because it is lexically
type-neutral. Then, in addition to the change(se, > used for (s, e) subjects formed by
intensionalizing type e objects, we could predicate a change((, (et, t)), t> of the intension of the (et, t)
denotation of every governor.
(6) [[every governor] = Xt . XQet . Vxe . (x is a governor at t) - (Q(x) at t) (s, (et, t))
[Ichanges]]' = A<(e, t), . 3tl < t . [A(tl) # A(t)] ((s, (et, t)), t)
[[every governor changesl]] = 3tl < t . [
[MQet. Vxe . (x is a governor at t1) -~ (Q(x) at t1)] •
[MQet . Vxe. (x is a governor at t) -+ (Q(x) at t)] ]
According to this last formula, every governor changes asserts that the extension of the set of
properties true of every governor at different times is different. But these are not the correct truth
conditions, as replacing a single governor with a new governor would suffice for this to be true.
In fact, the set of properties true of every governor might change if the set of individuals who are
governors doesn't change at all, by changing a property of even a single governor. For instance,
if in January all governors are unmarried and one governor gets married in February, then the set
of properties true of every governor includes the property denoted by unmarried in January but
not in March, and thus the truth conditions expressed in (6) are met. Nevertheless, these changes
are not sufficient to meet the truth conditions of every governor changes.
Instead, based on the intuition that each governor must be replaced by a new governor, it
seems that the (se, t) sense of change must hold for each member of a set of individual concepts.
The sentence should paraphrase as for every xse where x is a governor, x changes (i.e. has
different values at different times); and for "where xse is a governor" to make sense, governor
needs to have an (se, t) denotation. With this denotation available, the quantifier relates two sets
of ICs, the set denoted by governor and the set denoted by change. This is exactly the structure
that Montague posited for the temperature rises: after all, it was sentences of exactly this form-
sentences that seem to need a ((se, t), ((se, t), t)) denotation for the determiner-that motivated
Montague to give common nouns (se, t) denotations. And easy as it is to write a meaning in
which the set of governors ICs relates to the set of ICs that change...
(7) Vxse . governor(x) -* [3t < t. [x(tl) # x(t)] ]
...it forces us to retreat from one interpretation of Lasersohn's position: governor must denote a
set of individual concepts. But Lasersohn need not be read as arguing against the existence of
sets of individual concepts; his statement that "common nouns receive translations of type (e, t)
rather than (se, t)" (p. 132) may mean only that common nouns are never listed lexically as such
sets. This leaves open the possibility of deriving a set of individual concepts.
4.2.2. Deriving ICs from relational nouns
As a quantificational DP can be used as an IC regardless of whether its head noun is relational or
nonrelational, we will need an analysis that works for either one. This section begins by focusing
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on relational nouns, after which we will see ways in which nonrelational nouns differ empirically
from relational nouns and extend the analysis appropriately.
4.2.2.1. Attempt one: deriving a set of ICs from (the intension of) the set of individuals
We have seen that there is a type ambiguity in quantified DPs, one that follows from an apparent
ambiguity in common noun denotations. That is, picture (on Jordan's wall) can either denote an
object with type (e, t), which we will follow Lasersohn in assuming to be the lexical denotation
of a common noun, or a derived object with the type (se, t). Similarly, every governor may
denote an (et, t) object, suitable to be the subject of an extensional verb (such as votes) to express
that every individual who is a governor also has the property denoted by the verb. And it may
also denote an object of type ((se, t), t), combining with an intensional verb (such as change) to
express that every individual concept which is, in some way, a governor has the property denoted
by the verb.
Lasersohn derived the IC denotation of a DP by intensionalizing its type-e denotation.
We saw that an analogous derivation from the quantified DP does not work and that we need to
change the meaning of the noun. The simplest continuation of Lasersohn's approach might be to
derive the "set of individual concepts" denotation of governor from its lexical "set of
individuals" denotation. Of course, we would actually need the intensions of the set, as the
extension of a set of individuals does not contain enough information to allow the grammar to
construct individual concepts out of the individuals. However, given the extension of the set at
each possible world, the grammar can create individual concepts whose extension in each world
is a member of the set's extension in that world. This latter criterion for 8, a set of individual
concepts, derived from P, an intension of a set of individuals, can be expressed:
(8) VXse e 8. [Vw . P(w)(x(w)) = 1]
That is, every individual concept x in the set should be such that, in all worlds w, the individual
that is the value of x in w should be in the extension of P in w. (For instance, every individual
concept in the (se, t) denotation of governor should, when evaluated at any world w, return an
individual in the (e, t) denotation of governor in world w.)
This condition is necessary; but it isn't sufficient. Consider governor when it denotes a
set of individuals, as in every governor votes. What individual concepts might we expect to have
in the set of ICs denoted by governor? Let's use small models containing only two indices (e.g.
(2002 in wo and 2005 in wo--henceforth we will omit the world part of the index) and at most
twelve individuals who are governors, six at each index. As we'd like to derive the set of
individual concepts from the intension of the set of individuals, we'll start with the latter.
(9) [[governor]](s, et) =
[2002 - {Rowland, King, Swift, Benson, Almond, Dean),
2005 -. { Rell, Baldacci, Romney, Lynch, Carcieri, Douglas } ]
The six governors listed in each of the sets are the governors of the New England states
Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont, in that order,
for their respective years.
Now here are two sets of individual concepts that meet the criterion in (8):
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(10) a. { [2002 -, Rowland, 2005 - Rell], [2002 -- King, 2005 -+ Baldacci],
1[2002 - Swift, 2005 --* Romney], [2002 - Benson, 2005 -- Lynch],
1[2002 - Almond, 2005 -- Carcieri], [2002 -- Dean, 2005 - Douglas] }
b. { [2002 -+ Rowland, 2005 --+ Lynch], [2002 - King, 2005 -+ Romney],
1[2002 -+ Swift, 2005 -- Carcieri], [2002 -+ Benson, 2005 -+ Baldacci],
[2002 - Almond, 2005 - Douglas], [2002 -> Dean, 2005 - Rell] }
In each set, every individual concept denotes a 2002 governor when evaluated for 2002, and a
2005 governor when evaluated for 2005. Nevertheless, there is a very real sense in which the ICs
in the set in (10a) are governor-ICs and the ICs in the set in (10b) are not. The difference is that
the latter assignments are arbitrary, whereas the former follow a pattern: the individual concept
that maps 2002 to John Rowland and 2005 to M. Jodi Rell is the individual concept whose value
at each world/time is the governor of Connecticut, and so forth.
Producing a nonarbitrary set of ICs makes deriving the set harder; it's also essential to the
truth conditions. Let's use a new, hypothetical model with indices 2005 and 2007. Suppose that
each of the six New England governors has a term ending in 2006. Each runs for re-election and
wins. Both of the following sets satisfy (8), in that each IC in each set picks out a 2005 governor
for 2005 and a 2007 governor for 2007.
(11) a. { [2005 - Rell, 2007 - Rell], [2005 -- Baldacci, 2007 -+ Baldacci],
[2005 - Romney, 2007 - Romney], [2005 - Lynch, 2007 -+ Lynch],
[2005 -+ Carcieri, 2007 - Carcieri], [2005 - Douglas, 2007 - Douglas] }
b. { [2005 -- Rell, 2007 -- Baldacci], [2005 - Baldacci, 2007 - Rell],
[2005 -+ Romney, 2007 - Lynch], [2005 -+ Lynch, 2007 --+ Romney],
[2005 -- Carcieri, 2007 - Douglas], [2005 - Douglas, 2007 -+ Carcieri] }
In the scenario described above, (12) is true: every New England state kept the same governor
after the 2006 election.
(12) In New England, no governor changed.
However, while taking (11 a) to be the set of ICs denoted by governor makes the sentence true,
taking governor to denote (1 lb) makes the sentence false. In the latter case, it is not true that for
no individual concept in the set are there two different times such that the value of the IC at the
two times is different. On the contrary, every IC in the set meets that criterion; we might predict
on the basis of this set that every governor changed is true, which it is not.
But suppose that, instead of running for re-election at the end of their terms, all six New
England governors realize that the voters in their own states will never re-elect them, but that
they have strong support in other states. Consequently, Governor Rell decides not to run for re-
election in Connecticut, but instead buys a house in Maine and runs for governor there;
meanwhile, Governor Baldacci of Maine buys a house in Hartford and runs for governor of
Connecticut; and similarly for the other four states. All six win the gubernatorial race in their
new home states. Now we do want a set of ICs which permutes the governors-in fact, a set
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exactly like (1 1b). This set will still make (12) false and every governor changed true, but in this
new circumstance, these are the correct judgments for these sentences.
Therefore, we cannot let our grammar use any arbitrary set of ICs that satisfies (8). At the
same time, we do not want set a requirement that each IC must select the same member of each
set if possible, which would incorrectly prevent permutations in those situations where a
permutation is desired.5
We could make (8) stronger and require it to include all individual concepts that meet the
criterion. In other words, we could have the type-shifting operation:
(13) XP(s,et) .hse . [Vw . P(w)(x(w)) = 1]
This produces a larger set of ICs: instead of having six governor-ICs in it, the set derived by (13)
has thirty-six. Taking a more manageable model that contains only Jodi Rell, John Lynch, and
Donald Carcieri, and returning to the scenario in which each wins re-election in 2006 in their
own states, the shifting operation in (8) produces the set:
(14) { [2005 - JR, 2007 -- JR], [2005 -- JR, 2007 -, JL], [2005 -+ JR, 2007 -- DC],
[2005 - JL, 2007 -- JR], [2005 -+ JL, 2007 - JL], [2005 -- JL, 2007 -+ DC],
[2005 - DC, 2007 - JR], [2005 -- DC, 2007 --+ JL], [2005 - DC, 2007 --+ DC] }
Though the quantifier in every governor seems to quantify over a set with three ICs for this
model, we derive a set with nine, each of which maps each index to an individual who's a
governor at that index. The problem here, however, does not concern intuitions about the
cardinality of the set; the problem is that this set also gives us the wrong result for the truth
conditions of (12): change is true of six of the nine ICs in the set, and therefore using the nine-IC
set to evaluate no governor changed will again incorrectly predict that the sentence is false.
The key for the relational noun governor is that the ICs that ought to be in the (se, t)
denotation are not all ICs nor some arbitrary ICs, but only those that correspond to the states of
which the governors are governor. Though we derived the above sets from the intension of the
set of individuals who are governors, an individual cannot be a governor without being the
governor of something-which is to say, governor is a relational noun with an (e, et) meaning in
addition to its (e, t) meaning. The individual concepts must also each have something they are, in
some sense, governors of. We want the IC [2002 -+ Rowland, 2005 -- Rell] in the set of ICs
denoted by every governor because this IC represents a single governorship; it's the IC the
governor of Connecticut. In contrast, [2002 --+ Rowland, 2005 --+ Lynch] has no individual x
such that the governor of x names it.
What we need to limit the type-shifting operation is a reference to the argument position
of the relational noun, so that the set of ICs derives from the (e, et) meaning and not the (e, t)
5 ICs with relational nouns such as governor should not disallow permutations, at any rate. Permutations
with common nouns such as picture will be discussed in §4.2.4.
Another reason not to pick an arbitrary set of ICs is that the task gets harder with more individuals or
indices; the number of possible sets grows quickly. With six governors and two indices, there are 6! = 720 sets of six
individual concepts. Adding a third world/time index turns those 720 sets into (6!)2 = 518,400 sets. With fifty
governors, the grammar would have to pick one set out of 50! = 3 x 10 64 possibilities for two indices; and
representative (i.e. member of the U.S. House of Representatives) yields 435! = 3.5 x 10960, or somewhat more than
a googol cubed cubed, possible (se, t) denotations with cardinality 435.
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meaning. In subsequent sections, we will see how this can be done, and later we will use the
(e, et) vs. (e, t) distinction to derive CQ denotations; as a basis for these derivations, let us pause
to consider the status of this argument position.
4.2.2.2. The role of the argument position in relational nouns
In every/no governor, the argument position is not filled overtly. Using an object with a type e
denotation as the complement will produce an anomalous DP-because a state has only one
governor and an object has (in our somewhat simplified model) only one price, DPs such as
every governor of Massachusetts or every price of milk have the same anomaly as any other
universal quantification over a singleton set. 6 However, the position can in theory have a second
quantified DP.
In general, quantifiers within DPs have two possible scope positions. They can scope
outside the DP, as in the most natural reading of the sentence in (15), given in the rough semantic
translation below it.
(15) An applicant from every European country was accepted to the program.
Vye . [european-country(y) -- [3xe . applicant-from(y)(x) A x was accepted]]
Or they can scope within the DP, attaching under the determiner (see Heim and Kratzer 1998,
Chapter 8, for compositional details):
(16) Every applicant from a European country was accepted to the program.
Vxe. [[3ye . european-country(y) A applicant-from(y)(x)] -- x was accepted]
Generally speaking, either scope should be possible unless ruled out pragmatically (for instance,
(15) has the possible but extremely unlikely reading that there is an applicant x, where x is from y
for every European country y, who was accepted; (16) has the possible but somewhat less salient
reading that, for some European country y, every applicant from y was accepted).
With relational nouns, having the argument scope out of the DP is unproblematic,
regardless of whether the NP denotes a set of individuals or a set of individual concepts. With a
set of individuals:
(17) a. The governor of every New England state ran for re-election.
b. The price of every dairy product is divisible by seven.
These sentences mean, as one might expect, that for every New England state y, the governor of
y ran for re-election (not a property of functions, but a purely extensional property of the
individual governors) and that for every dairy product y, the price of y is higher than the price of
sugar (again, an extensional property true of the individuals). And with a set of individual
concepts and the intensional predicate change:
6 Such DPs are anomalous specifically when quantifying over ICs, as in the last section. They can be used
felicitously when governor of Massachusetts denotes a non-singleton set of individuals, as for instance when
discussing governors of Massachusetts throughout its history (Every governor of Massachusetts has been someone
born in the state).
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(18) a. The governor of every New England state changed.
b. The price of every dairy product changed.
These sentences, too, have the expected meanings. The former, for instance, can be represented
as (19),
(19) Vye. [NE-state(y) --+ change(Xwl . [txe. x is a governor of y at wi])]
with the type-e denotation of the governor of y intensionalized to turn it into an individual
concept, following Lasersohn.
However, trying to scope the embedded DP under the determiner produces different
judgments. Extensionally, RNs allow their arguments to take lower scope:
(20) a. Every governor of a New England state ran for re-election.
b. Every price of a dairy product is divisible by seven.
These sentences are synonymous with their counterparts in (17). But when used intensionally,
RNs disallow this lower scope.
(21) a. ?#Every governor of a New England state changed.
b. #Every price of a dairy product changed.
We might expect these sentences to be equivalent to those in (18), as the lower-scope reading of
(20a) would be paraphrased as Every x, where there's a NE state y and x is the (intensional)
governor of y, changed, and similarly for (20b). Nevertheless, they are infelicitous.
Of course, the unacceptability of these sentences cannot result from an incompatibility of
a quantifier with a set of individual concepts, as we have seen that a determiner can quantify over
a set of ICs. In fact, the meanings that these sentences fail to express can be expressed with a
quantification over ICs that does not fill the argument position of the relational noun. Restricting
the domain of the noun contextually instead of with an overt argument produces acceptable
sentences, as does using a pronoun (e.g. by paraphrasing the DP as all of them):
(22) a. Chris thinks he knows { the price of every dairy product/the governor of every
New England state }, but recently, all of them changed.
b. Chris thinks he knows the price of every item in the store, but in the dairy
section, every price changed after yesterday's milk shortage announcement.
c. Chris thinks he knows the governor of all fifty states, but in New England, every
governor changed after yesterday's election.
The problem must occur when the argument position is filled-indeed, nonrelational noun
phrases, which have no argument position to fill overtly, are acceptable as subjects of either
intensional or extensional verbs, as we saw earlier in this section (Every applicant from a
European country... demonstrated the extensional fact, and every picture on Jordan's wall..., the
intensional).
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Let us consider the conceivable but not actually possible interpretation of every governor
of a New England state changed (and every price of a dairy product changed). If we try to write
a logical form analogous to the paraphrase given above for every applicant from a European
country, we would have:
(23) Vxe . [[3ye . new-england-state(y) A governor-of(y)(x)] -* x changed]
The variable x must range over individual concepts and not over individuals; consequently,
governor-of(y) must be a property of ICs. In that case, governor would have, among its
denotations, something like the following.
(24) figovernor]](e, (se, t)) = XYe . Xse . Vw . x(w) is a governor of y in w
The infelicity of Every governor of a New England state changed suggests that governor cannot
have this meaning, and more generally that relational nouns cannot have (e, (se, t)) denotations.
This conclusion has important consequences for the current objective of incorporating the
argument of the relational noun into the derivation of the (se, t) meaning. Though we want to
include the state governed in the derivation of the ICs in the denotation of governor, we do not
want governor to be a function from states to the sets of ICs that represent their governors, as in
the meaning in (24). In other words, though we might (and, in a moment, will) derive
governor(e, t) from governor(e, et) so that the former set reflects the internal argument present in the
latter denotation, we do not want to derive governor(se, t) from a governor(e, (se, t)) meaning.
Nevertheless, the argument position of the relational noun must play some role in the
derivation of the set of ICs. In the next section, we begin to derive the desired meanings within
these constraints.
4.2.2.3. Attempt two: deriving ICs from a relational noun
The previous two sections demonstrated that the grammar does not derive (se, t) denotations for
relational nouns from (e, t) or (e, (se, t)) meanings. In this section, we return to the intuition that
governor and other relational nouns denote (e, et) objects, where the noun takes an individual as
an argument-e.g., a state-and returns a set of individuals-e.g., the individuals who are
governors of that state.7 The extension of governor in 2005 at wo (i.e. the actual world at the time
of writing) maps Connecticut to the singleton set {M. Jodi Rell , the only individual who is a
governor of Connecticut; it maps Massachusetts to {Mitt Romney}, and so forth. Its intension,
on our limited model, is as follows.
7 The function may return the empty set: for instance, [governor of MIT] = { ), because MIT has no
governor (it has a president, and deans, and so forth). Governor of MIT has the same status as unicorn in the
grammar: the governor of MIT fails to refer, There is no governor of MIT is true, and so forth.
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SCT -- {Rowland} NH -- {Benson) 1
2002 -- ME - {King} RI --+ { Almond }
LMA -- {Swift} VT -- {Dean} I
(25) [[governor]](s, (e, et = -CT --+ { Rell } NH -I {Lynch }
2005 --+ ME --+ { Baldacci} RI -+ { Carcieri
_MA -+ {Romney} VT -- {Douglas) _
Given the (s, et) denotation repeated here,
(9) I[governor](s, e,) =
[2002 - { Rowland, King, Swift, Benson, Almond, Dean),
2005 --- {Rell, Baldacci, Romney, Lynch, Carcieri, Douglas} ]
it might seem that governor needs to be lexically ambiguous between (the extensions of) these
two denotations. But looking at the two functions, we can see that this is unnecessary. In
particular, the information contained in the latter is a subset of the information contained in the
former. We can derive the latter from the former by stripping out that information via existential
closure (cf. Dowty's (xxxx) use of existential closure to intransitivize verbs such as eat):
(26) XP(s, (e, et)). -wl . XXe . 3ye. [P(wi)(y)(x) = 1]
For governor in particular, the relational meaning and the common-noun meaning are:
(27) [igovernorJ](,, (e, e)) = •wl .y . X.X x is the governor of y at wl
[[governor](,, eo) = Xwl . xe . 3ye . x is the governor of y at wl
The latter is a derived meaning for governor. In §4.2.2.1 we saw that we cannot derive the set-of-
ICs meaning for governor from this latter meaning, because the necessary governor-to-state
associations were missing. However, we can derive it from the former. The relational meaning
still indicates which state each governor-individual is the governor of, which needs to be built
into the set-of-ICs meaning in order to ensure that the set contains the right ICs.
We saw in the previous section that there should not be any sort of intermediate
(e, (se, t)) denotation in the shifting process. Therefore, we want a type-shifting operation that
takes the (s, (e, et)) meaning and returns an object with type (se, t). This is not at all complex; we
need only turn the external argument of the relational noun into an IC, and close off the
complement.8
8 Note that if we didn't include the existential closure as part of this process, we would have had the
intermediary step in (i).
(i) I[governor(e, (se, y) = Xy, . Xse. w . [x(w) is the governor of y at w] a
[CT -+ ([2002 -* Rowland, 2005 -* Rell]), ME -- { [2002 -+ King, 2005 -* Baldacci]),
MA -- ( [2002 -- Swift, 2005 -* Romney] }, NH -* ([2002 -, Benson, 2005 - Lynch] },
RI - { [2002 --+ Almond, 2005 --+ Carcieri]), VT - { [2002 -. Dean, 2005 -+ Douglas])]
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(28) kP(, (e,e) . xse . B3y . Vw . [P(w)(y)(x(w)) = 1]
Applying this to the intension of the relational noun governor given above, this produces a set of
exactly those six ICs we wanted to quantify over:
(29) [[governor](se, t) = LXse . 3ye. Vw . [x(w) is the governor of y at w]
{ [2002 - Rowland, 2005 -+ Rell], [2002 -* King, 2005 -- Baldacci],
[2002 -* Swift, 2005 -+ Romney], [2002 - Benson, 2005 -- Lynch],
[2002 -* Almond, 2005 --+ Carcieri], [2002 - Dean, 2005 - Douglas] } (= 10a)
Now the IC [2002 -+ Rowland, 2005 -+ Rell] will be in the set [Egovernor(se, t), because there
does exist an individual y such that, at each w, the value of the IC at w is a member of the set that
the extension of [Igovernor]](, (e, et)) at w assigns to y. (In this case, y = Connecticut; and the
denotation of governor returns, at 2002, the set { Rowland} for the value Connecticut, which
contains the value of the IC at 2002; and so forth.) The same is not true for ICs we wanted to
exclude, such as [2002 -- Rowland, 2005 - Lynch]. It is easy to see, as well, that this operation
will produce ICs that permute the governors among their states only in exactly those situations in
which the governors actually do swap states.
Summarizing, we have type-shifting operations and denotations for governor as follows.
(30) XP(s, (e, etl . w . Xe . 3ye- . [P(w)(y)(x) = 1] (s, (e, et)) -, (s, et)
XP(s, (ee,)) . xse . 3 y . Vw . [P(w)(y)(x(w)) = 1] (s, (e, et)) - (se, t)
[[governor]] = XYe . e . [governorw(y)(x) = 1] (e, et) (lexical)
f[governor]] = hXe . Bye. governor(e, eto]](y)(x) (e, t)
[g overnor]] = XXse . 3ye• Vw 1 . governor(e, et wl"' (y)(x(wl)) (se, t)
The governor of Vermont uses governor(e, et), which maps its argument to a set of individuals,
from which the selects the unique individual; every governor votes uses governoret. Interpreting
the governor of Vermont changed uses governor(e, et), along with Lasersohn's method of turning
the individual into an individual concept. With governor(se, t, we have a method of interpreting
every governor changed without having had to introduce lexical denotations with type (se, t),
which Lasersohn wished to avoid.
Before we move on, we should note that the (se, t) meaning is world-independent, having
no free world variable. The world variable that's free in the (e, et) and (e, t) meanings of
relational nouns, which allows them to be intensionalized, is necessarily bound by the universal
operator that derives the set of individual concepts; "necessarily", because it is this universal
binding of worlds that ensures that the individual concepts in the set are those which correspond
to a consistent argument (e.g. the same state) across worlds. If the world argument were left
unbound...
Though existential closure could then convert this to the meaning in (29), the infelicitous Every governor of a New
England state changed could be interpreted using (i), exactly as described in (23). That was the meaning we wanted
to prevent; (i) is exactly the meaning we do not want governor to be able to have.
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(31) * [ggovernor(se, t)If= Xse . Ye . I[governor(e, et)]"(y)(x(w))
= Xse . ye . [x(w) governs y in w]
...then at any given index, governor(se, t would denote the set of individual concepts such that, for
some y, the value of the individual concept at that index is a governor of y at that index. This is
worse even than the meanings that derived from the (s, et) meaning of governor, as those at least
required that the IC would map other indices to governors. In this case, any individual concept
that maps 2005 to Mitt Romney will be in the extension of this set at 2005, as it would meet the
requirement that it maps 2005 to the governor of some y at 2005. No restriction is set on what x
maps other world/times to, and thus, in addition to [2002 -+ Swift, 2005 -- Romney], the set of
ICs will contain [2002 -+ Romney, 2005 --+ Romney] and, for that matter, [2002 -+ the planet
Mars, 2005 -+ Romney]. At 2002, of course, ICs that map 2002 to non-governors such as
Romney and the planet Mars will not be in the set, though what the ICs map 2005 to is similarly
unrestricted.
So the world variable must be bound; if it were bound existentially...
(32) * I[governor(se, t)J = Xse . 3ye . 3wl . [[governorl]]" (y)(x(wl))
...then we would have a similar problem to the one above, with each IC in the set allowed to map
worlds to practically anything, as long as it maps some world to the governor of something. (In
fact, it is somewhat worse; the existential binding doesn't even guarantee that the value of x at
any particular index is a governor at that index.) The universal binding ensures that each IC be
consistent in its mappings.
This automatic world-independence solves Lasersohn's real objection to the use of sets of
individual concepts. Recall from the last chapter that Lasersohn wanted to avoid a meaning
postulate on temperature and price, repeated here,
(33) Vxse . 0 [a(x) -- Oa(x)]
that would force lexical (se, t) denotations to be independent of indices. Such a postulate, he
observes, is an "arbitrary lexical stipulation" (p. 130). The theory proposed in this section
ensures that (se, t) denotations will necessarily be index-independent by means of the universal
binding of the world variable in the type-shifting operation that derives the denotation.
Therefore, the need for index-independent sets of ICs in Gupta's syllogism presents no problem
for denotations like governor(se, t), which are index-independent without requiring additional
stipulation on the meanings themselves or on the (e, et) lexical meanings from which they derive.
4.2.3. Two kinds of relational noun
The analysis in the last section used governor to exemplify relational nouns, and in fact the same
arguments and judgments hold with many other RNs, such as capital and winner. However, the
shifting operations in (30) encounter problems when applied to, say, price.
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(34) [[price]]" = XYe . Xe . [y costs x at w] (e, et) (lexical)
[[price]'" = ), e . 3Ye [y costs x at w] (e, t)
[[price]]" = Lse . 3Ye Vwl . [y costs x(wl) at wl] (se, t)
Using these shifters once again bypasses the (e, (se, t)) denotation, correctly preventing an
intensional interpretation of every price of a.... All the same, it is not obvious that these are the
meanings we want. Taking price(e, t) in particular: while the set of governors in a world is the set
of individuals who are governors of something in that world, the set of prices ought to be the set
of individuals that are prices in some world. For instance, if $1.99/gallon is a price at some world
and time, it's a price even at a world and time when nothing has that as its price. On the other
hand, Arnold Schwarzenegger is not a governor at indices when nothing has him as its governor.
Thus, even in wo, one can say of $1.99/gallon that it is a price, even without knowing whether
anything in wo has it as price--indeed, even if nothing has it as a price in wo--on the basis of it
being a possible price. One cannot in the same manner say in wo that, e.g., Noam Chomsky is a
governor even though no state has him as a governor in wo, on the basis of him being a possible
governor (i.e. in some possible world he is the governor of Massachusetts).9, 0'
We can separate relational nouns into two classes, those like governor and those like
price; nouns in both classes have lexical (e, et) denotations, but their (e, t) denotations differ as
described above. Many nouns in the price class indicate measurements, such as temperature,
height, area, and age. Just as [[ $1.99/gallon]] is a price at all indices, [[90 degrees Fahrenheit]] is
necessarily a temperature, [[ten meters]] is necessarily a height, [[ten square metersl] is
necessarily an area, and I[Iten years (old)]] is necessarily an age. But not everything in this class
is, strictly speaking, a measurement:
(35) a. The color of Sam's hair depends on whether she's still interviewing for jobs.
b. The location of the meeting depends on when we decide to hold it.
c. The way to Harvard Square depends on where you're coming from.
As with measurement nouns, individuals in the sets denoted by color, location, and way are in
their respective sets across worlds. [[red] is necessarily a color, points in space are necessarily
locations, and paths are necessarily ways." Again, price-class nouns differ from governor-class
9 The same is true of times: one cannot say in 2005 that Howard Dean, governor of Vermont before Jim
Douglas, is "a governor" (regardless of honorary title). In fact, he is a "former governor", and former N denotes the
set of individuals who were in I[NI' for some t < to and who are not in I[NDto. But "$1.99/gallon" is arguably a price
even in prehistoric times, that is, before people paid in dollars (or, perhaps, at all), and "200 ducats a week" is still a
price even though ducats have not been legal currency for years; the notion of a "former price" is hard to understand.
10 It's not clear to me whether this argument extends to price(se, ,). An IC in the set denoted by governor(e, , )
must map each world to an individual who is a governor(e, t) in that world, and the same will be true of price.
However, governor is also constrained by each function having to pick out the governors of some given thing; does
price have the same constraint, or is any mapping from worlds to prices a price(se, t? I'm not prepared to rule out the
latter, but neither am I certain how one could test this. I will provide mechanisms to derive this kind of
(se, t) denotation, just in case; but at any rate the price(e, ) facts in the text are secure enough that we can continue
regardless of how the (se, t) facts fall out.
" Though with these latter two, the description may not apply in any given possible world. For instance,
the description the conference room on the fourth floor of the Stata Center at MIT does not describe anything in wo
at the time 1997, which is a time before the Stata Center was built at MIT, or in possible worlds in which the Stata
Center is only three floors, or has no conference rooms on the fourth floor, etc. Nevertheless, the actual individual
denoted by that description in wo, which is a particular point in space, is a location in any world. Similarly, while at
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nouns in this regard: Arnold Schwarzenegger is a governor in wo but is not necessarily a
governor, nor is Rome necessarily a capital.
Let us call those relational nouns like price, whose range of values is index-independent,
abstract relational nouns (ARNs), as the values of such nouns tend to be abstracts (numbers,
colors, measures, and so forth). Those like governor, whose range of values at an index is
dependent on that index, we will call concrete relational nouns (CRNs).
Based on the discussion in the preceding paragraphs, the shifting operations for CRNs
such as governor seem not to apply to ARNs such as price.12 We could instead derive ARN
meanings some other way. For instance, we could use different shifters:
(36) XP(s, e, et),. xe. 3ye . 3wI. [P(Wl)(y)(x) = 1] (s, (e, et)) -, (e, t)
XP(s, (e, et) . XZe . Vw2 [e .3W . [P(1))(z(w2)) = 1] (s, (e, et)) -- (se, t) 13
[[price]]w = LXe . 3Ye 3wl . [y costs x at wl] (e, t)
[Iprice]]w = s,.e - Vw . I[priceet]](x(wl)) (se, t)
The first shifter creates a set consisting of every individual such that it is the P of something in
some possible world. (This does assume that everything in, for instance, pricee, is the price of
some object in some possible world, and similarly for other nouns--everything that is a height is
the height of something in some world, everything that is a color is the color of something in
some world, and so on. Examining whether this is the case would take us deeper into
philosophical questions than this dissertation has space for.)
But this theory is not sufficiently restrictive. In particular, the shifting operations in (36)
will apply just as well to (the intension of) a CRN denotation as it does to an ARN denotation.
Using these shifting operations creates a chicken-and-egg problem: ARNs and CRNs can be
distinguished by the fact that the former but not the latter have the kind of meaning these type
shifters produce, but restricting the type shifters to apply to ARNs but not CRNs requires being
able to distinguish the two. We need an independent method to differentiate them, after which
we can restrict the type shifters to be sensitive to this differentiation.
Let us start with ARNs that relate to measurements, such as temperature, height, and
price. We have been assuming so far that, like CRNs, these denote (e, et) predicates; but if these
predicates involve measures, we can refine this assumption by comparing them to adjectives that
involve measures, i.e. scalar adjectives like hot, tall, and expensive.14 Scalar adjectives are often
treated as relating an individual and a degree on an ordered scale of values (Cresswell 1976, inter
alia):15
different worlds or times a particular path might not get you to Harvard Square-the subway is broken at that time;
Harvard Square was built elsewhere in that world; that world and time has a huge bottomless pit in the middle of
that route-the path is still a "way".
12 This may be too strong-price, may actually be used ambiguously between the set of all conceivable
prices and the governore,-like set of all actual prices, and similarly for price(se, t. Even if this is the case, the
following arguments still hold, as there must be a way to get the meanings described in the preceding paragraphs.
13 If necessary. See footnote 10.
14 L6bner (1981) offers a suggestion along these lines, in particular that the temperature ofx denotes not a
number such as ninety but "a certain value on a certain scale" (p. 474).
15 See, e.g., Schwarzschild and Wilkinson (2002) for arguments that the interpretation of scalar adjectives
requires not discrete points on scales but intervals on scales. Nothing said here should be incompatible with
intervals.
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(37) [[hot] = kd . Xx x is hot to degree d
[[tall] = Xd. x . x is tall to degree d
ffexpensive]] = d . Xx . x is expensive to degree d
The degree d can be closed existentially (Sandy is tall means, roughly "there is a degree of
tallness d such that things to that degree are 'tall', and Sandy is tall to that degree"), or bound by
comparative or superlative morphemes, and so forth. Extending this analysis to relational nouns,
we can take the "abstract" values of abstract relational nouns to be degrees, so that the nouns
have the lexical type (e, dt).'6
(38) [[temperaturel] = Xx . Xd .x has degree d on the temperature scale
f[height]] = kx . Xd . x has degree d on the height scale
[[price]] = Xx . Xd . x has degree d on the price scale
The internal argument is an individual; price of milk or Sandy's height denotes the set of degrees
such that milk has that degree on the scale of prices, or that Sandy has that degree on the scale of
heights. As with scalar adjectives, the sets of degrees are not singleton sets-if Sandy has the
degree "six feet" on the height scale, she also has the degrees "five feet", "four feet", and so on
for all degrees less than six feet. A definite determiner (or a possessive) will select the maximal
degree from the set, hence the following contrast.
(39) a. We need someone six feet tall to reach that shelf. Fortunately, Sandy is six feet
tall-in fact, she's six foot six-so we can get her to help.
b. #We need someone whose height is six feet to reach that shelf. Fortunately,
Sandy's height is six feet-in fact, she's six foot six-so we can get her to help.
The second sentence in (39a) asserts that "six feet" is a degree of height possessed by Sandy,
which is true if she's six and a half feet tall. The second sentence in (39b), however, asserts that
"six feet" is the maximal degree of height possessed by Sandy, which is not true if she's six and
a half feet tall.
By building scalar meanings into ARNs, the independence of their referents across
worlds and times follows logically with minimal extra assumptions. We need only to take the
laws of mathematics to be constant across worlds, which is a fairly tame assumption. The laws of
mathematics ensure the existence of the scale of real numbers in every world; the linear scale of
a scalar adjective or a scalar noun can be constructed by combining the scale of numbers with the
appropriate unit of measurement, so these scales are also constant across worlds. 17 From these
scales, we can derive the (e, t) and (se, t) meanings-or rather the (d, t) and (sd, t) meanings-
directly and without reference to (e, dt) meanings at all, thereby obviating the need for the
shifters in (36) or any others. For instance:
16 1 will use d in semantic types to indicate a degree argument. This move is primarily notational. I do not
mean to commit myself to the notion that degrees are substantially different than individuals of type e, rather than
being a special case, and I hope ontologists among my readers will refrain from sending angry letters.
17 Which suggests that units of measurement--dollar, ducat, meter, degree Fahrenheit, and so forth-are
rigid designators. This assumption is also, I hope, relatively uncontroversial.
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(40) [[height(e, dt)]l = Xx . Xd .x has degree d on [a height scale]
[[height(d, t]] = Xd. d is a member of [a height scale]
[[height(,sd, J = XXd . Vw .x(w) is a member of [a height scale]
...where "a height scale" is any scale derived by combining the real numbers with a measure of
height, such as feet.18
What about ARNs which are not so obviously measurements, such as color, location, and
way? Even though their denotations are not as obviously mappings to sets of numbers, each of
these can be expressed as scales in some number of dimensions. Colors, for instance, can be
expressed in two- or three-dimensional charts in various ways (colorwheels, etc.). We cannot, of
course, say the color of the sky is rising, because color is not a one-dimensional scale like
temperature or price, but we can talk about colors changing along dimensions with predicates
like fade. Locations in space are similarly expressible as triples representing distance from an
(arbitrary) origin; ways from one place to another can be expressed as a series of these triples.
We will return to the distinction between ARNs and CRNs in §5.3. The above discussion
should suffice to show that the (e, et), (e, t), and (se, t) meanings of relational nouns relate to one
another, though the details of the two kinds of relational noun may differ.
4.2.4. Deriving ICs from nonfunctional nouns
So far, this section has demonstrated how to derive sets of individual concepts from relational
noun denotations. However, we began with data demonstrating not merely that relational nouns
can denote sets of ICs, but that NPs in general can denote sets of ICs. In addition to every
governor changed with its set of ICs based on the relational noun governor, we had:
(3b) (Each month,) every picture on Jordan's wall changes.
We still do not want NRNs like picture to lexically denote a set of ICs, but the shifting
operations of the previous subsections cannot derive a set of ICs from its lexical denotation, as
they apply to objects with (e, et) meanings. Because picture is not a relational noun, there is no
variable to close existentially and thereby ensure that the correct set of ICs is derived.19 So the
previous techniques do not apply here.
4.2.4.1. Getting from sets of individuals to sets of ICs
By not having an argument that can be existentially closed, nonrelational nouns resemble the
naive meaning for governor written in §4.2.2.1. That is, nothing will prevent the individual
concepts in a set like picture on Jordan's wall from permuting the set, much the way the
18 Alternately, we could limit the shifting operations in (36) to those relational nouns that make reference to
scales, but the method in the text seems more elegant.
19 Again, see footnote 3 for a discussion of why picture is not a relational noun. Additionally, note that the
mechanism presented above to determine a set of ICs from the internal argument of RNs will not work for picture
and its internal argument. If Jordan were a federal employee in 1975 with three different pictures of Nixon on her
office walls, and she replaced each one with a different picture of Gerald Ford after Nixon's resignation, Every
picture on Jordan's wall changed would be true. But we could not determine the ICs in picture on Jordan's wall in
the same way as we did for RNs: the ICs do not select, at different indices, pictures of the same individual. Instead,
each one selects a picture of Richard Nixon at the earlier index, and a picture of Gerald Ford at the later index.
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incorrect denotation for governor permuted the governors between 2005 and 2007 in (1lb).
Suppose that Jordan has, on her wall, three paintings, A, B, and C. We require a way to prevent
the set of individual concepts in (41) from being a possible denotation of picture on Jordan's
wall in a situation where the pictures do not change,
(41) {[4/05 --- A, 5/05 -+ B], [4/05 - B, 5/05 -+ C], [4/05 -+ C, 5/05 --+ A])
lest it predict the truth of Every picture on Jordan 's wall changed in May (because for every IC
in the set, its value before May is different than its value in May).
For governor and other relational nouns, we used the additional argument to select the
right ICs for the set. Picture (on Jordan's wall) lacks this kind of inherent argument. I would like
to suggest that we can nevertheless introduce a pseudo-argument for picture through a type-
shifting operation. We could allow this argument to turn the (e, t) meaning of picture into an
(e, et) meaning. At this point, however, we should recall that the goal of this section is to derive
intensional and extensional meanings for relational and nonrelational nouns, so that when we
look for a procedure to turn RNs but not NRNs into CQs, the grammar can distinguish the two
classes by type. Therefore, let us reserve the (e, et) type as a lexical type for RNs, underivable for
NRNs. (This theoretical decision has additional empirical support: if an (e, et) meaning, or an
(e, (se, t)) meaning, were derivable for NRNs, we would expect the argument positions to be
filled overtly with the same of-PP used to provide arguments to RNs; but they cannot be.)
We can avoid giving (e, et) denotations to NRNs by having the type-shifting operation
introduce not merely an argument position but a bound argument position. As a post-lexical
operation should not be able to alter the internal structure of the noun's meaning, the argument
position itself can be simulated with a relation R(s, (e, et)) that expresses a correspondence between
an object in the denotation of the noun and the pseudo-argument object:
(42) XP(s, et) . xse . y Vw . [P(w)(x(w)) A R(w)(y)(x(w))] (s, et) --+ (se, t)
[[p.o.J.w.]" = ALx. [picw(x) A on-J's-wallw(x)]
[Ip.o.J.w.]] = XXse . By. Vw . [[picw(x(w)) A on-J's-wallw(x(w))] A R(w)(y)(x(w))]
Given the intension of the set of individuals that are pictures on Jordan's wall, this shifting
operation returns a set of ICs, the range of each of which comprises those objects which are
pictures on Jordan's wall and which correspond to some y via a relation R. Compare this to the
(se, t) meaning of governor, which is similarly the set of ICs whose ranges comprise those
objects which are governors corresponding to some y, the only difference being that the
correspondence between governors x and their ys is built into the RN governor.
Once this (se, t) denotation has been derived, the felicity of every picture on Jordan's
wall follows from the usual composition principles. Of course, this operator still requires some
explanation of the variable R: what relation between pictures and some other individuals
produces the correct set of ICs? We will see that, with one caveat noted below, it does not matter
what relation is chosen; it can be a salient relation, or an arbitrary relation that assigns a number
to each individual in each set, or another relation entirely. For instance, suppose that in April,
Jordan has pictures A, B, C on her north, south, and east walls respectively, and in May, she
replaces A with X, B with Y, and C with Z. Then the following two (s, (e, et)) relations produce
the corresponding sets of ICs:
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(43) a. R, = Xw . Ax, E {north, south, east} . Xye . [y is a picture on Jordan's x wall at w]{ [April --+ A, May --+ X], [April -- B, May -+ Y], [April -+ C, May -+ Z]}
1 -*A ] Y
b. R2 = April --+ 2 B , May 2 --* Z
-3 -CC -3 - X_
{[April -- A, May -- Y], [April --, B, May --+ Z], [April -- C, May --+ X]}
The first, using a salient fact about the pictures, produces the set of individual concepts that map
different indices to pictures on a particular wall. The second, using an arbitrary numbering
system, produces the set of individual concepts that map different indices to pictures with the
same arbitrarily chosen number. The two sets of ICs are different, but either way, change is true
of each element of the set.
Advocating an arbitrary relation, thereby creating an arbitrary set of ICs, may seem to
contradict the aforementioned conclusions of §4.2.2.1, where we saw that problems with
permutations meant that picking the wrong set of ICs gave the wrong predictions for Every/No
governor changed. When the governors were re-elected without switching states, the non-
permuting set of ICs (1 la) gave the correct truth conditions, while the permuting set in (1 lb)
gave the wrong ones; when the governors switched states, the reverse was true.
(11) a. { [2005 -+ Rell, 2007 --* Rell], [2005 - Baldacci, 2007 --+ Baldacci],
[2005 + Romney, 2007 - Romney], [2005 -- Lynch, 2007 -- Lynch],
[2005 -- Carcieri, 2007 -- Carcieri], [2005 -- Douglas, 2007 - Douglas] }
b. {[2005 -- Rell, 2007 --+ Baldacci], [2005 -- Baldacci, 2007 -- Rell],
[2005 - Romney, 2007 -, Lynch], [2005 -- Lynch, 2007 -+ Romney],
[2005 - Carcieri, 2007 - Douglas], [2005 -÷ Douglas, 2007 --+ Carcieri] i
This led us to conclude that arbitrarily picking six "governor" ICs was not sufficient. We might
think that an arbitrary set of "picture on Jordan's wall" ICs will have exactly the same problems,
and that the (se, t) meaning should only derive from a salient relation, as in (43a).
What makes common-noun ICs different is that this sort of permutation is, in general, not
allowed. Suppose Jordan moves around the three pictures on her wall at the beginning of May, so
that she has the same three pictures in different places. In this situation, every picture on
Jordan's wall changed is false, and no picture on Jordan's wall changed is true, which stands in
direct opposition to the results of moving around the six New England governors. But if we use
the relation R1 from (43a) to derive the set of ICs, we get
(44) {[April - A, May - B], [April -* B, May --- C], [April --+ C, May -+ A])
as the denotation of picture on Jordan's wall, and hence get the same results for the sentence as
we did when we permuted the governors: it is the case that change is true of each IC in this set.
In fact, even making a particular ordering salient does not allow that ordering to serve as
the R relation if it permutes the set, or rearranges it in any way such that the mapping changes
entirely but the sets do not. Suppose two people are discussing a particular committee of the U.S.
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Senate, which has been notable for how liberal its members are. The conversants observe that all
five members of the committee, from the most liberal to the most conservative, always vote
unanimously along the Democratic Party line. Then one points out,
(45) #On the first of May, every member of the committee changed. The most liberal
member stepped down and was replaced with someone more conservative than
anyone else on the committee.
The prominence of "most liberal to least liberal" in the context should make the following R
available (where mi through m5 are the members in April in order from most to least liberal, and
m6 is the new, least liberal member in May), thereby giving member of the committee the
subsequent set of ICs.
(46) R = Xw . ,xe E { 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 }. Xye. [y is the xth most liberal committee member at w] =
[April --+ [1 -- mi, 2 - m2, 3 - m3, 4 -- m4, 5 -- ms,
May -+ [1 -+ m2, 2 - m3, 3 m4, 4 -- ms, 5 -+ m6]]
[[member of the committee]] = { [April -- mi, May -- m2], [April --+ m2, May -+ m31,
[April - m 3, May -- mr4], [April -+ m4, May - ms], [April - ms, May - m6] }
Using this denotation, every member of the committee changed is true-change is true of each IC
in the set. Nevertheless, the sentence is infelicitous.
All of this suggests that, as with relational nouns, the set of ICs denoted by a
nonrelational noun cannot be just any arbitrary set; but unlike with relational nouns, the set of
ICs is not restricted to match a particular semantically determined or pragmatically salient
mapping. Hence the caveat mentioned above: it is not the case that R can be chosen arbitrarily
from all possible relations. Instead, it must be a relation that, if a given x is in the set denoted by
the nonrelational noun at two different times, maps the same y to each instance of x. That is:
(47) Vwl, w2 . VXe . [[N(wl)(x) A N(w2)(x)l - 3ye . [R(wl)(y)(x) A R(w 2)(y)(x)]]
where N(s, et) is the set being shifted.20
20 Properly speaking, R must have an additional restriction not mentioned above: at each index, each of the
individuals in the set denoted by the common noun must be in some set in the range of R. This prevents selecting an
R for [picture on Jordan's wall]<,e, ) that, for instance, maps states to their governors, so that the expression denotes
the empty set (as this R does not map anything to a set containing a picture on Jordan's wall, and thus there is no IC
whose value at any time is both a picture on Jordan's wall and in a set in the range of R). In fact, recalling the
intuition mentioned earlier in this chapter that the sentence every picture on Jordan's wall changed requires the two
sets to be the same size, we can add to this restriction a requirement that, first, each x in the common-noun set is in
only one set in the range of R, and second, each y in the domain of R maps onto a set containing only one of the
elements of the common-noun set. Formally:
(i) Vw. [Vx, G N(w) . 3ye. [R(w)(y)(x) = 1 A VZe,. [R(w)(z)(x) . z = y]] A
NVye. Vxe, ze E N(w). [R(w)(y)(x) = 1 A R(w)(y)(z) = 1 + z = x]]
where, again, N(•,, er is the set being shifted.
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With this caveat, it no longer matters which R meeting these criteria is used. In the case
where Jordan moves her pictures around without swapping in any new ones, the set of ICs will
be based not on positions on her wall but on the necessity of each IC mapping to the same
picture at each time-that is, the only relations meeting (47) are those of the form
(48) [April -- [yl --+ A, y2 -- B, 3 -- C], May -- [yl --+ A, y2 -+ B, Y3 - C]
for any arbitrary individuals y. In particular, the "which wall" R given above in (43a) will not be
available. Conversely, when Jordan takes down her three pictures A, B, C and puts up new ones
X, Y, Z, it does not matter whether R creates a set of ICs mapping each time to the picture in
location y, or each time to the zth most beautiful picture at that time, or any other way of
associating times with pictures-however the set is created, each IC in the set will have different
values at different times.2'
At last, we have a method of deriving (se, t) denotations for both RNs and NRNs, and
doing so in such a way that we require only the lexical types (e, t) and (e, et). This gives us a
theory of individual concept meanings that satisfies Lasersohn's criteria, while still
differentiating between those nouns which form CQs naturally and those which do not.
4.2.4.2. Not getting from relational nouns to sets of individuals to sets of ICs
Before moving to the next section, in which we derive CQ meanings, we must consider the
following unwelcome prediction: if the method just described can turn any (s, et) denotation into
a set of ICs, it should be able to do so for the denotation of governor of a New England state. We
know this DP has an extensional reading when quantified, so that every governor of a New
England state voted involves quantification over the individuals in the set denoted by governor
of a New England state, and thus the NP has an (e, t) denotation. In that case, we might expect
that an arbitrary relation R can produce an (se, t) denotation:
(49) [[governor of [a N.E. state] f = XXe. [3ye . new-england-state(y) A governor-of(y)(x)]
[[[governor of [a N.E. state]](se, t)J =
xxe . 3Ye. Vw. [[3Pe . NE-statew(z) A governor-ofw(Z)(x(w))] A R(y)(x(w))]
This latter formula is the set of ICs whose range is the individuals such that there is a New
England state of which they are governor, and such that there is some y to which they each bear a
certain relation. Suppose the relation R relates a person x to a state y if x is the governor of y.
Then we can rewrite the above meaning as:
21 One might be tempted to force the ICs to have as its later value the individual that replaced the individual
at its earlier value. Thus, if Jordan replaced A with X, [April -+ A, May -* X] would necessarily be an IC in picture
on Jordan's wall. This would also explain the committee membership problem, but only in part: while [April --+ mi,
May -- m6] would have to be one of the ICs if n6 replaced mi, we would still need the restriction in (47) to prevent
[April -- m2 , May -+ m3] out of the set, as m2 and m3 do not really "replace" themselves.
At any rate, using the "xi replaces x2" method of determining R would not only allow but in fact require
permutations in cases where the objects permute, as in the situation where Jordan replaces A with B, B with C, and
C with A. This is exactly the case where we do not want a permutation.
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(50) xse . 3ye . Vw . [[3z . NE-statew(z) A governor-of,(Z)(x(w))] A governor-ofw(y)(x(w))]
(cf. [[governorl from (30) : Xse . 3ye . Vw . governor-of,(y)(x(w)) )
This makes governor of a New England state equivalent in meaning to the derived governor
(se, t) with the added restriction that it contains only those ICs corresponding to New England
states, and not those for all fifty states. However, this meaning is entirely incorrect, as we saw
above:
(51) a. ?#Every governor of a New England state changed. (= 21a)
b. In New England, every governor changed. (= 22c)
If the shifting operation could apply to a derived (e, t) set such as the one derived from governor
of a New England state, we'd expect (51a) to be felicitous and very possibly equivalent in
meaning to (51b). The fact that it is not felicitous at all tells us that the (s, et) -+ (se, t) shifting
operation, needed for quantification over ICs with NRN-headed NPs, cannot apply to NPs with
RN heads.
I believe there are a few pragmatic restrictions that prevent governor of a New England
state from being shifted to an (se, t) meaning. First, relational nouns may simply resist the
addition of extra argument positions. Because the set denoted by governor of a New England
state comprises individuals (i.e. people) who have already been related to some other individuals
(i.e. states), there is an inherent pragmatic oddity to either relating each of them to another
arbitrary individual or re-relating them to the same individual.
Second and more strongly, the particular non-permutation restriction on the shifting
operator's R are incompatible with a relational noun. At a number of points, we have seen that
relational nouns allow sets of ICs representing permutations, whereas R specifically disallows
permutations. This is more than a casual incompatibility. The (se, t) denotations of relational
nouns such as governor forced permutations by relating the individuals at different indices via
the noun's other argument; R essentially requires an arbitrary relation, and indeed in the case of
permuted governors would not even permit governor(e, et) to relate the individuals who are
governors at different times.
Therefore, the operation in (49) can be straightforwardly ruled out on pragmatic grounds,
and the shifting operation that introduces to nonrelational nouns a kind of arbitrary second
argument can be considered sufficient as the last piece in the explanation of individual concepts.
4.3. Deriving Concealed Question Meanings
At last, having established the possible (e, t), (e, et), and (se, t) denotations for nouns, we can
decide what mechanisms we need to turn them into propositions-that is, concealed questions.
We will start with relational nouns, and as nothing will rely on the distinction between ARNs
and CRNs, we can use price as representative of all RNs (and we can once again treat the type-d
argument as type-e). After that, we will look at NRNs.
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4.3.1. Deriving CQs from relational nouns
In §4.2, we saw at least two ways to get IC meanings out of relational nouns-a single IC, which
is to say an (s, e) object, results from intensionalizing the denotation of a definite description,
and a set of ICs, which is to say an (se, t) object, derives from shifting the intensionalized
denotation of a relational noun. Having done this, we could either use these ICs as CQs,
following Romero (2005) and earlier authors, or derive propositions to use as CQs from them.
But if we derive CQ meanings from (s, e) or (se, t) objects, we will produce CQ meanings for
every definite DP, including those with NRNs like the picture on Jordan's wall-i.e., those
which lack CQ uses.
Ultimately, what primarily distinguishes the price (of milk) from the semanticist is not
that one or the other is an individual concept-as they can both be-but instead the fact that the
former is compositionally built from a relational noun and the latter is not. Over the course of
§4.2, DPs received denotations with various semantic types; but while the types (s, e) and (se, t)
were available to DPs and NPs, respectively, headed by any noun, the type (e, et) remained
reserved for relational nouns. To derive propositional meanings from relational nouns and only
relational nouns, we can therefore rely on this latter type.
To capture the "identity question" paraphrase, we want an identity proposition. As a
concrete starting point, let us take John knows the price of milk as a typical sentence with a CQ
in it. As with previous theories, we need to both derive a CQ meaning for the DP and decide on a
semantics for the verb. This latter task is simple. Because the CQ denotes a proposition, the
predicate needs to take a propositional argument (followed, naturally, by an individual argument,
which is the subject), and we already have a lexical entry for know with such a denotation: the
declarative know used when the argument is a clausal proposition. In the following discussion,
we will use Romero's knowdeclarative, and for our discussion we will need no other meaning for the
verb.22
With the verb presenting no challenge, we need to derive a propositional meaning for the
definite DP. Supposing that the (presuppositional) definite determiner performs its usual task of
mapping a set to the unique member of that set (regardless of whether the members of the set are
individuals or propositions), we can derive a propositional meaning from the price of milk by
having price of milk denote a set of identity propositions-which is to say, the meaning of an
identity question.
As noted above, though we could shift the set of individuals [[price of milk]], or its
intension, into a set of propositions, the derivation would apply equally well to [[semanticist] or
[[picture on Jordan's wallt]. Instead, we want to shift the function from individuals to sets of
individuals, the (e, et) meaning, into a function from individuals to sets of propositions, an
(e, (st, t)) meaning. The operator in (52) fulfils this function.
22 The next chapter includes a discussion of Lahiri (2000, 2002), who proposes interpreting clausal question
complements of know and similar verbs as propositions, thereby eliminating knowquestion from the lexicon. In fact,
Lahiri's questions-as-propositions proposal provided much of the inspiration for the theory of concealed questions
as propositions. This is especially true of §4.3.1.3, in which the discussion of Quantifier Raising (QR) relates closely
to Lahiri's theory of Interrogative Raising (IR), which was itself inspired by QR.
A more complete discussion of IR is postponed until the next chapter primarily because, in spite of the
inspiration IR provided for the theory that CQs are propositions, the truth of the latter does not depend on the truth
of the former. In particular, Lahiri's theory may be correct, or we may still need knowquestion to interpret question
complements, but which one is true is tangential to the interpretation of CQs as propositions.
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(52) XP(s, (e, e):, - XYe -. Pst . [3xe .p = Xw I . P(w1)(y)(x)]
This operator applies only to the intensions of relational noun meanings. Semanticist and picture
on Jordan's wall have no relational noun denotation, so the mechanism that creates CQs out of
RNs cannot apply to them.
When price shifts and takes milk as its first argument, it produces the set of propositions
in (53), i.e. the denotation of [[what a price of milk is]l. "A" price, and not "the" price, because
nothing in the lexical denotation of price, nor in the above shifting operation, guarantees a
unique price.
(53) •P,p . [axe .P = XW1 .x is a price of milk in wl]
The definite determiner should now choose a unique proposition from the above set, and that
proposition will be the denotation of the price of milk. This theory already faces a challenge: the
set in (53) is not a singleton set. In fact, there are an infinite number of propositions of the form
"x is a price of milk in wl"; for any price x at all, the proposition that it's the price of milk will be
in the set. How can the definite determiner select a unique proposition from a set of large,
perhaps infinitely large, cardinality?
The answer is that all determiners set a pragmatic restriction on their arguments. It's a
much-noted fact that every student came to the party does not mean that every student in the
universe came to the party, only that every student in a contextually salient set came; similarly,
please hand me the key is felicitous even when the universe contains more than a single key, as
long as a single key is relevant to the discourse. There are many theories that explore how to
incorporate the restriction, and where the division between the semantic and pragmatic
contributions lies; for concreteness, I will assume the fairly simplified meanings in (54), in which
C is a variable determined by context.
(54) [[thei](e, e, = XPet. Xe . [P(x) A Cet(X)]
[[the]((st, t), s) = XP(st, t). pss . [P(p) A C(st, t)(p)]
The variable C in the ((st, t), st) meaning for the limits the set to a single proposition which is, in
some sense, contextually "relevant". But propositions are not necessarily salient in the context
the way individuals are (and in fact the definite DP in John knows the price of milk is felicitous
without context, unlike John handed me the key, which does require a context to determine a
salient key). What C determines the unique proposition?
The same problem of selecting the correct propositions from a question denotation arises
with the interpretation of clausal questions, a fact discussed by Lahiri (2002) and Beck and
Sharvit (2002).
(55) a. Mary and John agree on who cheated. (= B&S, 114a)23
b. Mary is certain about who cheated. (= B&S, 117a)
c. Mary told us who cheated. (= B&S, 126a)
23 Beck and Sharvit's actual sentences include the modifier for the most part, which we can set aside as
irrelevant to the current discussion.
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(s, (e, et)) --+ (e, (st, t))
While who cheated in (55c) refers to the true answers to the question, the same question as the
object of agree on or be certain refers not to the answers which are true in the actual world, but
to those true in the subject's belief worlds (i.e. Mary's in (55b), Mary and John's in (55a)). The
solution proposed by Lahiri, which Beck and Sharvit adopt into a somewhat different
framework, is to incorporate into the meaning of the question a contextual variable whose value
is determined by the verb, and which restricts the set of propositions to an appropriate subset. For
a factive verb such as tell-the factivity of which, Lahiri observes, is not predictable from other
facts about its meaning, and indeed, tell is not factive with propositions--the variable restricts
the answers to the ones true in the world of evaluation; for the other verbs in (55), the variable
restricts the answers to the ones true in the subject's belief-worlds.24
The variable Lahiri proposes works in exactly the same manner for our purposes here. In
the next chapter, we will return to the particular theories of Lahiri and of Beck and Sharvit. But
for now, we have all the pieces we need to see the compositional meaning of John knows the
price of milk.
(56) IP10
DP9  VP 8
John V7  DP 6
knows Det5  NP4
the N2  PP3
NI of milk
price
1 •,Y. Xx, . [y costs x at w] (e, et) [[pricel
2 Xy,. Xp,,. 3xe .p = [Xwl .y costs x at wi] (e, (st, t)) shifter(^ 1)
3 milk e j[milk]
4 XPs,t. 3xe. p = [Xwl . milk costs x at wl] (st, t) 2(3)
5 XP(st, t). pst . [P(p) A C(p)] ((st, t), st) E[the]l
6 tps,. [33wxe . = [Xwl . milk costs x at wl] A C(p)] (s, t) 5(6)
7 APst . XZe. Vw2 e Doxz(w) [p(w2) = 1] (st, et) [[know]1
8 Xze . Vw 2 e Doxz(w) [ (e, t) 7(6)
[tpst. [3xe. p = [Xwl . milk costs x at wl]
A C(p)]](w2) = 1]
9 john e [[John]
24 Properly speaking, the type of C in a concealed question is (s, (st, t)): the proposition it selects varies by
world, and the factivity variable is Xw . Xp .p(w) = 1, a function from a world to the set of propositions true in that
world, not in the world of evaluation. In the extensional sentences discussed in this chapter, we can ignore the world
variable; in the next chapter we will need to refer to it explicitly.
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10 V14w2  Doxjhn(w) [
[tpst . [3xe . p = [Xwl . milk costs x at wI]
8(9)
A C(p)]](w2) = 1]
Step 6 has the denotation of the DP the price of milk, which is a proposition; in particular, it is
the only proposition that, first, has the form [Xw . milk costs x at w] for some x and, second,
satisfies C. Since know is factive, C represents the propositions true in the world of evaluation;
formally, C = Xp .p(wo). Consequently, the DP denotes the only true proposition in the world of
evaluation that asserts that some x is the price of milk. If the price of milk in wo is $1.99/gallon,
then this proposition is that the price of milk is $1.99/gallon, and the above sentence is true if in
all worlds compatible with what John knows, the price of milk is $1.99/gallon, and these are the
correct truth conditions.
4.3.1.1. Heim's ambiguity, reading A
To be a serious candidate to replace Romero (2005), the theory that CQs are interpreted as
propositions must also be able to derive both readings of John knows the price that Fred knows.
(57) IP 17
DP16  VP 15
John V14  DP1 3
knows Detl 2  NP 11
the NPlo CP7
NP9  C6  IP5
NPR that DP4 VP3
price
price Fred V2 CP1
knows
First, Reading A, paraphrasable as John knows the same price that Fred knows. (Note that the
trace of knows has type (s, t) instead of type (s, e) as in Romero's derivation; once again we only
need a single declarative know to interpret CQs.)
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1 pi (s, t) [[tst]
2 Xp,,. Ze. Vwl e Doxz(w) [p(wl) = 1] (st, et) [[knowl]
3 Xze . Vwl E DoxZ(w) [pl(wi) = 1] (e, t) 2(1)
4 fred e [[Fred]
5 Vw E DOXfred(W) [PI(W)= 1] t 3(4)
6 lambda-abstraction introduction
7 Xpst. VWl e Doxfred(W) [PI(WI) = 1] (st, t) Xp . 5
8 Xye. xe . [y costs x at w] (e, et) [[price]
9 Xye X ,t. ]3xe, p = [Xwl. y costs x at wl] (e, (st, t)) shifter(A8)
10 Xpst. 3ye .3xe p = [,w 2 y costs x at w2] (st, t) 3-closure
11 pst. [ Vwl e Doxfred(W) [p(w 1) = 1] A (st, t) 7 A 10
3ye 3Xe .p = [hw2 . y costs x at w2]]
12 P(st, ) . tpst . [P(P) A C(p)] ((st, t), st) [[thel]
13 tp,. [ Vwl c Doxfred(W) [p(wI)= 1] A (s, t) 12(11)
3ye, . xe -P = [2 . y costs x at W2] A C(P)]
14 XPst . XZe - Vw3 c Doxz(w) [p(w3) = 1] (st, et) [[know]I
15 Xze . Vw 3 e DoxZ(w). [ (e, t) 14(13)
tp*. [ Vwl E DoXfred(W) [p(w) = 1] A
3 ye . 3x, p = [,w 2 . y costs x at w2] A
C(p)](w3)=1]
16 john e [[Johni
17 Vw3 e Doxjom(w). [ t 15(16)
tps . [ Vwl e Doxfred(W) [p(W) = 1] A
3ye . 3xe . p = [Xw 2 . y costs x at w2] A
C(p)](w3)=l]
Note that the lexical, relational meaning of price shifts in meaning twice, first into a "relational
proposition" via the shifter in (52) which was also used in the derivation in (56), and second into
a set of propositions via the same existential closure that turned relational price into a set of
individuals and relational-IC price into a set of ICs. In this case, with the y variable bound
existentially, price is the set of propositions which, speaking informally, express that something
is the price of something else.
The above formula asserts that some proposition p is true in all of John's knowledge
worlds; in particular, it's the unique proposition that (i) is true in all of Fred's knowledge worlds,
and (ii) expresses that x is the price of y (for some x, y) as well as being true (i.e. satisfying the
restriction C). Once again, these are the correct truth conditions.
Comparing this to Romero's derivation for the same sentence, it's apparent that the two
follow the same fundamental principles. In each case, there's some "price" object which has a
certain value in all of Fred's knowledge worlds and the same value in all of John's knowledge
worlds. For Romero, that object is an individual concept and its value is the individual which
corresponds to the object's price in the actual world. For the CQ-as-proposition theory proposed
here, that object is a proposition and its value is "1" or "true". Insofar as the two derivations are
parallel, it's unsurprising that they capture Reading A equally well.
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4.3.1.2. Heim's ambiguity, reading B
To derive Reading B, consider what distinguishes it from Reading A. Because interpreting CQs
uses a single, proposition-embedding meaning for know, Reading B does not require an
intensionalized object (and the rising meanings Heim describes do not require infinite
intensionalization). Taking seriously the idea that Reading B asserts that John knows the answer
to a meta-question, we can think of the two propositions as follows.
(58) Reading A: John knows that the price of milk is [the actual price of milk].
Reading B: John knows that Fred knows that the price of milk is [the actual price of
milk].
Of course, as John needn't know the actual price of milk for Reading B to be true, the embedded
proposition cannot be spelled out in paraphrase in quite the same way. In reading A, we can
substitute "$1.99/gallon", or whatever the actual price of milk is, for the bracketed phrase, but
we don't want that to be part of John's knowledge in Reading B. It could be paraphrased with a
free relative, e.g. "whatever the price of milk actually is"; or the proposition that John knows
could be phrased "that Fred knows that q, where q is the appropriate 'the price of milk is I
proposition". In any case, the meta-answer is created in the paraphrase by wrapping another
proposition around the one from Reading A.
The compositional semantics can realize the above intuition by means of another shifting
operation, not one that changes the function denoted by relational-noun price into a different
proposition than the shifter in (52), but one that changes the set of propositions derived by that
operation into a new set of propositions that has an extra propositional layer added to it. In
particular:
(59) XP(s, (st, t)) -XPst - [3qst .p = Xwl . P(wi)(q)]
This takes the intension of a set of propositions and returns a new set of propositions p, each of
which represents the set of worlds in which some proposition q is in the original set.
Let's see it in action by applying it to the intension of the set of propositions derived
above as the meaning of price that Fred knows in step 9 of Reading A.
(60) [XP(s, (St, ) .- Pst . [3qst. p = Xw 4 . P(w 4)(q)]]
(Xw3.,rst.[Vwle Doxfred(W3)[r(wl) = 1] A 3ye.3xe.r = [Xw 2.y costs x at w2]])
XPst . [3qt . p = Xw 4 .
[Vwl e DOXfred(w4) [q(w1) = 1] A 3ye . 3xe . q = [Xw 2 .y costs x at w21 ]]
This is the set of propositions p such that there is a q which asserts, for some x and y, that x is the
price of y, and which is true in every world compatible with what Fred knows in the world of
evaluation of p. Taking the unique true proposition (after contextual restriction) from this set via
the definite determiner and making the DP the object of John knows..., we have the following
logical form for Reading B of the sentence John knows the price Fred knows.
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(61) Vw 3 E Doxjoim(w) . [ tpst. [C(p) A 3qt. p = Xw4 .
[VwI E DOXfred(W4) [q(wl) = ] 3y e. 3Xe. q = [w 2 . y costs x at w2]]](w3)=1]
This asserts that the proposition John knows is the (true) one that expresses that Fred knows
some (particular) price, which is the right meta-knowledge for John to have.
For Heim's meta-meta-knowledge sentence and any higher sentences, iterating this
shifting operation will continue to produce the right (singleton) sets of propositions. Thus,
repeating Heim's example,
(62) John knows the price known to Fred that Bill knows. (Heim 1979, (36))
The different readings described in the previous chapter can be derived by shifting different sets
of propositions. That is, to get Reading W (on which John, Fred, and Bill all know what the price
of x is, for some x), neither price known to Fred nor price known to Fred that Bill knows is
shifted; to get Reading Z, on which Fred knows the price of x, Bill knows that Fred knows the
price of x, and John knows that Bill knows that Fred knows the price of x, both sets of
propositions are shifted. Shifting one or the other but not both gives the intermediate X and Y
readings.
4.3.1.3. Quantifiers other than the
Heim (1979) discusses inferences of the following sort, in which the latter sentence should
logically follow from the former.
(63) a. John knows every price.
[John knows the price of milk. (cf. Heim 1979, 22)
b. John knows every price.
t John knows a price. (cf. Heim 1979, 32)
She demonstrates that both the CQs-as-ICs theory and the pragmatic theory she proposes capture
the validity of this inference. What about the new theory proposed above?
Using the same (st, t) denotation of price to interpret every price and a price as we used
for price that Bill knows, the quantifiers quantify over the following set of propositions:
(64) XPs,. 3ye . 3xe .p = [,w2 . y costs x at w2]
The quantifier in each case has the type ((st, t), ((st, t), t)), 25 and the quantified DP raises from
object position as it does in ordinary Quantifier Raising (QR). The sentences in (63b) have the
following logical forms.
25 Perhaps more transparently, this type is (Pt, (Pt, t)), where P is the proposition type (s, t); in this respect,
this denotation of a or every is a crosscategorial variant of the more familiar (et, (et, t)) denotation. Just as type
(et, (et, t)) determiners relate two sets of individuals, these determiners relate two sets of propositions.
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(65) Vpst,,. [3y[3xe .[x = [w 2 . y costs x at w2] A C(p)]] -- [Vwl Doxjoi(W) [pi(wi)=1]]
[3ps,. []ye. [3Xe. p = [•w 2 . y costs x at w2] A C(p)]] A [Vw 1 e Doxjohn(W) [p1(w1)=1]]
The latter follows from the former just as John likes every teacher entails John likes a teacher.
The same reasoning holds for the inference John knows the price of milk. Of course, determiners
other than every and a show the same quantification, and the quantification over propositions
works as well with other verbs: John told me no European capital, John predicted most Academy
Award winners for 2005, and so forth.
Allowing quantification over a set of propositions opens a few more possibilities that
must be explored. First, if instead of quantifying over the argument via existential closure, a
sentence provides an explicit argument for the relational noun, a quantifier should still be
acceptable. The data bear out this prediction, though of course not all such quantification is
pragmatically felicitous-every governor of Vermont, in a world where each state has only one
governor, is no better a set of propositions than it is a set of individuals. But where an individual
might have more than one value associated with it, as with colors, a quantifier is fine.
(66) John knows every color of the rainbow.
Vpst. [3xe -p = [Xw 2 .x is a color of the rainbow at w2 ] A C(p)]
[Vwl e Doxjomh(w) [pi(wi)=1]]
In other words, for every (true) proposition that expresses that x is a color of the rainbow, John
knows the proposition to be true-once again, the correct truth conditions.
In §4.2.2, we prevented every governor of a New England state from denoting a set of
individual concepts by shifting governor directly into a set of ICs, without first making it a
function from individuals to sets of ICs. Without an argument to fill, the set-of-ICs denotation of
governor cannot compose with of a New England state. But the shifting operation in (52)
explicitly leaves the argument position open. Therefore, we would expect that the object of the
relational noun need not be a type-e-denoting object like the rainbow in (66), but that it can be a
quantificational DP such as a New England state and that, moreover, the DP can have the narrow
scope that is disallowed for the set-of-ICs meaning. In fact, this is the case:
(67) Kim knows every governor of a New England state.
This sentence is felicitous with the predicted meaning, namely "for every (true) proposition p
such that there is a New England state y for which p asserts that some x is a governor of y, Kim
knows p". And as above, this holds true for other predicates and other quantifiers: Kim told us
three governors of a New England state, for example. The acceptability of these DPs as CQs is
all the more striking in light of their unacceptability as ICs.
4.3.2. Deriving CQs from nonrelational nouns
So far, this section has discussed relational nouns, which form CQs without the need for
additional syntactic material. In §4.1, we distinguished these from nonrelational nouns, those
such as city, semanticist, wine, or person, for the very reason that DPs headed by nouns of this
latter class do not readily act as CQs. Thus, even with a context establishing the uniqueness of
the referent, the city... is infelicitous as a CQ whereas the capital... is fine.
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(68) a. Let me tell you the capital of Vermont.
b. Vermont has only one large city. #Let me tell you {the city/the large city/the large
city of Vermont/Vermont's large city}.
If we want to derive propositional meanings for those, and only those, DPs with NRNs that can
be CQs, we will need to understand which DPs these are.
4.3.2.1. Methods of CQformation from nonrelational nouns
As a starting point, many DPs that could not otherwise be a CQ can be used as one if the context
can force a relational interpretation-that is, if the NRN heading the DP can be reinterpreted as
an RN. For example, take the following context, based on a suggestion from Lynsey Wolter
(p.c.): suppose that the University of Southern North Dakota, Hoople, announces that they are
eliminating their science departments in order to put more funding into linguistics. Instead of
separate departments of chemistry, physics, biology, geology, and so forth, they plan to establish
a single Department of Science, with one faculty member representing each field. In this context,
one might say (69):
(69) Kim told me Hoople's biologist.
In general, biologist is not a relational noun, but in this context it does act as a function from one
individual to another, specifically the function from a category of scientist x to the (singleton set
containing the) x at Hoople. The context in which every institute of higher learning (by mutual
agreement, or governmental policy, or the like) reduces its biology department to a single faculty
member also makes (69) felicitous; in this case biologist is a function from a school y to the
(singleton set containing the) biologist at y.
This pragmatic method works in sufficiently rich context. If said out of the blue,
however, the acceptable-in-context (69) becomes odd; similarly, the sentences in (70) may be
felicitous in contexts that allow semanticist or city to have relational noun interpretations, but
they are otherwise ungrammatical. On the other hand, the sentences in (71), with the same
NRNs, need no context.
(70) a. #Tell me USNDH's semanticist.
b. #Tell me Vermont's large city.
c. #Tell me a city in Vermont.
(71) a. Tell me the semanticist who teaches at USNDH.
b. Tell me { the largest city in Vermont/Vermont's largest city}.
c. Tell me a city you visited last month.
In fact, the DPs in the latter set cannot easily be reinterpreted as functions: for instance, city you
visited last month does not suggest that city represents some salient and general mapping from
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people to the set of cities they visited last month, or from months to the set of cities you visited
during that month, or any other such function.26
In general, then, we want a semantic explanation and not a pragmatic one. The (st, t)
meaning will need to derive from some contribution of the denotation of the modification (or of
the structure itself), a contribution absent from those modifications which do not turn DPs into
CQs. So let us consider which modifications these are. (71) shows that relative clauses and
superlatives create CQs; (70) shows that prepositional phrases and possessives do not.
Adjectives without superlative morphology, such as large in (70b), also seem not to
produce CQ meanings. In fact, the data with adjectives is somewhat complicated by a difference,
discovered by Bolinger (1967), between prenominal and postnominal adjectives. The following
scenario illustrates a striking example of the contrast.
(72) Kim and Sandy are working on a project together, under the direction of Sam.
Kim is a fine, upstanding person who never forgets deadlines and is wholly
reliable. Sandy is much more absent-minded and is prone to carelessness. While
walking together to their office, Sandy tripped and spilled a box of papers, which
got wet, torn, and generally mutilated. Gathering up the papers, they continued to
the office and left the papers on a table, where Sam saw them. At that point...
a. Sam yelled at the responsible person.
b. Sam yelled at the person responsible.
The sentence in (72a) asserts that Sam yelled at Kim, who is the responsible person;
prenominally, responsible can only mean "reliable". 27 On the other hand, the sentence in (72b)
asserts that Sam yelled at Sandy, who is the person responsible; postnominally, responsible can
only mean "to blame for".
The sentences in (72) are part of a more general paradigm, in which an adjective used
prenominally expresses, informally speaking, a permanent property, and used postnominally
expresses a temporary property. Thus, being responsible is a long-term fact about Kim, whereas
being responsible is true of Sandy only in this particular situation. This distinction becomes even
more apparent when one compares pre- and post-nominal uses of the same sense of a single
adjective. Thus, the determiner phrase in (73a) refers to the rivers that one can, generally
speaking, navigate (and when it is the subject of include the Volga, the proposition asserts that
the Volga is such a river); the determiner phrase in (73b) denotes those rivers that can be
navigated at the moment-those that, in addition to being generally navigable are not currently
flooded, frozen over, etc.
(73) a. the navigable rivers (include the Volga)
b. the rivers navigable (include the Volga)
26 These mappings could conceivably derive from focus placed on the appropriate lexical item--city [you]F
visited last month might be a mapping from individuals to the cities they visited last month--but the CQ
interpretations of these DPs do not require any such focus.
27 To some degree, (72a) has a reading on which the responsible person refers to Sandy. The availability of
this reading will be explained in footnote 28 on page 117.
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Further evidence for this distinction comes from the acceptability of (74a), with a stage-level
adjective after the noun, and the unacceptability of (74b), with an individual-level adjective after
the noun.28
(74) a. the children sick
b. #the children tall
For our purposes, the distinction between pre- and postnominal modification is relevant
because, while prenominal adjectives do not turn NRNs into CQs, postnominal adjectives can.
(75) a. #Sam wanted to know the responsible person.
b. Sam wanted to know the person responsible.
Following the scenario above, (75a) cannot be used to mean "Sam wanted to know who the
responsible person was (and it was Kim)", though this meaning would fit the situation (if for
instance Sam wanted to know who could be trusted to repair the damage done). However, (75b)
does mean that "Sam wanted to know who the person responsible was (and it was Sandy)". So
postnominal modification with an adjective is one way to turn a non-relational noun into a CQ.
Given these distinct methods of forming a CQ from an NRN (postnominal adjectives,
relative clauses, superlatives), none of which rely on the pragmatics discussed at the start of this
subsection, we need to find a way to derive propositional meanings from the denotations and
compositional principles. For instance, we could shift the entire NP if we could find a
distinction--one not opaque at the NP level-between a bare noun like city, which cannot be
shifted, and a modified noun like city you visited last month, which can. Or we could try to find a
way to shift the denotation of the noun itself to something that yields a proposition, if the shift
were only completed by appropriate modification.
4.3.2.2. The semantic ramifications
Instead, I believe that the simplest solution is to have the modifier itself perform the shift. That
is, while modifiers-adjectives and relative clauses-usually denote a set of individuals and
28 We also have the judgments in (i). The former DP denotes the subset of "navigable rivers" (rivers that are
generally navigable) that cannot currently be navigated. The latter DP denotes the subset of "unnavigable rivers"
(those that cannot be navigated) that one can currently navigate: the empty set, as no unnavigable rivers will ever be
temporarily navigable.
(i) a. the navigable rivers unnavigable
b. #the unnavigable rivers navigable
Larson (1999) further observes that when adjectives describing temporary states can come before the noun, they
precede those describing permanent states.
(ii) a. the unnavigable navigable rivers
b. #the navigable unnavigable rivers
For this reason, the responsible person has, to some extent, a reading on which responsible has a temporary
meaning, i.e. on which it is synonymous with the only reading of the person responsible. The availability of that
reading depends on responsible going into the earlier adjective slot, and the slot closer to the noun remaining empty.
For the sake of explication, I will use prenominal adjectives only on their "permanent" readings.
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compose with the noun via predicate modification, there is an operator that turns a modifier into
a shifting operation, taking the (e, t) denotation of a noun as its argument and returning a set of
propositions. For instance, if the relative clause that Kim visited last month has the simplified
denotation in (76a), it also has the denotation in (76b)...
(76) a. hxe . Kim visited x last month
b. )ýP(s, .e XPs, . [[3xe .p = Xwl . [P(wl)(x) A Kim visited x last month in w1]]
...so that city Kim visited last month denotes the set of propositions which, for some x, express
that x is a city and that Kim visited x last month, which is exactly the meaning we want.
Therefore, we have the following shifting operation, which wraps a propositional meaning
around "P(x) A Q(x)", roughly the result of predicate modification.
(77) XQ(s, et) - XP(s, et) . P,t . [[3xe . p = XWi . [P(wi)(x) A Q(wl)(x)]] (e, t) - (et, (st, t))
Using this shifter, we can derive propositional meanings for DPs like the city you visited last
month or the biologist who teaches at USNDH without assigning any meaning other than the
lexical (e, t) meaning to the NRNs at their heads.
Portner and Zanuttini (2005) independently reach a similar conclusion about nominal
exclamatives such as The strange things he says!, which they argue to be syntactically DPs with
clause-like semantics, whether used as matrix or embedded exclamatives. They interpret these
exclamatives with a morpheme very much like the one in (77)-in fact, barring notational
variation, the formula in their (34a) differs from the one independently derived here only by the
inclusion of factivity (a sensible inclusion, as all exclamatives are factive).2 9
Portner and Zanuttini assign this shifting operation as the meaning of the wh-word, rather
than including it as a separate element in the derivation; I hesitate to do so. Certainly, placing the
shifting operation into the relative clause morphology would explain why a relative clause (like
you visited last month) can shift an NRN into a set of propositions, while a prepositional phrase
(like in Vermont cannot). However, other forms of nominal modification also license this shift,
even without relative clause morphology: for instance, the superlative in (71b), Tell me
Vermont's largest city, turns the otherwise non-CQ Vermont's large city into a CQ.
For CQs, we could adopt the analysis that the shifting operation above is part of the
relative clause morphology, and find other methods of deriving CQ meanings for other forms of
modification. It's plausible, for example, that superlative morphology genuinely does add an
extra argument, so that an NP like largest city has an (e, et) denotation that maps places to the
singleton sets containing their largest cities, and this (e, et) argument can undergo the same
shifting operations as those that have the type lexically. On the other hand, we will see evidence
in the next chapter that suggests the need to reserve some semantic type to only relational nouns,
which suggests that (e, et) denotations for superlatives may not be correct.
29 In general, their discussion of CEs, when compared to the discussion here of CQs, underscores how
similar the two are. For instance, they use the term "nominal exclamatives" to distinguish the exclamatives they
discuss, which can be used as matrix exclamations, from the "concealed exclamatives" discussed by Grimshaw,
such as the one in John couldn't believe the height of the building, which cannot. I suspect that CEs which can be
used only in embedded contexts are exactly those with RNs like height, as opposed to NRNs like thing, though
exploring this suspicion will once again take us beyond the scope of this dissertation.
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To find a unified semantic categorization of which nominal modification can create a CQ,
I think the most promising starting point is offered by the distinction between prenominal and
postnominal adjectives, namely that the former denote permanent (i.e. stage-level) properties
while the latter denote temporary (i.e. individual-level) properties. Judgments vary somewhat on
whether a DP with a relative clause providing an individual-level property (e.g. the person who's
(always so) responsible) can be used as a CQ. If it cannot, using the stage/individual-level
distinction seems even more likely to be correct, and there is enough uncertainty about such
examples to warrant further consideration. On the other hand, a relative clause like that Kim
visited in June 2005 (i.e. the familiar that you visited last month, but with the indexicality
removed) is fairly static, not something that changes over time, and thus seems less likely to
provide an individual-level property.
A related approach involves events. If, as Larson (1999 inter alia) suggests, a
postnominal adjective makes reference to an event, the same might be true of certain relative
clauses. Thus, that Kim visited contains a reference to an event of visiting, and who is
responsible for this refers to a specific event at which someone has the "responsible" property,
whereas who is always so responsible refers to no single event, or has a generic operator binding
the event (so that it means something like "in most events/situations e, x is responsible in e").
This latter possibility, however, seems incompatible with a sentence like
(78) I can't remember the city John visits when he's in Europe.
which seems fine with a CQ meaning (I can't remember which city John visits...), even though
the relative clause exhibits the classic case of a generically bound event ("Generally, in events e
which are events in which John visits Europe, John visits city x").
Neither of these approaches applies to superlatives (or the related modifier favorite) in an
obvious way. In general, one thinks of a superlative as a fairly stable property of something; but
at the same time superlatives exhibit context-dependence, so it's not unreasonable to think of,
e.g., the tallest mountain as denoting different mountains at different times/events/etc. Favorite
does not vary so easily; though John might change his mind, John's favorite x doesn't typically
vary across events. (It might vary, of course: John's favorite musical artist depends on his mood
is a perfectly sensible description of John if he always listens to Pink Floyd when depressed and
Britney Spears when cheerful. But it needn't.)
Essentially, a complete understanding of which modifiers can become functions that turn
sets of individuals into sets of propositions must await a more thorough analysis of the semantics
of these modifiers. Whatever attribute of a modifier turns out to license this change, however, we
can at least take the shifting operation in (77) as providing us with a method of building
concealed questions from nonrelational nouns.
4.4. Summary
This chapter has provided a complete set of mechanisms for deriving individual concept
meanings and concealed question meanings for the range of DPs that exhibit them, while
blocking overgeneration of such meanings for DPs that do not exhibit them. While IC meanings
remain common in the grammar, they are uniformly derived meanings; CQ meanings, which are
less ubiquitous, are also derived. Lexically, only (e, t) meanings (for nonrelational nouns) and
(e, et) meanings (for relational nouns) are required.
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In Chapter 2, we rejected question meanings for CQs primarily because the distribution
of CQs can be characterized semantically in a way that question meanings failed to capture.
Therefore, our next step will be to return to that semantic characterization, to see how the theory
presented in this chapter can provide an explanation for it.
- 121 -
- 122
CHAPTER 5 - THE PCQC
We ended Chapter 2 with the Proposition/Concealed Question correlation, based on the general
correlation seen in (2).
(1) The Proposition/Concealed Question Correlation (PCQC)
In Case-assigning argument positions that allow questions, propositions and concealed
questions have the same distribution.
(2) Comparison of CQ embedding and proposition embedding
a. know b. learn c. tell d. decide e. predict f. be certain g. wonder g'. ask h. care
CQ / J / / / / * / *
Prop. V / / V / * * /
We also observed that assigning question denotations to CQs necessarily leaves this correlation
unexplained.
However, with the theory that CQs have propositional denotations, this correlation almost
follows as an immediate logical consequence. The immediate prediction of the theory would be
stronger: looking only at the compositional semantics, we would expect propositions and
concealed questions to have the same distribution, without qualification. This chapter takes up
both the qualification that the PCQC applies only to question-embedding predicates and the
counterexamples to the correlation. (The necessity of adding the syntactic qualifier that the
PCQC is true only of Case-assigning positions was discussed in §2.3.2.)
§5.1 discusses the need to restrict the PCQC to those predicates which take clausal
questions. If concealed questions have propositional denotations and compose with declarative
(i.e. proposition-embedding) denotations of predicates like know, then, barring other factors, the
proposition-denoting DP should be a suitable object of all predicates that take propositions as
arguments, such as believe. Instead, John believes the price of milk is ungrammatical. I will
discuss this in terms of Lahiri (2000, 2002), mentioned briefly in the last chapter. Lahiri's theory
of Interrogative Raising (IR), which raises question complements of proposition-embedding
predicates and leaves a trace with semantic type (s, t), faces the same challenge as the PCQC for
non-question-embedding predicates. IR will therefore provide a basis for explaining why believe
is not compatible with CQs. The section concludes by arguing that care, which also embeds
propositions but does not allow CQs, is more like believe than like know.
§5.2 takes another look at decide, which seems unexceptional in its ability to embed
questions, propositions, and CQs. However, Beck and Sharvit (2002), also mentioned briefly in
the last chapter, suggest that at least one sense of decide does not embed propositions. Therefore
we will take some time to reconsider its status with respect to the PCQC. A more careful
examination will demonstrate that decide is unexceptional.
Finally, §5.3 will take on two predicates, ask and depend, which really are exceptional in
their abilities to accept CQ arguments. The former is a predicate problematic enough for CQ
distribution that, as we saw in Chapter 2, the theory of Dor (1992) distinguished PEC predicates
from non-NEC predicates solely to account for it. The theory under discussion here must explain
why ask, though it cannot take a propositional complement, is compatible with CQs. Depend
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does not appear in the table in (2), or in the discussion thereof in Chapter 2, primarily because
questions as subjects were specifically set aside by previous authors like Grimshaw (1979) and
Dor (1992). Once depend is finally under consideration, it can be seen to form much the same
kind of counterexample as ask does. To explain both of these predicates, we will revisit
relational and nonrelational nouns, and it will become clear that, while ask and depend are
compatible with DPs that resemble CQs, their arguments are not actually CQs after all.
5.1. Concealed Questions and Non-Question-Embedding Predicates
While the PCQC comes as a welcome consequence of the theory that CQs denote propositions,
the theory also has the unwelcome consequence that predicates like believe, which accept
propositional complements, should accept CQ arguments. In other words, because the grammar
can assign the following propositional denotation to the price is milk,
(3) tpst. [3xe. p = [Xwl . milk costs x at wl] A C(p)]
any (st, et) predicate should be able to take it as an argument.' Just as John knows the price of
milk is synonymous with John knows that the price of milk is $1.99/gallon (in a world where the
price of milk is in fact $1.99/gallon), John believes the price of milk should mean that John
believes that the price of milk is $1.99/gallon, or at least that it is some price or another. Instead,
the sentence is ungrammatical.
In theories in which CQs denote questions or individual concepts, predicates like believe
are unremarkable; they simply lack a denotation compatible with CQs. We now need to find a
new reason that non-question-embedding predicates cannot embed concealed questions. To do
so, let us turn to Lahiri (2000, 2002), who also uses (st, et) denotations of predicates to interpret
their question arguments and who therefore must also explain the incompatibility of believe with
certain objects.
5.1.1. Lahiri (2000, 2002) and the Quantificational Variability Effect
Berman (1991) observes that, in certain circumstances, adverbs can quantify over the questions
embedded as objects by the verbs they ostensibly modify.2 Thus we have the contrast between
the sentences in (4), which are followed by their approximate meanings.
1 Or, at least, any (st, et) predicate which assigns Case to its object. Believe, as it happens, allows the same
kinds of DP arguments we saw with wonder in §2.2.3 (John believes that as well; What does John believe?), so we
cannot rule out *John believes the price of milk on the basis of Case.
2 Primarily adverbs of quantity such as mostly or to some extent. See Lahiri (2002) for a thorough
discussion of the distinction between adverbs of quantity and adverbs of frequency such as usually and seldom, and
for reasons to think the latter do not give proper QVE readings.
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(4) a. Sue mostly remembers what she got for her birthday.
mosts[Sue got x for her birthday][Sue remembers that she got x]
b. # Sue mostly wonders what she got for her birthday.3
mostx[Sue got x for her birthday][Sue wonders...?]
The adverb mostly can quantify over an interrogative embedded under a verb such as remember,
giving a meaning that can be roughly paraphrased as above: for most things that Sue got for her
birthday, she remembers that she got them. No similar paraphrase is available with the verb
wonder, and the sentence is ungrammatical. This ability of the adverb to quantify over the
embedded question is the Quantificational Variability Effect (QVE).
This effect does not hold only for questions and the predicates that embed them. In fact,
these adverbs can quantify over DPs as well, as seen in (5).
(5) a. The boys that live around the corner are, for the most part, idiots.
mostx [x is a boy that lives around the corner] [x is an idiot]
b. Mary mostly likes Beethoven's Fifth Symphony.
most, [x is part of Beethoven's Fifth] [Mary likes x]
Adverbs of quantity can quantify over objects that comprise multiple parts. Plural DPs like the
boys that live around the corner can be broken into parts based on the meaning of the plural, and
something like a symphony inherently consists of parts (the various instrumental parts; the key,
the tempo, the volume; the movements; and so forth). Thus, mostly or for the most part can take
scope over the entire sentence, with the DP as its restrictor.
Berman's account of the contrast in (4) treats the two questions as different semantic
objects: question complements to proposition-embedding verbs are open propositions, while
question complements to verbs that exclusively embed questions, as they cannot be propositions,
must have question meanings. The QVE adverb quantifies over the individuals in the open
proposition, giving meanings like the one in (4a). This not only gives a method for deriving
QVE, it also, by making QVE rely on the complement being an open proposition, immediately
explains why verbs that cannot embed propositions do not show QVE.
Lahiri (2000, 2002) offers a number of theoretical and empirical criticisms against
Berman's approach, which I will not repeat in detail (though one immediately apparent problem
is the need to give questions non-uniform meanings in spite of their uniform distribution). His
explanation maintains Berman's type distinction between predicates, but also keeps a uniform
semantic type and semantic interpretation for questions. That is to say, verbs like know seem to
be ambiguous between type (st, et) (proposition-taking predicates) and ((st, t), et) (question-
taking predicates), whereas verbs like wonder seem to have only the latter type; both Lahiri and
Berman make proposition-embedding verbs exclusively type (st, et), and question-embedding
verbs exclusively ((st, t), et). Berman, however, resolves the apparent ambiguity in the semantic
3 There is a grammatical and felicitous reading of this sentence, a reading which exists in many of the
ungrammatical sentences with adverbs that appear in this dissertation. On this reading, mostly quantifies not over the
question (or its answers) but over events or situations: At most events e, Sue wonders at e what she got for her
birthday. Such a reading is unsurprising-events and especially pluralities of events can be broken down into
smaller pieces, perhaps depending on one's theory of event structure--and not relevant to the issue here.
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type of know by introducing an ambiguity into the semantic type of questions. Lahiri preserves a
single (st, t) type for questions.
One consequence is that, while Berman had the set of individuals that could complete the
open proposition over which the adverb could quantify, Lahiri does not have access to such a set.
For Lahiri, the quantifiability of questions follows from the creation of a Boolean algebra of
answers, which allows the answers to questions to be separated into parts in much the same
manner as plural DPs, thus giving the adverb its necessary set. The data I will discuss in this
dissertation do not require so thorough a treatment, and I will simplify Lahiri's proposal by
treating questions, following Hamblin, as the set of propositions that answer the question. The
same basic principles will hold, as a set of propositions can be separated into constituent parts in
the same manner as a set of individuals (e.g. the set of boys who live around the corner).
Another, more fundamental consequence of Lahiri's move is that proposition-embedding
predicates can no longer compose directly with their question complements due to the type
mismatch between the (st, et) predicate and the (st, t) complement. Lahiri resolves this mismatch
with a rule of Interrogative Raising (IR). IR resembles Quantifier Raising (QR) in resolving a
type mismatch by moving the uninterpretable object to the top of the tree and leaving behind an
interpretable trace. In the case of IR, the raised syntactic object has semantic type (st, t) (that is,
the type of a question), and leaves behind a trace of type (s, t) (the type of a proposition). The IP
of the original sentence is thus an open proposition with a variable over propositions, and
lambda-abstraction over the variable gives the IP the type (st, t) as well. The relation between the
two sets of propositions (the raised question and the open proposition) is expressed by the
quantificational adverb, which therefore has the type ((st, t), ((st, t), t)).
The tree in (6) shows the syntax of QVE.
(6) Sue mostly remembers what she got for her birthday. (= 4a)
IP
CP - - IP
Adv IP




rem nire rS. .... _
This may not bear an obvious resemblance to the interpretation of CQs, which typically does not
require movement of the DP object. But consider the tree in (7a), which does require QR to
interpret the quantified CQ (as discussed in §4.3.1.3). To make the analogy visually clearer,
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compare (7a) to the pseudo-tree in (7b), which is (6) redrawn to give the quantificational adverb











mostly CP ----.. xp IP
"•ue VP
what she got for her birthday
V CP
remembe r ~....
In both QVE and quantified CQ interpretation, a quantifier (mostly, every) with type
((st, t), ((st, t), t)) takes a set of propositions as its restrictor (the question what she got for her
birthday, the derived set thing she got for her birthday) and a set of propositions formed by
abstracting over an IP with an (s, t) variable as its nuclear scope.
Bearing in mind the similarity between CQ and QVE interpretation, let us look at the
meaning Lahiri gives (6).
(8) Most p . [Ans(p, [[what she got for her birthdayll) A C(p)] [know(p)(sue)]
4 In fact, a typical quantificational adverb differs from a quantifier in just this manner, taking its nuclear
scope as its first argument and its restrictor as its second (see Chierchia (reference needed):
Italians are usually short = [usually]D([be shortl)(Iltaliansl) = I[most]([Italians])([be short]).
So the non-standard movement in (7b) is not necessary for interpretation, nor am I proposing it as such. (7b) is
presented only to underscore the analogy to (7a). (Readers interested in the actual movement and binding, i.e. that
shown in (6), are referred to the discussion in Lahiri (2000), pp. 340-342, and in particular his rule of Unselective
Binding. Nota bene: "is a translation of a" in Rule UB should read "is a translation of i".)
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Ans(p, Q) is true if p is an answer to Q (again, for Lahiri this is defined formally over the
Boolean algebra of answers; for the purposes of this dissertation, we can consider p an answer to
Q iff Q(p) = 1).
C(st, t is the contextual variable introduced in the last chapter, used to limit the
propositions in the set of answers to Q. Because Hamblin's semantics gives questions the
meaning of the full set of propositions that answer the question (rather than just the true ones, as
in Karttunen 1977), the denotation of the embedded question in (6) is the set:
j[what Sue got for her birthdayl] = { Xw . Sue got a bicycle for her birthday,
Xw . Sue got a puppy for her birthday, Xw . Sue got a sweater for her birthday,
Xw . Sue got a BMW for her birthday, Xw . Sue got a computer for her birthday,
Xw . Sue got a pony for her birthday, Xw . Sue got a Lear jet for her birthday, ... }
Suppose that Sue got a bicycle, a puppy, and a sweater for her birthday. We certainly don't want
Sue remembers what she got for her birthday to mean that, for all of the propositions in the
above set, she remembers that proposition; this would require Sue to remember all sorts of false
propositions (e.g. Sue remembers that she got a pony for her birthday would have to be true).
Therefore, for a factive verb such as remember or know, C is Xp . [p(wo) = 1], i.e. true of a
proposition p iff p is true in the actual world. The set of propositions that satisfy both p E [[what
Sue got for her birthday] and C(p) are the true propositions in the above set, i.e.
Xp [ [[what Sue got for her birthdayll(p) A C(p)] = {
Xw . Sue got a bicycle for her birthday, Xw . Sue got a puppy for her birthday,
,w . Sue got a sweater for her birthday I
in the situation described above. Sue remembers what she got for her birthday requires only that
Sue remember those three propositions (and Sue mostly remembers... requires that she remember
most of the propositions).
In the absence of an explicit quantifier such as mostly, sentences interpretable with IR
contain an implicit adverbial. Lahiri correctly hesitates to adopt any analysis in which that
adverbial is always universal quantification. That would assign the right meaning to Sue
remembers what she got for her birthday, which should only be judged true if, for everything
that she got for her birthday, she remembers that she got it. However, it will give the wrong truth
conditions for John knows where to get gas, which is acceptable in situations where there is a
place to get gas such that John knows one can get gas there, without it being necessary for John
to know every such place. Overall, the quantifier is best left to be determined by context.
5.1.2. An explanation of believe
Because IR interprets questions by raising them and leaving an (s, t) trace as the first argument of
the verb, Lahiri's theory makes an incorrect prediction about (st, et) predicates very similar to the
one made by the theory that CQs have (s, t) denotations. In particular, the CQ theory predicts that
all (st, et) predicates that should allow CQ objects, not just those that allow question
complements; Lahiri's theory predicts that all (st, et) predicates should allow question
complements.
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The sentence in (9) is ungrammatical, which in most theories of question interpretation
can be explained by a semantic mismatch between the (st, et) predicate believe and the (st, t)
question complement.
(9) * Sue mostly believes what she got for her birthday.
If Lahiri is right about IR, this mismatch should be resolvable by raising the question clause,
leaving a propositional trace, and quantifying over answers to the question, giving a logical form
like the following.
(10) Most p . [Ans(p, [Ewhat she got for her birthday]]) A C(p)] [believe(p)(sue)]
Paraphrased, that meaning states: for most (relevant) propositions that answer the question
"What did Sue get for her birthday?", Sue believes that proposition. This may be a sensible
meaning to express, but it is not expressible with believe and a question complement.
An anonymous reviewer brought this to Lahiri's attention, and he responds (footnote 10
of Lahiri 2000, p. 340):
This is not an argument against the account developed here, but an independent
question to which I have no answer at this point. Some predicates can take
proposition-denoting direct objects as well as question-denoting direct objects,
some predicates can take only proposition-denoting direct objects. I assume that
such information is present in the lexicon.
What Lahiri assumes to be "present in the lexicon" is, in essence, the s-selection postulated by
Grimshaw (1979). This brings us back to a predicate by predicate specification for allowing or
disallowing question complements. Indeed, a purely type-driven semantic solution would not
work, as it could not specify that believe has a type incompatible with an interrogative clause (for
the simple reason that know, in Lahiri's theory, has the same (st, et) type that believe has). On the
one hand, it is inelegant at best to block IR with ((st, t), et) predicates like wonder via a semantic
mechanism and to block it with certain (st, et) predicates via lexical stipulation. And, on the
other hand, s-selection will only stop believe from accepting question-denoting predicates, and
will not help with a proposition-denoting CQ.
What we need is a semantic solution, and fortunately there is room in Lahiri's theory to
use a semantic fact about the lexical entry instead of a syntactic stipulation. We have seen that
the contextual variable C depends on the embedding predicate, but not in a predictable manner;
at least some of the information for determining C must be stored lexically. If believe lacks this
lexical specification, the domain of the quantificational adverb (in IR) or the quantifier (in a CQ)
cannot be restricted, and the sentence cannot receive an interpretation.
Alternately, a few semantically oriented methods have been suggested for distinguishing
believe and know, such as that of Egrd (2004), who notes that "the fact that a verb like believe
does not allow interrogative complements constitutes a semantic puzzle relatively understudied
in the linguistic literature". Egr6 postulates the Factivity Hypothesis: a predicate that embeds
5 "Le fait qu'un verbe comme croire n'admette pas les compl6ments interrogatifs constitue une enigme
s6mantique relativement peu 6tudi6e dans la litt6rature linguistique." (Egr6 2004, p. 189)
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propositions can embed questions if and only if it is factive. Some predicates seem to be
immediate counterexamples, for which he refines the notion of factivity-he discusses tell (dire)
as a predicate which embeds questions without seeming factive, and regret (regretter) as a
predicate which seems factive without embedding questions. If Egr6 is correct, his theory may be
taken as a more restrictive version of the one suggested above: predicates necessarily determine
the restrictor C to be Xp . [p(wo) = 1], and as question meanings require the restrictor (whether
clausal, or the NP within a CQ), they will be incompatible with predicates that do not impose
that restriction on their complements.
Egr6 also notes, and argues against, theories (Russell 1918, Ginzburg 1995, et al.) which
take the that-clause objects of know and believe to be different semantic objects, the former
being "facts" and the latter being "propositions" (with only facts being derivable from questions,
hence the difference in complementation). Without in any way committing such an account, I
will note that it, too, would provide a way to restrict CQs to know-like predicates and not those
like believe, as long as CQs can be made to denote facts and not propositions in this sense.
Any of these theories resolve the problem of believe + CQ, as well as that of believe + Q
with IR, via semantic means. Naturally, each would require a more in-depth exploration of the
counterexamples and the ramifications before we could adopt it with full confidence. I will not
attempt to do so here, and instead I will end this section simply by observing that, whatever
semantic explanation turns out to be correct, some semantic explanation certainly seems
possible. We may not yet have an understanding of why believe does not embed CQs even
though their types seem compatible, but we can be guardedly confident that a semantic
explanation exists. This allows us to adopt the theory that CQs denote propositions without
having to stipulate that CQs appear only where clausal questions appear, and without further
worry about believe-type predicates as counterexamples.
5.1.3. An explanation of care
We saw in Chapter 2 that care, though it does embed propositions and questions, does not embed
CQs.7
(11) a. John cares that the time is 3 pm.
b. John cares what time it is.
c. * John cares the time.
6 See also Igr6 (2005), which recasts the hypothesis in terms of veridicality rather than factivity. In neither
place does tgr6 consider be certain (of) or estimates, predicates discussed in Lahiri (and herein) which seem to need
values of C other than Xp . [p(wo) = 1]. Whether such predicates can be explained under his theory, and whether that
explanation can then extend to CQs, must be left to further exploration.
7 Verbs of relevance other than care pattern with know, though of course for syntactic reasons a CQ cannot
be extraposed the way a clause can. Thus:
(i) It matters that it's raining. / That it's raining matters.
(ii) It mostly matters who cheated. / Who cheated mostly matters
(= For most people who cheated, it matters that they cheated.)
(iii) The price of milk matters. / *It matters the price of milk.
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Because care does embed questions, it seems at first to pose an entirely different challenge than
believe does. In fact, care and believe are quite similar: not only does neither allow CQ
complements in spite of allowing proposition-denoting arguments, but neither allows QVE.
(12) #John mostly cares who plays for the Red Sox (but doesn't care who plays first base).
(Lahiri, as it happens, does not discuss care; nor do Beck and Sharvit (2002) in their discussion
of QVE, which we will see in the next section.) The fact that care, like believe, is not compatible
with propositional arguments that incorporate question meanings suggests that the two might
have similar solutions.
Interrogative Raising, while it preserves a single denotation for questions (unlike, e.g.,
Berman 1991), provides two different interpretation mechanisms. For know-class predicates,
which are unambiguously (st, et), the semantics (via IR) relates the subject to the answers to the
questions; for wonder-class predicates, which are unambiguously ((st, t), et), the semantics (via
function application) relates the subject to the question itself. Therefore, we have entailments
like those in (13)-(14) between a sentence with an embedded question and one with an embedded
answer to the question. The second premises differ in exactly the same way the predicates differ
in the contextual variable C that they set:
(13) Mary knows who left.
It is the case that John left.
1Mary knows that John left.
(14) Mary is certain who left.
Mary considers it possible/likely that John left.
[Mary is certain that John left.
In contrast, no analogous entailment exists for wonder, as that predicate neither restricts the
propositions in the set denoted by the embedded question nor expresses a relation between the
subject and those propositions. 8
(15) Mary wonders who left.
I It is the case/Mary considers it possible/...? I that John left.
-Mary wonders....?
These are direct consequences of the two different methods of interpretation. With believe, even
if we set aside the ungrammaticality of *Mary believes who left, we have the same problem as
we do with the second premise of wonder: the predicate sets no restrictor, and therefore we
would not be able to set up a second premise.
Care is factive with propositions, so we might expect the same entailment to hold for
care as holds for know. Nevertheless,
8 It may be an entailment that Mary wonders if/whether John left (and see Beck and Sharvit (2002),
discussed in the next section, for a subquestion theory of embedded question interpretation). The entailment that
does not exist is one relating Mary to the proposition that John left. Even the apparent near-paraphrase "want to
know", alluded to in §3.2.3, produces the wrong entailment: if Mary wonders who left and if it is the case that John
left, it does not exactly follow that Mary wants to know that John left.
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(16) Mary cares who left.
It is the case that John left.
VMary cares that John left.
it does not hold. In particular, one cannot care that P without knowing that P, e.g. Mary cares
that John left entails (or perhaps presupposes) that she knows that John left; but the premises in
(16) are compatible with Mary not knowing that John left, so the conclusion that she cares that
he left does not necessarily follow. Nor can it be made to follow with any other second premise;
in fact, care differs from know and be certain in this respect, and instead resembles both wonder
(though the conclusion happens to be grammatical with care) and believe (though the first
premise happens to be grammatical with care). Therefore, question-embedding care should, like
wonder, relate the subject to the object question and not to its answers; intuitively, it does just
that.
The solution this suggests, and the solution I propose, is that care is in fact two different
predicates, one that embeds propositions the same way that believe does and one that embeds
questions the same way that wonder does. Neither sense of care is like know, so we no longer
predict that care will allow either CQ complements or QVE readings. Care(st, et) doesn't allow
CQs because, like believe, it lacks the C-assigning ability necessary for semantic composition
with question complements; care((st, t),et) doesn't allow CQs because, like wonder, it cannot
semantically compose with a propositional object.
5.1.4. Two down, three to go
We have seen, in this section, that neither believe-like predicates nor the predicate care poses a
problem for a theory in which concealed questions have the same meanings as, and therefore
should have the same distribution as, propositions. In each case, we had a predicate which,
though it should have been semantically compatible with a CQ meaning, does not take CQs as
arguments.
In the remainder of this chapter, we will look at verbs with the opposite problem: though
they should be incompatible with CQ meanings, they nevertheless do take CQ arguments. The
next section looks at a particular approach in which decide is argued not to embed propositions.
Following this, we will consider ask and depend, predicates for which the inability to accept
propositional arguments is unquestionable.
5.2. Concealed Questions and Apparent Non-Proposition-Embedding Predicates
According to the data presented so far, decide presents no problem for the theory that CQs
denote propositions. It does embed both propositions and questions, and it allows CQ
complements. (Additionally, as predicted by Lahiri, it allows QVE.)
(17) a. The committee decided that Fritz would be admitted.
b. The committee (mostly) decided who would be admitted.
c. The committee decided the price of milk.
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If there were nothing else to be said about decide, we could immediately move on to ask and
depend. However, Beck and Sharvit (2002) offer new data intended to suggest that decide has at
least one sense whose argument must be a question and not a proposition, and if their analysis of
the data is correct, we will have a predicate which composes with some proposition denotations
(i.e. CQs) but not others (i.e. clausal propositions). This section begins with a brief overview of
their theory and presents their data and conclusions; subsequently, we will see that their data
does not actually require a non-proposition-embedding decide.
5.2.1. The challenge from Beck and Sharvit (2002)
Beck and Sharvit (henceforth B&S) challenge Lahiri's theory of Interrogative Raising and
suggest that adverbs which exhibit QVE quantify not over the propositional answers to the
embedded question, but over subquestions of the question. Using Lahiri's example, Sue mostly
remembers what she got for her birthday, B&S assign the sentence the meaning:
(18) Most Q . [Q e Part([[iwhat she got for her birthdayl) ] [know(Q)(sue)]
where Part(Question) is a set of subquestions of Question-in particular, the set of whether
questions whose answers determine an answer to the question. For what Sue got for her birthday,
the set will be the denotations of the questions whether Sue got a bicycle for her birthday,
whether Sue got a puppy for her birthday, whether Sue got a Lear jet for her birthday, and so on.
In B&S's theory, know does compose directly with an object of type (st, t). Of course,
they require a variant of know that composes with propositions, so for know-and most other
predicates-the proposed correlation between embedding propositions and embedding CQs can
be maintained regardless of whether Lahiri or B&S are correct about QVE.
However, they do observe two points of data concerning verbs compatible with QVE but
not with propositional meanings. Because these verbs also allow CQs as arguments, the
challenge for Lahiri's theory of IR extends to the proposal that CQs are propositions. B&S's first
point concerns verbs of dependency, which can have questions but not propositions as subjects,
but nevertheless allow QVE, as seen in (19b) (= B&S's (20)/(21b)).
(19) a. * That John will be admitted depends exclusively on this committee.
b. For the most part, who will be admitted depends exclusively on this committee. (=
For most people, it depends exclusively on this committee whether they will be
admitted.)
Again, as CQs also appear to be legitimate subjects for depend,
(20) The price of milk depends exclusively on the decisions of the Dairy Council.
a defense of propositional meanings for CQs must explain how they can be compatible with
depend. Let us set this issue aside for the time being and return to it in the final section of the
chapter, when we discuss ask.
This brings us to decide. We saw that it appears to present no trouble for either Lahiri's
theory or for the theory of CQs as propositions. But B&S observe that it seems to have different
senses when embedding propositions and questions. In sentences like the ones in (17), this is not
necessarily apparent. However, when decide is used with the simple present with a generic
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meaning (i.e. what B&S call "generic tense" on page 112), a proposition seems anomalous,
though a question does not.
(21) a. ?The committee decides that Fritz will be admitted.
b. The committee decides who will be admitted. (= B&S (26))
And decide with a proposition does not adequately paraphrase QVE with generic decide, unlike
decide with a whether-question:
(22) a. The committee mostly decides which candidates will be admitted.
b. = For most candidates, the committee decides whether they will be admitted.
c. #For most candidates, the committee decides that they will be admitted.
or For most candidates that will be admitted, the committee decides that...
(=B&S (25), (27), emphasis added)
B&S demonstrate (in §3.2 of their paper) that the paraphrase in (22c) is inadequate as a result of
the exhaustivity of the embedded question. Pragmatically, decide often requires strong
exhaustivity-the subject of decide must not only choose which answers to the complement
question will be made true, but must actively reject the other possibilities. In the case of deciding
who will be admitted, for instance, the subject typically must make a decision for each candidate
x, regardless of whether that x will be admitted is true or false. In the paraphrases in (22), using a
whether-question allows quantification over the entire set of candidates, giving a strongly
exhaustive meaning, while the paraphrase with that they will be admitted does not cover the set
properly: quantifying over most candidates that will be admitted means that the rejected
candidates aren't included in the decision, which provides only a weakly exhaustive answer to
the question and not the strongly exhaustive answer preferred by decide.9
The concern of B&S that Lahiri (2000) "counts atomic parts of complete answers to a
question, and for the Ans-strg [i.e. strongly exhaustive] interpretation would need to count
atomic parts of Ans-strg instead of (as in his theory) Ans-wk" (p. 120) is entirely valid.
Fortunately, Lahiri (2002, §3.6) shows that the theory of Interrogative Raising can do exactly
this. Consequently, the proper paraphrase for The committee mostly decides which candidates
will be admitted is For most propositions p of the form "that candidate x will be admitted", the
committee will decide p or -p (as appropriate).
So as it happens, decide does not provide evidence for or against either Lahiri's or B&S's
theory; the correct meaning for decide with QVE can be derived in both. But our real concern
here is not QVE but CQs, and if the above data demonstrates, as B&S suggest, "a semantic
9 Beck and Sharvit offer the following (example 49, cited to Irene Heim, p.c.):
(i) On Monday we mostly decide who won't be accepted. On Wednesday we mostly decide who will be
accepted.
In this context, the embedded questions must have a weakly exhaustive reading: on Monday, the decisions made by
the committee are (mostly) the propositions of the form that x won't be accepted that they want to be true, but the
committee does not have to decide on Monday that all other propositions of this form will not be true; similarly for
Wednesday. In fact, for the sentence in (i), propositional paraphrases like the one in (22c) are entirely correct: for
most candidates who won 't be accepted, we decide on Monday that they won't be accepted; for most candidates who
will be accepted, we decide on Wednesday that they will be accepted.
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difference between proposition embedding decide vs. question embedding decide" (p. 112), then
decide should fail to accept CQ objects for exactly the reasons that the non-CQ-embedding care
does, as described in the previous section. That is to say, because care has distinct proposition
embedding and question embedding senses, it is not compatible with CQs; if decide also has two
distinct senses of this sort, then it, too, should not be able to embed CQs. Nevertheless, it can.
Moreover, though B&S do not discuss CQs, a propositional paraphrase for an embedded
CQ on analogy with (22) also seems inadequate.
(23) a. The Council decides the price of milk.
b. =The Council decides what the price of milk will be.
c. #The Council decides that the price of milk will be $1.99/gallon.
The exhaustivity explanation used above does not work here: (23c) implicates that, for all prices
that are not $1.99/gallon, the Council does not decide that the price of milk will be that price
(unlike the explicit quantification over most students who were admitted, which if anything
implicates that the committee did not make the decisions for the other students). We might
therefore conclude that a CQ object of decide must have a question meaning and not a
propositional meaning.
The next subsection will explain the felicity contrast in (21) in terms of independent facts
about the simple present, thereby eliminating the need to postulate separate proposition- and
question-embedding senses of decide. The subsection following will explain the inadequacy of
the paraphrase in (23) in terms of independent facts about world-dependency and question
interpretation.
5.2.2. One decide or two?
Before explaining the data given in the previous section, we should note that decide does in fact
have at least two senses, though not necessarily the different senses suggested by Beck and
Sharvit.
(24) a. The committee decided that Fritz would be admitted to USNDH.
b. #The committee decided that Fritz had been admitted to USNDH.
c. The committee decided whether Fritz would be admitted to USNDH.
d. The committee decided the price of milk.
(25) a. Fritz decided that he would be admitted to USNDH.
b. Fritz decided that he had been admitted to USNDH.
c. #Fritz decided whether he would be admitted to USNDH.
d. # Fritz decided the price of milk.
The decide of (25) has a sense of deduction-Fritz drew the conclusion from the evidence (or
possibly just from wishful thinking) that he would be admitted. This sense does not allow
questions or CQs; it is compatible with a complement whose time precedes the decision time; it
sets no requirement on the subject's relation to the complement true; and it is not at all factive (as
Fritz can draw any conclusion he likes without that conclusion necessarily being true). In
contrast, the decide of (24) has the sense of choosing, of making a decision-the committee
chose that Fritz would be admitted, who would be admitted, or what the price of milk would be.
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This sense of decide allows propositions, interrogatives, and concealed questions; the time of its
complement must follow the decision time; it requires that the subject has the power to make the
complement true; and it is factive.' 0
As a brief digression: these latter two facts about the come-to-a-decision sense of decide
recall Copley (2002), who discusses a number of different future-oriented sentences:
(26) a. Simple futurate: Sandy leaves tomorrow.
b. Progressive futurate: Sandy is leaving tomorrow.
c. Future: Sandy will leave tomorrow.
d. Progressive future: Sandy is going to leave tomorrow.
She analyzes all four as presupposing the existence of a director: an individual or force with the
power and the desire to bring about the event. In general, the director of a future-oriented
proposition need not be syntactically determined; thus, Sandy might be the director of the
sentences in (26) if she has determined the plan for her to leave, but they are also compatible
with some other person having made the plan. (Copley's sentence The Red Sox are playing the
Yankees tomorrow shows an event in which the individual with the power and desire to bring it
about, namely Major League Baseball, is determined by context and not the syntax of the
sentence). A sentence with decide has the meaning of its embedded future-oriented sentence with
the added information that the embedded sentence's director is the matrix subject. Thus, all of
the following sentences:
(27) a. Kim decided that Sandy leaves tomorrow.
b. Kim decided that Sandy is leaving tomorrow.
c. Kim decided that Sandy will leave tomorrow.
d. Kim decided that Sandy is going to leave tomorrow.
presuppose that someone directs the event of Sandy leaving, and assert that it is Kim who directs
the event, i.e. has the desire and power to cause Sandy to leave tomorrow. The reader is referred
to Copley's dissertation for more details of the differences in the four kinds of future sentence
1O A few caveats. First, there are circumstances in which one may seem to make a decision about the past (a
judge deciding that a defendant had been in the wrong, for instance). One might imagine (24b) describing a situation
analogous to the real-life situation somewhat erroneously described in (i):
(i) In December of 2000, the Supreme Court decided that George W. Bush had been elected in November.
However, even in (i), the court was essentially choosing which possible worlds corresponded to the actual world:
those in which Bush had been elected a month before or those in which he had not. So the situation still
fundamentally involves a choice about present possible worlds, and not a choice (or deduction) about the past.
Second, decide's factivity requires an added "if nothing changes..." assumption. If the committee decides
that Fritz will be admitted to USNDH, then Fritz will be admitted, though if the committee decides that Fritz will be
admitted and then Fritz withdraws his application, or the university cuts the department's funding-that is, if the
committee loses the power to make the complement come true-then it can be the case that Fritz will not be
admitted.
Incidentally, note that the decision verb determine has two senses as well, though one is the "choose" sense
that decide has and the other is a "find out" sense. In the case of determine, both senses embed questions and CQs-
Fritz determined the price of milk (i.e. he found out what the price of milk was), The committee determined the price
of milk (i.e. they set what the price of milk would be)--so distinguishing them is less important.
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(and for a more complete discussion of directors and of the inertial modal force behind the
factivity).
At any rate, Beck and Sharvit's conclusions about a "different sense" of decide refers to a
nuance within the "make a decision" sense just discussed, so we can set aside the non-question-
embedding "deduction" sense. Now, repeating B&S's data designed to illustrate the two senses
of decide:
(28) a. ?The committee decides that Fritz will be admitted.
b. The committee decides who will be admitted.
This shows, according to B&S, that decision verbs "seem to be used in a different sense when
embedding a question than when embedding a proposition" (p. 112), which is the claim that
poses a challenge to the current theory of CQ interpretation.
But does the contrast in (28) really indicate two different senses of decide? I believe that
the anomaly of (28a) has a much more mundane source: it results from the pragmatics of the
generic use of the simple present, which requires that the action be repeated (or at the least
repeatable). So while a generic requires repeated or habitual action, deciding that Fritz will be
admitted can (under usual circumstances) only be done once. Therefore, the proposition
expressing that Fritz will be admitted makes a poor argument for generic decide, just as other
one-time events are anomalous when expressed with a generic simple present.
(29) a. #The rose bush I planted in 2003 dies.
b. #A powerful hurricane destroys the Pensacola Seaside Hotel.
Simply by replacing the unique event with something repeatable-for instance, a proposition
with an indefinite-the generic with decide + a proposition improves markedly.
(30) a. ?The network decides that Star Trek will be cancelled.
b. (Every few weeks,) the network decides that a show will be cancelled.
Though a given show can only be cancelled once under ordinary circumstances, the decision
"that x will be cancelled" can be made repeatedly for different values of x. In fact, even (28a) and
(30a) can be improved:
(31) a. Every year, the committee decides that Fritz will be admitted, and every year, the
administration overrules them.
b. About twice a season the network decides that Star Trek will be cancelled, but the
outrage from the fans always makes them change their mind.
Reversing the decision removes the unrepeatability of making the decision.
B&S, because their theory uses whether subquestions, reduce the felicitous sentence The
committee decides who will be admitted to a set of sentences such as The committee decides
whether Fritz will be admitted. One might expect, based on the above discussion, that this latter
sentence would be as infelicitous as (28a), as it too describes the one-time action of deciding
whether Fritz will be admitted. And in fact, forcing a generic reading of the sentence does create
exactly the same infelicity.
- 137 -
(32) # In general/Periodically/On Tuesdays, the committee decides whether Fritz will be
admitted.
If the generic reading is not forced and if a future time is salient, the sentence can be interpreted
with a futurate meaning of the sort exemplified by the simple present sentence in (26a).
(33) (Some time next week,) the committee decides whether Fritz will be admitted.
That is, roughly following Copley (2002), someone has a plan in which, some time next week, it
will be the case that the committee is deciding at that time whether Fritz will be admitted.
But Beck and Sharvit's claim is based on the generic reading of the simple present, not
on the futurate reading. Moreover, the infelicity of (34), which has a simple present with futurate
interpretation and a propositional complement,
(34) # (Some time next week,) the committee decides that Fritz will be admitted.
is easily explained by the pragmatic restriction on futurates that one cannot plan something out
of one's control. One can plan for the committee to make a decision about Fritz next week, but
one can't plan the actual decision. Thus, a plan which involves knowing the outcome of a
decision in advance is as infelicitous as Copley's sentence in (35), which involves planning the
outcome of a baseball game in advance.
(35) #The Red Sox are defeating the Yankees tomorrow.
(cf. The Red Sox are playing the Yankees tomorrow.)
Both (34) and (35) improve in situations where "the fix is in": where a corrupt gambler has paid
the Yankees to deliberately lose their game, or where a university official has ordered the
committee to accept Fritz so that his father will make a sizeable donation. In these situations, the
particular outcome can be part of the plan.
So contrary to what B&S suggest, it seems that there are not two different senses of
decision-making decide, one of which takes propositional complements and cannot be used
generically, the other of which takes only interrogative complements and can be used
generically. There is only one decide which, as it takes both interrogative and propositional
complements, allows QVE as Lahiri predicts and allows CQ complements. Used in the simple
present, the predicate simply has either the restriction that its complement be repeatable (as with
any generic) or the requirement that its complement be plannable (as with any futurate).
5.2.3. The inadequacy of propositional paraphrases
So it seems that propositional complements with decide really are generally possible, though
they happen to by and large not be possible with the generic interpretation of the simple present.
But in (36), repeated from (23), why does the paraphrase with an embedded proposition fail to
capture the right meaning?
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(36) a. The Council decides the price of milk.
b. = The Council decides what the price of milk will be.
c. #The Council decides that the price of milk will be $1.99/gallon.
In other words, if (36a) receives its semantic interpretation via [[decidel] taking a propositional
meaning as its argument, we might want it to have the same meaning as (36c), which it does not.
The problem here is not the infelicity of simple present depend with a proposition, as deciding
that the price of milk will be $1.99/gallon is a repeatable action.
We can easily explain the difference in meaning in light of the previous section. While
(36c) does not have the anomaly of decide with a non-repeatable action, it is true only if the
Council always (or habitually, or repeatedly) picks the same price for milk, which need not be
the case in (36a). What makes the particular propositional paraphrase in (36c) wrong is that the
proposition denoted by the CQ is not really that the price of milk will be $1.99/gallon or any
other single, constant proposition. Instead, the CQ denotes different propositions at different
times. This is no different than a CQ complement of other verbs used generically, such as know:
(37) a. Kim always knows the price of milk.
b. Kim always knows that the price of milk is $1.99/gallon.
The index-dependent nature of the proposition comes from the index dependence of the
contextual variable C. Remember that, though we generally left out the world argument of C in
the last chapter, the proper denotation of the price of milk is the following.
(38) [[the price of milk])w = tps,,. [3xe. p = [Xwl . milk costs x at wI] A C(w)(p)]
Hence, while the price of milk might be $1.99/gallon at the moment, the CQ [[the price of milk]"
in (36a) and (37a) should not be paraphrased with the proposition that the price of milk is
$1.99/gallon, but rather something like:
(39) at each index w, the proposition p such that...
(a) p is of the form [Xwl .x is the price of milk at wl] for some x, and
(b) p satisfies a contextual restriction C at w
With know, the variable represents the set of true propositions at a given index, so that the price
of milk denotes, at a given index w, the proposition which (a) expresses a price of milk and (b) is
true at w. This is a different proposition at different indices, which makes the paraphrase in (37)
incorrect.
Similarly, with decide, the variable represents the set of propositions that the subject
directs at w in the sense of Copley (2002), the propositions such that the subject wants them to be
true and has the power to make them true. Because the subject of decide may want a different
proposition to be true at different times, the CQ object of decide also denotes a different
proposition at different indices. This makes the sentence compatible with the committee
deciding, at different times, a different "price of milk" proposition. Consequently, the theory
presented here has no trouble interpreting CQ objects of decide as propositions, in spite of the
apparent consequence of B&S's arguments that interpreting the complement of decide as a
proposition will give the wrong truth conditions.
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We have seen in this section that, in spite of Beck and Sharvit's data, decide does embed
propositions and questions with equal facility, and interpreting an embedded question or
concealed question by having decide compose with a propositional meaning is unproblematic.
5.3. Non-Proposition-Embedding Predicates and Apparent Concealed Questions
The final two predicates to discuss, depend and ask, both allow questions but not propositions in
their argument positions. Both verbs should be incompatible with proposition-denoting CQs, yet
both verbs seem to allow CQs, depend in its subject position, ask in its object position.
(40) a. How much milk costs depends on how much milk dairy cows produce.
b. * That milk costs $1.99/gallon depends on how much milk dairy cows produce.
c. The price of milk depends on how much milk dairy cows produce.
(41) a. Sam asked how much milk costs.
b. * Sam asked that milk costs $1.99/gallon.
c. Sam asked the price of milk.
These are certainly not marginal uses of concealed questions; indeed, sentences with ask + CQ
are among the most cited uses of concealed questions. If the price of milk denotes the same
proposition as that the price of milk is $1.99/gallon, these facts are quite mysterious; in contrast
with decide, the ungrammaticality of the paraphrases with propositions is not an accident of
tense or aspect, but a fundamental incompatibility of ask and depend with propositions.
Faced with the claim that decide could embed CQs but not propositions, I defended
proposition denotations for CQs by arguing that decide actually could embed propositions. Faced
with the same claim about ask and depend, I will defend proposition denotations for CQs by
arguing exactly the opposite: these verbs actually cannot embed concealed questions, and the
price of milk in the above sentences is not a CQ. Thus, DP arguments of these verbs do not
denote propositions as they do when used as CQs.
It may seem strange to claim that the price of milk, which has a concealed question
interpretation in argument positions that allow questions, is not a CQ in the above sentences.
What makes this claim justifiable is that neither ask nor depend can have as its argument the full
" Ask does allow that-clauses in object position, but only those which are embedded commands or
requests, such as Sam asked that the time of the meeting be changed, and not those which are propositions. See
footnote 3 in Chapter 2.
Depend also accepts questions but not propositions in object position. However, a DP object of depend is
not really a concealed question. Consider this committee in Beck and Sharvit's sentence in (19b):
(i) For the most part, who will be admitted depends exclusively on this committee.
While one might be able to interpret this committee as something like an identity question-who will be admitted
might depend on "who this committee is" in the sense of who serves on it, though this interpretation is a stretch-
it's not the case that the DP must be interpreted as an identity question. The more salient paraphrase is that
admittance depends on what this committee decides. In fact, this committee can't even really be a CQ: Sam knows
this committee has the irrelevant "is friends with" reading, but not the "can provide the identity of' reading. For this
reason, the discussion of depend here and throughout will concern only its subject argument.
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range of DPs that can have CQ meanings. In fact, the acceptable DPs for each verb fall into
categories familiar from Chapter 4:
(42) a. Sam knows { the price of milk/the height of the building }.
b. Sam knows { the capital of Vermont/the governor of California}.
c. Sam knows { my favorite wine/the person responsible/the city I visited last week }
(43) a. Sam asked { the price of milk/the height of the building}.
b. Sam asked { the capital of Vermont/the governor of California}.
c. #Sam asked {my favorite wine/the person responsible/the city I visited last week
(44) a. {The price of milk/the height of the building } depends on a few factors.
b. # { The capital of Vermont/the governor of California} depends on a few factors.
c. # {John's favorite wine/the person responsible/the city I will visit next week }
depends on a few factors.
While know allows any CQ as its argument, ask does not; it allows only DPs headed by relational
nouns. Nor does depend, which allows only DPs headed by abstract relational nouns.
The difference in distribution may be easy to describe in these terms, but any theory
seeking to explain it faces a number of challenges. We will look first at these challenges, after
which we will sketch out a possible solution for each predicate.
5.3.1. The difficulties of the data
What denotations do we want the DP object of ask and the DP subject of depend to have? We
know the DPs can have propositional denotations; but if they did denote propositions, with a
mechanism (type-shifting, movement, etc.) allowing the predicates to compose with these
denotations-we would be left with the dual mystery of, first, why other proposition-denoting
DPs (e.g. the city I will visited last week) cannot fill these argument positions, and second, why
propositional CPs cannot do so. Similarly, if the predicates were made compatible with another
denotation type available to these DPs such as e or (s, e), we would have no way of explaining
why every DP with that type could not appear in these argument positions.
So we do not want to make the predicates compatible with the possible DP types; but we
also do not want to give question denotations to the DPs to make them compatible with the
predicates. Keeping DPs such as the price of milk and the governor of Vermont from having
question denotations is at the heart of the semantic explanation for their compatibility with know
but not wonder; once the price of milk can be interpreted as a question when the object of ask or
the subject of depend, it becomes mysterious why it cannot receive this interpretation when it is
the object of wonder.
Between the limited set of DPs which can appear in these argument positions and the
limited set of non-proposition-embedding predicates in whose argument positions these DPs can
appear, we have eliminated a large number of the possible types for the DPs' denotation. In
general, using any type or mechanism available to DPs outside the set of possible arguments of
ask or of depend will fail to distinguish between the arguments possible and those not possible.
Instead, let us return to what does semantically distinguish the price of milk from the governor of
Vermont, and what distinguishes these from the city I visited last month. Relational nouns like
price and governor, unlike other nouns or noun phrases, have (e, et) and (e, (st, t)) denotations
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available; price and governor differ not in denotation type but in the nature of their (e, t)
denotations, the former's being constant across worlds and times, the latter's being world-
dependent.
Using these distinctions, however, proves difficult. First consider the type difference in
possible DP complements of ask. While the nouns differ in type, this difference is already
invisible in the NP, a compositional step before the creation of the DP that the verb takes as its
argument. That is, while governor and city can be distinguished by type, the (e, t) and (se, t)
denotations of governor of Vermont are compositionally indistinguishable from the denotations
of city or picture (on Jordan's wall) or any other nonrelational noun or noun phrase, and the
(st, t) denotation is similarly indistinguishable from the denotation of any other CQ's noun
phrase.12 Similarly, while the (e, t) meanings of price and governor can be distinguished by their
index-independence, the (e, t) meanings of price of milk and governor of Vermont are both small
(perhaps singleton) sets; other, derived meanings of price and governor have no argument
position for milk or Vermont to fill.
Note too that simply having an (e, et)-denoting head is not sufficient to make a DP a
possible argument of ask:
(45) a. #Kim asked me [the governor Sandy met last night].
b. # Kim asked me [the governor Sandy knows].
Governor in (45a) is, in the theory presented in the last chapter, the (e, t)-denoting variant; the
CQ sense of the DP with proposition-embedding verbs (e.g. Kim told me the governor Sandy met
last night) comes from the modification of governore, by the relative clause. Nevertheless, the
(e, t) denotation derives from the relational noun denotation (via the existential closure type
shifter), and therefore this DP has an (e, et) denotation at its foundation. Similarly, the Heim-
ambiguity DP in (45b), anomalous in this context with either Reading A or Reading B, also
derives ultimately from the RN meaning.
Unfortunately, this leaves us with a dilemma: even the meanings unique to RNs like price
and governor, useful in explaining their distribution as CQs, seem unhelpful in explaining
depend and ask. I am not sure that any solution to this puzzle is a good solution; in the rest of this
section, I will sketch one possible solution for depend, followed by one for ask.
5.3.2. Toward a semantic solution for depend
Setting aside irrelevant senses (e.g. one which asserts that the subject in some way needs the
object: children depend on their parents), we will be concerned with the depend that relates a
subject question to an object question. With this meaning, depend asserts that the answer to the
object question in any given possible world is necessary and, with perhaps some other
information, sufficient to determine the answer to the subject question.
This is spelled out in the simplified meaning of question-embedding depend, adapted
from Lahiri's (2002 : 226ff) discussion of the one proposed in Karttunen (1977 : 10, fn. 6):
(46) [[depend (on)]](wo)(FQ)(KQ) = 3g(Q, Q) .Vw 1 woRwi [g(F') = K'] (Q = (st, t))
12 Though, of course, syntactically distinguishable from (st, t)-denoting CPs (in other words, questions).
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K and F represent the subject and object questions, respectively, with Qn being the set of true
answers to a question Q in a world w,: Qf = {p: p E Q A p(wn)}; R is an accessibility relation. g
is a function from sets of propositions to sets of propositions, so that "the denotation of the
question in the subject position of depend on is determined in all possible worlds by the
denotation of the question in object position" (Karttunen 1977: fn 6). The function g maps a set
of propositions which answer the object question F to a particular set of propositions which
answer the subject question K, so that any world wl in which the set of true answers to the object
question is X, the set of true answers to the subject question will necessarily be g(X).
Suppose now that depend allows ICs as subjects. This prevents RNs with relative clauses
such as the price John knows, where the relative clause forces a propositional meaning for the
DP and thus precludes an IC meaning, from being the subject of depend. For the verb to
compose with its subject, it is not necessary for the IC meaning to shift to a question meaning
whose answers would be evaluated in possible worlds. Because an IC already has world-
dependence built into it, depend could instead use a different kind of function than g to relate the
subject and object.
(47) [[depend (on)il(wo)(F(st, t))(se) = 3h .VWI woRwl [h(F') = x(wl)]
Rather than using g E D((st, t), (st, t)) to correlate the answers to the object question in wi and the
answers to the subject question in w1, depend with a DP subject uses a function h E D((st, t), e) to
correlate the answers to the object question in wl and the value of the IC in wl.
We don't want depend to accept just any IC as its subject, so let us set a presupposition
on h that only the right ICs can meet.
(48) Presupposition on h, first attempt:
Vwl . [h(Q') e y(wo)], where y is the (s, et) meaning of the subject's head noun
The A of B depends on Q asserts that the same set of true answers to Q maps to the same
individual in all possible worlds wl; the presupposition in (48) ensures that each of these
individuals is an A in wo as well as in wl. Thus, the price of milk depends on how much milk
dairy cows produce might be paraphrased "Which price is the price of milk depends....", and
while this paraphrase works for an NP that denotes the same set in all worlds, it fails for one that
does not:
(49) #Next election, the governor of California will depend on how well Arnold has been
leading the state.
If grammatical, (49) would mean that the answer to the question "how well has Arnold been
leading California?" in any given world determines the individual who is the governor of
California after the next election in that world. If we take into account the restriction on the
mapping function h described in (48), the sentence would mean that that answer determines
which (actual) governor is the governor of California. But the individual who is the governor of
California in many of those possible worlds is not, currently, a governor, and thus cannot be an
answer to the question "which governor would be the governor of California?" In fact, the only
kind of IC suitable to be the subject of depend is one headed by a noun whose (e, t) denotation is
constant across all worlds-exactly the result we want.
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For the most part this approach achieves the right results, but it is not the final word on
the matter. In §4.2.3 we saw how we might derive the (e, t) meaning of an ARN from its (e, et)
meaning, but if that derivational mechanism is a semantic operation, it would be odd to have it
apply in the pragmatics; nor was the shifting operation of such simplicity that we could
reasonably fold it into the pragmatic restriction. Moreover, the pragmatic nature of the restriction
also predicts that setting up a context in which the (e, t) denotation of a CRN is constant across
(relevant) worlds will improve it as the head of the DP subject of depend. This prediction is
wrong, as the following context demonstrates:
(50) Several friends are playing a board game in which one person, playing the prime
minister of a country, appoints the other players to various governmental
positions, including three ministers: the Minister of Finance, the Minister of
Security, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The prime minister, having assigned
the other roles to players, is left with Chris, Sam, and Alex to be the three
ministers. She announces:
#The Minister of Security depends on how much money you each bribe me with.
(cf. Who the Minister of Security will be depends on how much money...)
In all possible worlds accessible from the world described, including of course that world itself,
the set of ministers is {Chris, Sam, Alex }. This should satisfy the restriction on h, but the
sentence is still anomalous. It seems that the lexical difference between price and minister, and
not the facts of the situation, determine the grammaticality of the sentence.
Instead of using in the restriction on h the fact that (se, t) denotations derived from ARNs
are index-independent, we can go back a step to the cause of that independence. That is, we can
base the presupposition on h on the fact that ARNs and not CRNs are built from scales, as
follows.
(51) Presupposition on h, revision:
3y(s, et) . VW1 . [h(Q1) e y(w,)], where y(wl) is based on a scale.
How the latter clause is formalized depends on the exact relation between (e, t) sets and their
scales-for instance, it might be written as "...where y(wl) has an ordering mechanism".
Though more work remains to bring this approach to completeness, I believe it to be a
step in the right direction. 13
13 Another option is to change the denotation of depend in (47) so that its second argument, i.e. its subject,
has the type (s, d) instead of (s, e). Depend then expresses a correlation in all worlds between the answers to its
object question and the degree denoted by its subject DP. Equivalently, the presupposition on h could be as simple
as requiring that its range be degrees: VQ<,, ) . h(Q) e Dd. Either solution requires recognizing degrees as distinct
from individuals, a move I hesitated to make in §4.2.3 and one I still hesitate over.
There are some nouns which can be the subject of depend but which less obviously describe a scale:
(i) The meaning of a sentence depends on its syntactic structure.
(ii) The solution to the problem depends on which theory of question interpretation is correct.
(iii) The personality of a child depends on how much television he or she watches each day.
The last of these causes a particular headache, in that the DP the personality of your child (or Kim's personality)
should function as an actual CQ. Yet #Tell me the personality of your child is no good; and yet again, Sandy was
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5.3.3. Toward a semantic solution for ask
With ask, working a pragmatic restriction into the meaning is somewhat more difficult. While
depend has by its nature a pragmatically determined variable available for modification, no such
variable seems to relate the asker to the asked question. This variable, if it existed, would need to
find a type (e, et) meaning, as it is this type (and not for instance (e, t)) that is missing from DPs
without relational nouns. Compare this to the restriction on h postulated for depend in (51),
which places a restriction on the meaning of a DP; for ask, the hypothetical variable would
restrict the DP not to particular meanings, but to particular types.
Introducing a variable with a pragmatic restriction does not seem to be the proper way to
make use of the (e, et) meaning necessarily present in the noun phrase. In fact, this basic
approach-having the pragmatics check the DP's composition because it is opaque to the
semantics-constitutes an abuse of the division between pragmatics and semantics. A pragmatic
restriction may be a natural way to require the presence (or absence) of a particular meaning, but
the need for a particular semantic type should arise within the compositional semantic derivation.
Therefore, I suggest that ask takes as its first argument a noun (such as price or governor)
which has a type (e, (st, t)) denotation-recall that objects of this kind are derived from (e, et)
objects, and thus this type, too, is unique to relational nouns. As its second argument, it takes a
noun (milk, Vermont, etc.) with a type e denotation.
(52) [[ask]]w = XP(e, (st, )) . XYe . XXe . [x asks P(y) in w]
Because ask requires an explicit type-e argument, the sentences in (45) will be uninterpretable in
spite of having DPs headed by a relational noun. Those RNs have had their argument positions
bound with existential closure so that they could be modified by relative clauses with (e, t) and
(st, t) denotations, and therefore lack an (e, (st, t)) denotation.
The only piece lacking from this meaning is the role of the determiner. For the reasons
described above, the determiner is hard to place: if it combines with price as an identity function
(a strange meaning for the definite determiner in any case), then [[the price]](e, (t, t)) + [[milk]le will
give a DP, the price of milk, with an (st, t) denotation, which as we have seen should be avoided.
What meaning it does contribute to this already unconventional derivation remains unclear, and
will need further research to uncover. As with the solution to depend of the previous section, the
meaning of ask described here is not the final word on the matter, but it should provide a useful
starting point for an explanation of the rather tangled data.
able to predict the personality of her child (while he was still in the womb) is fine, and the DP does have a CQ
interpretation.
But whatever factors may be at work here, these nouns are ARNs-the sets of meanings, solutions, and
personalities is index-independent in a way that the sets of governors and capitals are not. The notion of "scale"
described in the text may need to be refined, either altered to reflect that the function ranges over a clearly delimited
set of possibilities, or extended to cover these nouns.
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5.4. Summary
When we began exploring the possible meanings of concealed questions, there seemed to be no
semantic condition on their distribution. Over the course of the dissertation, we have seen
evidence for the PCQC, given in full in (5).
(53) The Proposition/Concealed Question Correlation
A concealed question can fill a predicate's argument position if and only if
(a) the Case requirements of the position are met, and
(b) a (clausal) question can fill the position, and
(c) a (clausal) proposition can fill the position.
This chapter has demonstrated that, not only does (5c) follow from the theory that CQs have
propositional meanings, but the apparent stipulation in (5b) can also be made to follow from
semantic facts about the presence of a contextual variable common to question meanings and CQ
meanings, and that predicates which seem to contradict this correlation have other, independent
factors at work.
Consequently, interpreting concealed questions as propositions both derives the correct
truth conditions in a compositional manner and allows us to categorize which DPs can be CQs




6.1. Where We Are
This dissertation has argued for a new view of concealed questions and the verbs that embed
them. The primary conclusion is that concealed questions denote not questions but propositions
with an added question element. For predicates, this means that:
* If a predicate does not license propositions, it will be compositionally
incompatible with the proposition meaning of a CQ and thus will not license
them.
* If a predicate cannot determine the value of the contextual variable C present in
both clausal questions and CQs, it will be unable to license either: thus, if a
predicate does not license questions, it will not license CQs.
* If a predicate licenses both questions and propositions, it will license CQs.
* If a predicate licenses questions but not propositions, it may allow DPs with
meanings similar to identity questions, but the range of DPs is not the full range
of CQs.
For nouns, the consequences are that:
* There is a shifting operation that turns relational nouns into CQ heads.
* There is a different shifting operation that turns nonrelational nouns into CQs,
when modified appropriately.
* Individual concepts, although intensional like CQs and often formed from
relational nouns, are independent entities, created differently and with a different
distribution.
To achieve these results, we framed the interpretation of questions in Lahiri's theory of
Interrogative Raising, but in fact no new syntactic machinery is needed. Semantically, quantifiers
need to be treated cross-categorically, so that in addition to an (et, (et, t)) meaning, they have an
((st, t), ((st, t), t)) meaning; the definite determiner, similarly, has both an (et, e) meaning and an
((st, t), st) meaning. In addition, we have the following types of meanings for nouns, of which
only the first two are lexical types.
* Relational Nouns individuals to sets of individuals (e, et)
* Common Nouns sets of individuals (e, t)
* Individual Concept Nouns sets of individual concepts (se, t)
* Functional Propositional Nouns individuals to sets of propositions (e, (st, t))
* Propositional Nouns sets of propositions (st, t)
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We also have the following operations to derive one kind of noun from another:
* (e, et) -* (e, t) XP(e, et) · w. ),Xe. 3ye. [P(w)yY)y)(x) = 1]
* (e, et) -+ (se, t) XP(e, et). 4xse. 3ye VW [P(w)(Y)(x(w)) = 1]
* (e, t) -- (se, t) XP(e, t) Xse. x ye . Vw . [P(w)(x(w)) A R(w)(y)(x(w))]
* (e, et) -, (e, (st, t)) XP(e, et). XYe. XPst. [3Xe .p = ,wl . P(w1)(y)(x)]
* (e, (st, t)) (st, t) XP(e, (st, t)) XPst. 3ye. [P(y)(p) = 1]
* (st, t) , (t t) (PS,s.t) . pPts. 3ye. [3qst .p = Xw . P(w1)(q)]
Taken together, this provides us with a complete description of the grammar of concealed
questions.
6.2. The Road Ahead
The first question that arises for any new linguistic theory is, "Does this hold across languages?"
We might well expect a great deal of variability due to the presence or absence of any given
subset of the shifting operations. In fact, some languages reportedly have no CQs at all (for
example, Thai). Other languages have no embedded clausal questions, and embed questions via
nominalization (such as Nupe (Kawu 1999)1). Between the two, any number of possibilities
exist, and it will be interesting to see what future research uncovers.
Another question to investigate is the relation of this new theory of CQs to specificational
subjects of copular sentences (SSs). Relating the two is the primary goal of Romero (2003),
which she accomplishes by giving individual concept meanings to both. Thus, Romero's use of
ICs gives (1) the rough meaning "the value in wo of the IC the number of planets is nine".2
(1) The number of planets is nine.
By using ICs for both SSs and CQs, Romero captures the fact that SSs show the same ambiguity
as the one Heim observed for CQs. Hence the bracketed DP in (2) can be the subject of (2a), in
which case it denotes, for Romero, the IC whose value in wo Fred thought was $1.29; or it can be
the subject of (2b), in which case it denotes the intension of the IC, with the sentence asserting
that the extension is the IC the price of milk.
(2) [The price that Fred thought was $1.29]...
a. ...was actually $1.79.
b. ...was the price of milk.
A propositional meaning for the DP seems not to work as a specificational subject: certainly (1)
cannot be paraphrased *[That the number of planets is nine] is nine.
On the other hand, some theories of SSs have suggested that the subject denotes a
question. For instance, Schlenker (2003) assigns question denotations to SSs while preserving
their DP status, with the object being a partially elided clausal answer to the question--roughly,
I am grateful to Roger Schwarzschild for bringing this paper to my attention.
2 Between the time this dissertation was written and the time it was officially filed, the truth of (1) seems to
have changed. This rather bothersome fact fortunately does not affect the discussion.
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[What the number of planets is] is [the number of planets is nine].3 Adapting the analysis of this
dissertation to an analysis like Schlenker's should be possible: such a treatment could give the
sentence in (1) the meaning:
(3) tps . [3,e .p = Xwl . number-of(wl)(planets)(x)] = Xw 2 . number-of(w2)(planets)(9)
If it proves possible, reconciling what Romero calls the "question plus deletion" account of
specificational sentences with this analysis of CQs will help maintain the correlations Romero
finds between the two.
In the end, I hesitate to commit to such an analysis without further consideration. One
immediate concern is that, as with ICs but not CQs, a wide range of DPs can be the subject of a
specificational sentence: The large city in Vermont is Burlington. I hope that further exploration
of the topic can lead to a unified account.
Other phenomena may relate to CQs in their requirement of nominal modification. Dayal
(1995) discusses the usage of any outside negative or modal contexts, which requires its noun to
be modified; as with CQs, relative clauses and postnominal adjectives license any, while
prenominal adjectives do not:
(4) At the party last night...
a. #John talked to any politician.
b. John talked to any politician who is powerful. (=Dayal 1995, 33b)
(5) a. John punished any person responsible.
b. #John punished any responsible person.
The two constructions do not align exactly-because of the particular meanings involved, any is
not compatible with superlatives (#...any most powerful politician). Dayal's approach is very
different than the one in this dissertation, but enough similarity exists to suggest the possibility of
a relation between the two.
Similarly, Wolter (2005) analyzes instances of demonstrative that with an NP denoting a
singleton set. Usually singleton sets are incompatible with demonstratives, which pragmatically
require non-singleton sets for the speaker to be distinguishing a single member of.4
(6) * That Moon
* That smallest prime number
* That center of this flower
* That mother of John Smith
However, when the NP has certain modification, that can be used with singleton sets with a
meaning that is neither deictic nor anaphoric.
3 Other accounts treat the subject, like the object, as an elided clause instead of a DP. See Schlenker for a
more complete discussion, which would be outside the scope of this chapter. Note that Schlenker uses the term
"concealed question" frequently, but I believe that (outside of §4.1, in which he draws specific parallels to Heim
1979) he means it in the informal sense of "a DP that has a question denotation" mentioned and set aside in the
introduction to this dissertation.
4 Setting aside emotive readings of these DPs: "Oh, that mother of John Smith! Whatever will she do
next?"
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(7) That prime number which is smallest (is also even )
That runner in last place (will be given a consolation prize )
That person responsible (will be punished )
Those students writing a term paper (do not need to take the exam)
* Those responsible people (will be rewarded )
When the noun is plural, the interpretation is necessarily maximal: those students writing a term
paper, when not referring to a particular set of students made salient, must refer to all students
writing a term paper. (In contrast, those responsible people, which has only the deictic or
anaphoric meaning, must refer to a subset of the responsible people.) As with the any cases that
Dayal analyzes, the specifics of the modification are not identical; it seems that any postnominal
modification licenses the demonstrative. But again, the two phenomena are similar enough to
warrant comparison.
Finally, references to concealed exclamatives have appeared throughout this dissertation,
but there has not been space to investigate them properly here. Exclamatives in general seem to
have a straightforward distribution: they can appear as complements of, and only of, factive
predicates, and this seems to hold true of concealed exclamatives as well. But the investigation
of Portner and Zanuttini (2005) suggests that, while the distributional facts may be different from
those of concealed questions, the internal composition is strikingly similar.
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